



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2014

<https://archive.org/details/coherenceinhartm00iino>

BOSTON UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL

Dissertation

COHERENCE IN
HARTMANN'S ETHIK

by

David Norimoto ^{TINO}~~Line~~

(B.Th., Auburn Theological Seminary, 1936)

Submitted in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

1941

PhD
1941
i
copy 1

APPROVED

by

First Reader... *Eugene S. Brightman*
PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Second Reader... *L. Harold De Wolf*
PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	PAGE
1. Problem of the dissertation	1
Investigation of Hartmann's criterion of the truth of value judgments, with special reference to the relations between his appeals to independent intuitions (atomism) and his appeals to synoptic intuitions (coherence).	1
2. Previous work in the field	4
a. August Messer's view	4
b. Werner Brock's view	14
c. Johannes Hessen's view	15
d. M. G. Walker's view	35
e. G. F. Thomas's view	40
3. Method of the dissertation	42
Internal evaluation and criticism	
CHAPTER I. EMPIRICAL BASIS FOR HARTMANN'S POSITIVE VIEW	44
1. <u>Wertgefühl</u> as central	44
a. <u>Wertgefühl</u> and <u>Wertordnung</u>	46
b. <u>Wertgefühl</u> and <u>Werthöhe</u>	47
c. <u>Wertgefühl</u> and <u>Wertstärke</u>	51
d. <u>Wertgefühl</u> and <u>Wertsynthese</u>	53
e. <u>Werttauschung</u>	54
f. The apriority of <u>Wertgefühl</u>	57
2. <u>Wertgefühl</u> and the extent of the <u>Wertreich</u> . .	62
3. Criticism of Hartmann's view of <u>Wertgefühl</u> . .	64

CHAPTER II. THE THEORETICAL CONSTRUCTION OF HIS SYSTEM	71
1. Grounds for objectivity of value	71
a. Kant's subjectivism and its two diffi- culties	71
b. Value is related to a subject but is absolute in itself	74
c. Not the material of value but the valuational character is objective.	78
d. A subject is purely receptive in intuiting values	80
e. Value offers the same absolute resistance to the will as the real object of per- ception.	80
f. <u>Wertt��uschung</u> is a proof for objectivity of value.	81
g. The self-existence of value	82
2. The systematization of values as the task of philosophical ethics	83
3. The order of the <u>Wertreich</u>	85
a. The lack of systematic structure	85
b. Stratification and the foundational relation	91
c. Oppositional relation and the synthesis of values	95
d. The complementary relationship	97
e. The grade and the strength of values	99
f. Valuational indifference	103
4. Criticism of Hartmann's system of values as a whole	105

1	THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES OF THE
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100

CHAPTER III. EXAMINATION OF HARTMANN'S CRITIQUE OF THE CONCEPT OF GOD AS A PRINCIPLE OF COHERENCE AMONG VALUES.	141
1. His metaphysical reasons for atheism	141
a. God's timelessness not relevant to moral struggle	141
b. God not objective: Max Scheler's law of <u>Korrelativität</u> contrary to the meaning of <u>Gegenständlichkeit</u>	145
c. Illicit universalization of human personality	147
d. Corporate personality is illicit	150
e. Category of subject not applicable to God.	151
f. An absolute entity excludes personality.	154
2. Moral reasons for atheism	157
a. Religious determinism violates moral freedom	157
b. Religion is heteronomous as regards the authority of values	160
c. Forgiveness of sin is immoral	165
3. Theological reasons for atheism	168
a. Otherworldliness is immoral	168
b. Divine transcendence	170
c. Divine teleology has unknown ends	171
d. Religion is heteronomous as regards human ends	172
4. The view of God which is consistent with the moral life and is not open to justified criticism from Hartmann	175
CONCLUSIONS	178

INTRODUCTION

1. Problem of the Dissertation: Investigation of Hartmann's Criterion of the Truth of Value Judgments, with Special Reference to the Relations between His Appeals to Independent Intuitions (Atomism) and His Appeals to Synoptic Intuitions (Coherence)

In Nicolai Hartmann's system of ethics we discover two kinds of ethical convictions which are apparently inconsistent with each other. The first is the conviction that ethical knowledge is revealed to us only through intuition or Wertgefühl¹ and that solely out of an immediate Wertgefühl without regard to any synoptic survey can we know anything about the realm of values.²

Wertstrukturen sind eben ideale Gegenstände, jenseits alles realen Seins und Nichtseins, auch jenseits des realen Wertgefühl, welches allein sie erfasst.³

Wie die Dinge liegen, kennen wir selbst die wenigen uns bekannten Züge der Wert-Rangordnung lediglich aus dem unmittelbaren Wertgefühl, nicht aus konspektiver Überschau.... Die Rolle des relationalen Kriteriums hier auf ein Minimum reduziert ist. Es tritt kaum in Funktion. Und--so müsste man schliessen--wenn emotionale Wertschau wirklich absolut sein sollte, so bedarf es seiner auch nicht.⁴

¹ Hartmann, Ethik, 107.

² Hartmann, GME, 542.

³ Hartmann, Ethik, 107

⁴ Hartmann, GME, 542.

In another context, however, Hartmann holds that through coherent thought a unique insight into ethical knowledge can be obtained--an insight which is beyond the scope of any immediate intuition.⁵

Die Zusammenschau überlässt der wandernde Wertblick der sekundären Wertschau, die sich geschichtlich an den Stadien dieser Wanderung das Material aufliest. Die Aufgabe der philosophischen Ethik im Gegensatz zur positiven Moral ist hiermit, eindeutig gekennzeichnet. Ihr Nachteil, ihr Sekundärsein, ihre Abhängigkeit hat als Kehrseite den Vorzug, dass sie durch ihren Umfang, d. h. eben durch ihr Nachfolgen und Zusammenschauen, etwas durch aus Neues und Eigenartiges erschaut; die Zusammenhänge, die Ordnung, die das Wertreich selbst durchziehenden Relationen und Gesetzmäßigkeiten. Für sie sind eben die Stadien jener Wanderung nicht verloren. In ihr sind sie aufgehoben und zusammengefügt. Ihre Tendenz geht auf das System der Werte.⁶

A similar conviction is expressed in the following passages in which Hartmann holds that one's Wertgefühl is so limited that it cannot always discern the syntheses of moral values, while every value reaches true fulfilment only in its synthesis with all the others and that synoptic thought, compared with Wertblick, is more adequate in grasping the entire gradational ladder of moral values, with which morality in the full and genuine sense has to do.

Dass wir statt ihrer nur die Antithetik der Werte sehen, beruht eben darauf, dass wir die Wertsynthesen zu ihnen nicht konkret zu erfassen vermögen, wie sehr wir auch mit

⁵ Hartmann, Ethik, 38, 144, 245, 267, 496, 518, 526, 527, 534, 535, 540, 556, 557.

⁶ Ibid., p. 144.

unserem Wertgefühl nach ihnen tasten. Die eigentlichen Tugenden würden auch hier erst die Synthesen sein.... Sofern aber die Antithetik der Werte sich abgestuft durch das ganze Wertreich hindurchzieht, so ergibt sich die Konsequenz, dass isolierte Werte für sich überhaupt nicht bestehen, dass vielmehr jeder Wert nur in Synthese mit anderen zu seiner wahren Sinnerfüllung kommt--und zwar der Idee nach schliesslich in Synthese mit allen.⁷

Drückt man das positiv aus, so besagt die Synthese zwischen Vorzug der Stärke und Vorzug der Höhe nichts als dieses, dass Sittlichkeit im vollen und echten Sinne es immer zugleich mit der ganzen Stufenleiter der sittlichen Werte zu tun hat, dass die niederen Werte niemals gleichgültig werden um der höheren willen, wie diese niemals entbehrlich werden um der fundamentaleren willen. Bedenkt man, wie sehr die Enge menschlich-endlichen Wertbewusstseins gerade in diesem Punkt zur Einseitigkeit neigt, wie labil sein Gleichgewicht gerade an dieser Grenzscheide ist, so leuchtet es ein, dass diese Forderung eine eminent praktische und aktuelle ist; und am meisten für den, der am höchsten hinaus tendiert, denn bei ihm sind die elementaren Grundlagen am meisten gefährdet.⁸

To take Hartmann seriously would mean, on the one hand, that ethical knowledge which is atomistically intuitive is always right and, on the other, that ethical knowledge is never right until it is tested by coherent thought. Thus there is an inconsistency between his appeals to independent intuitions (atomism) and his appeals to synoptic intuitions (coherence). Hence this dissertation aims to examine more comprehensively the relations between these two kinds of appeals, in hope of investigating his criterion of the truth of value judgments.

⁷ Ibid., 526.

⁸ Ibid., 556.

In this dissertation we deal also with the problem of belief in God, a belief which he rejects on metaphysical, moral, and theological grounds. We aim to test whether or not his reasons for atheism rest on an appeal to coherence.

2. Previous Work in the field

a. August Messer's View

August Messer, in his Wertphilosophie der Gegenwart⁹ accurately represents Hartmann's Ethik which he regards as highly important (hochbedeutsam).

As to the essence of values, Messer says, Hartmann rejects Nietzsche's valuational relativism. If Nietzsche's teaching of the re-valuation of values ("Lehr von der Umwertung der Werte") were true, we could create and annihilate them, and they would be as arbitrary as fancies.¹⁰ In the valuational domain what is invented by man has no power over man, no power to convince his his feeling. His Wertgefühl has in it something unaccommodating; it has a law of its own. Values have an essence which is independent of all contrivance and likewise independent of all longing. Indeed values are self-existent ideal objects ("an sich seiende ideale Gegenstände"); they are not actual objects. When the

⁹ Messer, WdG, 12-20, 34-39, 49-52.

¹⁰ Ibid., 12.

subject perceives them they are perceived a priori and as contents which are independent of all experience ("von keiner Erfahrung abhängige Inhalte").¹¹

Hartmann's values are ideal essences and are different from Plato's ideas which he regarded as truly actual essences ("wahrhaft wirkliche Wesenheiten"). Messer regards these Platonic wirkliche Wesenheiten as an inadmissible hypostatization ("eine unzulässige Hypostasierung").¹²

Messer points out that Hartmann's values are not formal, contentless forms ("formale, gehaltlose Gebilde") but materials or structures, which constitute a special source of things, relations and persons ("ein spezifisches Quale an Dingen, Verhältnissen, Personen"). Values are not directly comprehensible by thought; rather they are directly comprehensible only to an inner view (eine innere Schau). By the inner view Hartmann understands the valuational feeling which is illustrated in acts of attitude, approval and disposition ("das Wertfühlen, das sich in Akten der Stellungnahme, Billigung, Gesinnung dokumentiert"). That which is set over against the subject as something independent, something irremovable ("als Unabhängiges, Unver-

¹¹ Messer, WdG, 13.

¹² Ibid., 13; a consideration of Plato's ideas in comparison with Hartmann's values will appear in Chapter II, 4 of this disseratation (pages 119-126).

rückbares")--that which the subject may grasp or miss but cannot arbitrarily change--this has for him the character of self-existence (Ansichsein). The act of perceiving the values is a transcendental act and in this perception the subject is purely receptive and submissive. The values determine him but he on his part determines nothing ("es selbst aber bestimmt seinerseits nichts").¹³

Messer points out that according to Hartmann, an Ought is contained in the essence of value, but this ideal and pure Ought-to-Be is not equivalent to the Ought-to-Do. From the fact that something is valuable does not follow the fact that someone ought to do it. The ideal Ought-to-Be is the mode of being of the value. Though value and Ought-to-Be belong together indissolubly they are not identical; the Ought means the direction toward something ("die Richtung auf etwas"), the value that something toward which the direction goes.¹⁴

By means of these phenomenological considerations (phänomenologische Betrachtungen) concerning the essence of value Hartmann comes to the conclusion that values have a self-existence and over against the valuing subject they

¹³ Messer, WdG, 13-14

¹⁴ Ibid., 14.

have absoluteness.¹⁵

Here Messer completely agrees with Hartmann. "Ich glaube, dass in dieser Frage Hartmann richtig das Wesen der Werte geschaut hat."¹⁶ Messer is impressed by Hartmann's argument that Wertrelativismus does not do justice to the fact of experience that we must feel, view and think values as something self-existent and that we find them as independent of our caprice and all contrivance ("als unabhängig von unserer Willkür und allem Erfinden").¹⁷ Messer maintains that if valuational objectivism such as Hartmann's were not true, then our value experience would be dependent upon natural inclination, craving, and experiences of pleasure and displeasure.¹⁸

As to Hartmann's view of valuational knowledge (Werterkenntnis) Messer points out that Werterkenntnis is above all a Wertgefühl which is a primary, immediate contact of feeling with the valuable ("ein primäres, unmittelbares Fühlunghaben mit dem Wertvollen"). Wertgefühl has a valuational orientation of its own (eine eigene Wertorientierung). It is an independent, autonomous power in man ("eine

¹⁵ Messer, WdG, 14-15

¹⁶ Ibid., 15.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

selbständige, selbsttätige Macht im Menschen"), which is independent of his will (Willen). Through Wertgefühl numerous values arise in us, without being grasped directly by thought. Their structure becomes illuminated (durchleuchtet) only in the philosophy of value.¹⁹

According to Hartmann, Messer says, the essence (Wesen) of value is supertemporal (überzeitlich). Wertbewusstsein cuts (schneidet), from time to time, a small circle of the perceived ("ein kleiner Umkreis des Erschauten") out of the total realm of values. This indicates a narrowness of valuational consciousness ("die Enge des Wertbewusstseins"). With a growing range of the valuational consciousness, however, its intensity and immediacy diminish ("Aber mit wachsendem Umfang des Wertbewusstseins nimmt seine Intensität und Unmittelbarkeit ab").²⁰

Messer agrees with Hartmann in that the element of preference ("das moment des Vorziehens") lies necessarily in the primary Wertfühlen, through which the height of a value is immediately given to us. With the belief (which is common to Scheler and Hartmann, says Messer) that the gradation of values itself is something absolutely

¹⁹ Ibid., 16.

²⁰ Ibid., 17.

unchangeable is combined the fact that actual preference in the course of history changes greatly.²¹

The knowledge of values is not valid a posteriori but it is valid a priori, independent of experience. In order to know whether and in what way an instance of experience is valuable man must have in his Wertgefühl a valuational standard (Wertmassstab).²²

Messer points out that Hartmann's understanding of a priori valid knowledge is different from Kant's. Kant could not conceive an Apriori, which was not produced by the subject. For Kant there were only two possibilities; either a value is abstracted from things (Dingen) or natural impulses (Trieben) in us--in which case its knowledge is valid solely a posteriori--or it is dictated by the willing subject ("vom wollenden Subjekt diktiert")--and hence value is not objective. Messer agrees with Hartmann in that the concept of the Apriori does not originate from the subject nor from his reason (Vernunft). Nor is it found in real empirical objects.²³ Values, even when they are objectively valid, are not laws of being (Seinsgesetze); they are not realized in all actuality ("nicht in allem

²¹ Ibid., 17-18.

²² Ibid., 18.

²³ Ibid., 19.

Wirklichen realisiert"). Hence the fact that they do not agree (Übereinstimmen) with the actual does not count against their objectivity. Thus the apriority of values hovers in the air, as it were ("die Apriorität der Werte schwebt gleichsam in der Luft"). The whole responsibility for the legitimacy (Rechtmässigkeit) and objectivity (Objektivität) of the valuational standard (Wertungsmaassstab) rests upon Wertgefühl itself.²⁴

Messer goes on to describe Hartmann's view of the system of values. Both Messer and Hartmann do not believe in a system where one value takes the lead ("ein Wert an die Spitze trete") but in a systematic unification of manifold values ("ein systemartiger Zusammenschluss mannigfaltiger Werte") without having one supreme unity. Messer refers to Hartmann's belief in the ideal table of values (die ideale Werttafel), which is united (einheitlich) and absolute (absolut) and transcends the multiplicity of historical tables of values.²⁵

In considering the system of values a relationship between values has to be considered. Hence Messer refers to Hartmann's view of the relation of conditioning ("das Verhältnis der Fundierung"). Properly moral values do not

²⁴ Ibid., 20.

²⁵ Ibid., 34-35.

cling to things and relations of things but to persons alone. Only acts of persons can be good or bad. Further, a moral relation is always a relation to persons, but it is at the same time always a relation in reference to something valuable and something contrary to value. For example, the moral value of truthfulness is conditioned upon the value of the true assertion for the other person.²⁶

Where moral values and disvalues should appear in persons, there a world of real goods must already be present, for to such goods as objects the acts of persons refer. This Fundierungsverhältnis is irreversible (umkehrbar). The conditioning value is a material of a higher axiological formation. In every other way the conditioned value is independent of it. This conditioning is merely material and not axiological.²⁷

Hartmann maintains, Messer says, that in the realm of values the assumption of a single gradation of values is not tenable. Vertical (senkrecht) to the scale (Skala) of each valuational height (Werthöhe) is a coordinate relation of various values upon the same valuational height ("ein Koordinationsverhältnis verschiedener Werte auf gleicher Werthöhe"). Thus the System der Werte is many-

²⁶ Ibid., 35.

²⁷ Ibid., 35-36.

dimensional (mehrdimensional) and the Werthöhe is only one of the many dimensions.²⁸

Messer agrees with Hartmann in that the thought that there is a united, ideal system of values ("ein einheitliches, ideeles Wertsystem"), in which we can perceive the exact place (Ort) and rank (Rang) of each value,--the thought of such a Wertsystem is not self-understood (selbstverständlich). Even if there were such a system we have no sufficient knowledge of it. Hence we cannot solve (lösen) valuational conflicts either by means of a table of values (Werttafel) or on the ground of Wertgefühl. Though Wertkonflikte cannot be solved (gelöst) they can be decided (entschieden); in other words, a person, through an independent procedure can take upon himself the responsibility and guilt. If man could solve the conflict by perceiving (erschauend) its axiologically sufficient solution, then he would have nothing to decide; he would need only to follow the perceived solution (die geschaute Lösung). The given situations of life, however, are not such. From step to step in life man must decide, without being able to solve the conflicts. Hence he must be free in the sense of being capable of a genuine initiative (echte Initiative).²⁹

²⁸ Ibid., 37.

²⁹ Ibid., 38.

This is, on the whole, an accurate summary of Hartmann's view. Messer exactly represents Hartmann's views of Wertgefühl, the Wesen der Werte, Werterkenntnis, and the Rangordnung der Werte. And from time to time Messer indicates that he is an advocate of Hartmann's ethics.³⁰

Messer fails to represent Hartmann correctly, however, in two respects. First, in describing the theoretical construction of Hartmann's system, Messer mentions only the Fundierungsverhältnis, while Hartmann contemplates, besides this relation, seven other relations which are equally significant--the Schichtungsverhältnis,³¹ the Gegensatzverhältnis,³² the Wertsynthese,³³ the Komplementärverhältnis,³⁴ the Werthöhenverhältnis,³⁵ the Wertstärkenverhältnis,³⁶ the Wertindifferenz.³⁷

Secondly, Messer fails to indicate that Hartmann

³⁰ Ibid., 12, 13, 15, 49.

³¹ Hartmann, Ethik, 500-511.

³² Ibid., 512-532.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid., 532-541.

³⁵ Ibid., 541-557.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid., 558-564.

does not believe in religious values at all and the reasons why he is atheistic.

Because of these omissions Messer fails to present a synoptic view of Hartmann's system.

However, on the whole, Messer holds to Hartmann's ethics so closely that our critical evaluation found in the first and second chapters of this dissertation may be applicable to Messer also.

b. Werner Brock's View

Werner Brock in his An Introduction to Contemporary German Philosophy³⁸ regards Hartmann as one of the "few especially prominent personalities" of contemporary German philosophy. According to Brock, Hartmann has modelled his view under the influence of phenomenology, especially in its more realistic tendency as represented by Max Scheler, Moritz Geiger and Alexander Pfänder. Hartmann is concerned with an ontology of different spheres of reality (matter, life, soul, mind) in the sense that he treats of the problems, underlying the different sciences, in their individual character and their insolubility. Brock believes that Hartmann is pre-eminent for his thorough and penetrating

³⁸ Brock, ICGP, 89.

analysis of his problems.³⁹

Brock is right in holding that Hartmann is a master of analysis. His analytic genius is shown everywhere in his Ethik, especially in his sections, "Die Allgemeinsten Wertgegensätze"⁴⁰ and "Zur Gesetzlichkeit der Werttafel."⁴¹

But all analysis must be completed by synopsis. And since Hartmann is pre-eminently an analytic thinker he is apt to miss a view of the whole, which is vital in metaphysics. Hence we have reasons to disagree with Hartmann in many metaphysical problems, to which the second and third chapters of this dissertation refer.

c. Johannes Hessen's View

In his Wertphilosophie Hessen points out that Hartmann is an advocate of phenomenological philosophy of values ("die phänomenologische Wertphilosophie").⁴² The founder of this philosophy, says Hessen, is Max Scheler. His great work, Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik, is an attempt to apply (anzuwenden) to the realm of values the phenomenological method which was introduced into

³⁹ Ibid., 90-91.

⁴⁰ Hartmann, Ethik, 267-305.

⁴¹ Ibid., 495-564.

⁴² Hessen, Wertphilosophie, 18.

philosophy by Husserl ("die von Husserl in die Philosophie eingeführte phänomenologische Methode").⁴³ The results so gained are in keeping with Brentano's philosophy: in opposition to psychologism (Psychologismus) and to axiologism (Wertlogismus)⁴⁴ values are defined as objective qualities which are comprehended in the acts of intentional feeling ("in Akten des intentionalen Fühlens). Upon the foundation laid by Scheler Hartmann builds his ethics. While Scheler holds to valuational objectivism (Wertobjektivismus) Hartmann goes further and holds to valuational ontologism (Wertontologismus): in the sharpest antithesis to every valuational relativity (Wertrelativismus) value is defined as an ideal self-existence (ein ideales An-sich-sein).⁴⁵ For Hartmann the realm of values is a self-subsistent, independent world of being (Seinswelt); the realm of values is independent not in the sense of real existence ("nicht im Sinne der realen Existenz") but in the sense of objective ideal being ("im Sinne des objektiven idealen Seins")⁴⁶

Hessen criticizes Hartmann's ethics by saying that in

⁴³ Ibid.; See Husserl, IPpP, 1-6, 48-57, 108-141, 265-323.

⁴⁴ Brightman stated in a note of December 6, 1940 that Wertlogismus means "appeal to value as a criterion of truth" and Psychologismus, "appeal to psychological method as a criterion of truth."

⁴⁵ Hessen, Wertphilosophie, 18.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 20.

it value is taken out of its context with its relation to the valuing subject. Hessen is right when he regards this as an inadmissible hypostasization ("eine unzulässige Hypostasierung"). Hessen points out that Hartmann used to hold to neo-Kantian subjectivism and functionalism but that he has reacted against it and now holds to ontologism (Ontologismus) which is equally one-sided. Hessen believes that value is not, as Hartmann maintains, something which subsists in itself ("ein an sich Seiendes") but something which exists for someone ("ein für jemand Seiendes"). Hessen regards it as impossible to eliminate from the concept of value (Wertbegriff) the relation to a value-experiencing spirit ("die Beziehung auf einen werterlebenden Geist") without destroying the Wertbegriff.⁴⁷

Concerning the problem of evil Hessen agrees with Hartmann when the latter maintains that evil is just as real as the perfect and the good ("das Vollkommene und Gute") and that evil cannot be explained away.⁴⁸ Both Hessen and Hartmann agree that a theoretical solution of this problem is impossible, though Hessen maintains that this problem can be solved practically (praktisch) since we overcome evil through moral deed ("indem wir durch die sittliche

⁴⁷ Ibid., 31-32.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 58, footnote.

Tat das Böse Überwinden").⁴⁹

Hessen's consideration of the gradation of values ("die Rangordnung der Werte") is much influenced by Scheler and Hartmann. Hessen holds that values are not only distinguishable from one another but also stand in a fixed gradation to one another. The order of values (Wertordnung) has a hierarchial structure ("eine hierarchische Struktur").⁵⁰

As to the criteria of the valuational rank ("Kriterien des Wertranges") Hessen accepts Scheler's five criteria and then goes further to maintain with Hartmann that Wertgefühl is more finely discriminating than any of Scheler's five criteria.⁵¹

Scheler's criteria to which Hessen refers are as follows:⁵²

1. Values are relatively higher the more enduring they are: 2. Values are so much the higher, the less the quality of their carrier increases with its extension and decreases with its division: 3. Compared with the values

⁴⁹ Ibid., 58.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 87; See pages 129-133 of this dissertation, where we present our criticism of a scale of values.

⁵¹ Hessen, Wertphilosophie, 87-92.

⁵² Ibid., 87-89.

which are dependent, the value which is fundamental (der fundierende Wert) is the higher: 4. There exists an essential relation between valuational height and the depth of satisfaction ("die Tiefe der Befriedigung") which accompanies the consciousness of fulfilment of value: 5. An indication of the height of a value consists in the degree of relativity to some specific valuational feeling. The value which is the less relative in this sense is the higher.

Hessen agrees with Hartmann in that Wertgefühl is more finely discriminating than any of Scheler's five criteria. Hessen points out that Hartmann, influenced by Hildebrand's theory of valuational response ("Theorie der Wertantwort"),⁵³ believes that for every value there is only one kind of emotional reaction which corresponds to its essence ("Es für jeden Wert nur eine seinem Wesen entsprechende Art der gefühlsmässigen Reaktion gibt"). Every living feeling of value is already primarily related to a scale of values. "Alles konkrete Wertgefühl ist bereits primär auf eine Rangordnung bezogen."⁵⁴

Making use of these criteria, Hessen contemplates

⁵³ Ibid., 89-90, footnote; Hildebrand, "Die Idee der sittlichen Handlung," Jahrbuch f. Philos. u. phän. Forschung, III, 1916, p. 162 ff.

⁵⁴ Hessen, Wertphilosophie, 89-92; Hartmann, Ethik, 260.

a Rangordnung der Werte in which there are three classifications:

1. Spiritual (geistig) values are higher than sensuous (sinnlich) values. Hessen says that the application of Scheler's criteria makes this evident.⁵⁵

2. Within the class of spiritual values ethical values are higher than logical and aesthetic values. Ethical values are characterized by the marks of unconditioned validity ("die Merkmale der unbedingten Geltung").⁵⁶

3. The highest values are religious values because all the rest of values are dependent upon them.⁵⁷

Concerning "die Gnoseologie der Werte," Hessen points out that Hartmann is much influenced by Scheler who maintains that the organ of valuational knowledge is not understanding but feeling ("Das Organ der Werterkenntnis ist nicht der Verstand, sondern das Gefühl").⁵⁸ Even more strongly than Scheler, says Hessen, does Hartmann emphasize the intuitive character of valuational knowledge ("intuitiver Charakter der Werterkenntnis");⁵⁹ for Hartmann

⁵⁵ Hessen, Wertphilosophie, 90.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 90-91.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 91.

⁵⁸ Scheler, FEMW, 262; Hessen, Wertphilosophie, 94.

⁵⁹ Hessen, Wertphilosophie, 96.

Wertfühlen means a beholding of value (ein Wertschauen),⁶⁰ and valuational knowledge is not a neutral comprehending (kein neutrales Erfassen) but an act by which man is captured (ein Erfasstsein). "Man ist ergriffen, gepackt von dem, was einem als wertvoll und seinsollend einleuchtet."⁶¹

In his consideration of human being ("Betrachtung des menschlichen Wesens") Hessen holds to Hartmann's ontological consideration of personality.

Wir halten uns dabei im wesentlichen an die Gedankengänge, die N. Hartmann im ersten Teil seines Buches: Das Problem des geistigen Seins entwickelt hat.⁶²

Hessen agrees with Hartmann in that since the world (Weltwirklichkeit) has the character of stratification and man is, to a certain degree, a condensation (Zusammenfassung) of the world, he too participates in the stratificational character of the world. In consequence, man is a stratified being (ein geschichtetes Wesen).⁶³

The lowest stratum is that of the physical-material (Physisch-Materiellen). It is the inorganic nature, the world of inanimate body ("die Welt der unbelebten Körper"),

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Hartmann, Deutsche systematische Philosophie nach ihren Gestalten, herausgegeben von H. Schwarz, Bd. I, Berlin 1931, 324.

⁶² Hessen, Wertphilosophie, 160-161.

⁶³ Ibid., 161.

which is extended (ausgedehnt) and exhibits a juxtaposition of parts ("ein Nebeneinander von Teilen").⁶⁴

Upon the inorganic is raised the realm of the organic ("das Reich des Organischen"). The organic contains the inorganic in itself and depends upon the inorganic. The law of the physical-material stretches into the organic realm.⁶⁵

Above the stratum of the organic comes that of the psychical being (seelisches Sein). This is essentially different from the organic life in that the former possesses consciousness (Bewusstsein) which is lacking in the latter.⁶⁶

Above the psychical stratum is raised the spiritual being (das geistige Sein) as the highest layer. It means a novelty (ein Novum) over against the psychical realm. This novelty consists of volition (Wollen), action (Handeln), valuation (Wertung), ethics (Ethos), religion (Religion) and art (Kunst). These realms tower above (ragen hinaus) the realm of psychic phenomena ("das Reich der psychischen Phänomene").⁶⁷

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 161-162.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 162.

Even here, however, the same relation to the lower being is present. The spiritual being does not hover in the air ("schwebt nicht in der Luft"). It is supported by the psychical being just as the psychical realm is supported by the organic, which in turn is supported by the material.⁶⁸

Concerning the stratificational constitution of the world and man Hartmann discovers three laws to which Hessen holds.

1. Each stratum has its own principles (Prinzipien), laws (Gesetze) or categories (Kategorien). The particular feature of one stratum cannot be explained by the categories of another stratum.⁶⁹

2. In the stratification of the world, the higher stratum is always supported by the lower.

Es handelt sich also um eine durchgängige Abhängigkeit des Höheren vom Niederen: ohne materielle Natur kein Leben, ohne Leben kein Bewusstsein, ohne Bewusstsein keine geistige Welt.⁷⁰

It is impossible to reverse (umkehren) the direction of this dependence.⁷¹ Hartmann calls this law the law of strength (Gesetz der Stärke).⁷²

⁶⁸ Ibid., 162.

⁶⁹ Hartmann, PgS, 15; Hessen, Wertphilosophie, 163.

⁷⁰ Hartmann, PgS, 15; Hessen, Wertphilosophie, 163.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Hartmann, Ethik, 544; Hartmann, PgS, 15; Hessen, Wertphilosophie, 163-164.

3. The dependence which is indicated by the Gesetz der Stärke does not cancel the independence of each higher stratum of a lower. The particular formation and peculiarity of the higher has unlimited scope (unbegrenzter Spielraum) over against the lower. The novelty which appears in the higher stratum is the independence (Selbstständigkeit) or freedom (Freiheit) of the higher category. To the Gesetz der Stärke is thus added the law of freedom (Gesetz der Freiheit); these two laws counterbalance each other.⁷³

Hessen agrees with Hartmann in that these two laws combined enable us to realize the inadequacy of every monistic explanation of the world (Welterklären) whose process of explanation is either exclusively from above (von oben) or exclusively from below (von unten). The Gesetz der Stärke is opposed to the first kind of world-view, and the Gesetz der Freiheit forbids the second kind.⁷⁴

Hessen compares Scheler with Hartmann as to their attitude toward what is called the phänomenologisches Wesensgesetz. According to Scheler, this law which is the law of correlation between act and object ("das Gesetz der Korrelation von Akt und Gegenstand") is the most important

⁷³ Hessen, Wertphilosophie, 164.

⁷⁴ Hartmann, PgS, 16; Hessen, Wertphilosophie, 164-165.

means of thinking (der wichtigsten Gedankenmittel) which enables us to infer the existence of an absolute spirit ("das Dasein eines absoluten Geistes"). This law states:

Da das Sein der Welt selbst vom zufälligen Dasein des Erdenmenschen und seinem empirischen Bewusstsein mit Sicherheit unabhängig ist, da aber gleichwohl strenge Wesenszusammenhänge bestehen zwischen gewissen Klassen geistiger Akte und bestimmten Seinsregionen, zu denen wir Zugang durch diese Aktklassen gewinnen--muss dem Grunde aller Dinge alles das an Akten und Operationen zugeschrieben werden, was uns vergänglichen Wesen diesen Zugang gibt.⁷⁵

Hessen points out that this proposition concerning the essential relation between act and object ("der Satz vom Wesenszusammenhang zwischen Akt und Gegenstand") is regarded by Scheler as unconditionally valid (unbedingt gültig). Hartmann who also stands on the ground of phenomenology ("Boden der Phänomenologie"), however, does not accept this law, though he bases his ethics on the foundation laid by Scheler. For Hartmann values are self-subsisting essences which require no subjective correlate at all.⁷⁶

Hessen does not regard the phänomenologisches Wesengesetz as unconditionally valid but finds an element of truth in it: values are relative to the spirit that appreciates them; they exist for the spirit ("Die Werte sind

⁷⁵ Scheler, Philosophische Weltanschauung, 11 f; Hessen, Wertphilosophie, 241-242.

⁷⁶ Hessen, Wertphilosophie, 242-243.

für den Geist da"). Hessen maintains that this relation of values to the spirit indicates their origination from the life of an absolute spirit. Hessen admits that here he is guided not so much by a logical compulsion of reason ("logischer Zwang der ratio") as by the characteristic feature of a deep and living persuasion of the dignity of spiritual values ("Zug einer tiefen und lebendigen Überzeugung von der Dignität der geistigen Werte").⁷⁷

There is another way in which Hessen disagrees with Hartmann. As Hessen points out, in Hartmann's philosophy the metaphysics of moral values culminates in proving that man is free and has the power to commit himself to values and actualize (verwirklichen) them. Hessen maintains, however, that exactly that which is proved by Hartmann demands an explanation. Here Hessen wonders why actuality (Wirklichkeit) at its highest (spiritual) stage exhibits the power to actualize values. This fact finds its valid explanation (vollgültige Erklärung) only in the thought that actuality at its very foundation is constructed for values ("für die Werte angelegt"), that the primal cause (Urgrund) of being is a valuational power (Wertmacht) and valuational actuality (Wertwirklichkeit).⁷⁸

⁷⁷ Ibid., 243-244.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 245-246.

In considering the problem of theodicy (Theodizee-
problem) Hessen theoretically agrees with Hartmann, though
 practically Hessen solves the problem theistically while
 Hartmann remains an atheist throughout. Hessen holds that
 we cannot harmonize the fact of evil ("die Tatsache des
 Übels") with the existence of a perfect (vollkommen),
 almighty (allmächtig) and infinitely good (allgütig) God.⁷⁹
 Hessen regards the following remark by Hartmann as decisive:
 To explain evil as unreal (nichtig) does not help us to
 solve the problem of theodicy, for by so doing we obliterate
 the reality of evil.⁸⁰ Since Hartmann has in mind an idea
 of God who is an infinite and perfect spiritual person
 ("unendliche und vollkommene Geistesperson")⁸¹ or the uni-
 versal, absolutely all-inclusive being ("das universale,
 absolut allumfassende Wesen")⁸² he regards the problem of
 theodicy as unsolvable. Hessen holds, however, that
 theoretically we cannot solve the problem of evil but practi-
 cally we can solve it because we overcome evil through
 moral act ("Wir durch die sittliche Tat das Böse über-

⁷⁹ Ibid., 57.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 58, footnote; Hartmann, Zur Grundlegung
der Ontologie, 62.

⁸¹ Hartmann, Ethik, 217.

⁸² Ibid., 225.

winden")⁸³

Hessen's contention that we overcome evil through moral act agrees with Baron von Hügel's thought that Christianity cannot completely explain evil but has immensely increased the capacity which issues in a practical transcendence and transformation of sorrow, pain and sin.⁸⁴ However, when Hessen holds that evil cannot be harmonized with the existence of a perfect and almighty God he reminds us of Kant when he wrote about the teleological argument for God:

The utmost, therefore, that the argument can prove is an architect of the world who is always very much hampered by the adaptability of the material in which he works, not a creator of the world to whose idea everything is subject.⁸⁵

Concerning this Brightman would say that here the evidence points to a finite God, yet both Kant⁸⁶ and Hessen decline to consider the conception.⁸⁷ As long as we hold a priori that God is almighty and infinite the problem of

⁸³ Hessen, Wertphilosophie, 58.

⁸⁴ Hügel, EAPR, First Series, 111.

⁸⁵ Kant, KrV (tr. N. K. Smith), A627 (B655), quoted by Brightman in his POR, 294-295.

⁸⁶ The attributes of God which Kant had in mind are allmächtig, unendlich (Kant, KrV, A595) and allgenugsam (KrV, A627) and so forth.

⁸⁷ Brightman, POR, 294-295.

theodicy must remain unsolved.⁸⁸

Hessen points out that one of the greatest problems for Hartmann is the Augustinian problem of grace (Gnade) and freedom. Hartmann's solution of this problem, compared with Augustine's, points exactly in the opposite direction. While Augustine emphasizes grace at the cost of freedom ("auf Kosten der Freiheit") and makes human causality (Kausalität) absorbed (aufgesogen) by divine causality, Hartmann emphasizes human freedom at the cost of grace, human activity (Wirksamkeit) at the cost of divine causality. Hessen goes on to say that what Augustine could see Hartmann overlooks; namely, here the problem is about a polarity (Polarität) which constitutes perhaps the deepest secret (Geheimnis) of our being. Hessen holds that we cannot successfully explain this problem in a formula which is free from logical objection ("eine logisch einwandfreie Formel"). The religious person knows, says Hessen, that religion is life (Leben) and not theory (Theorie) and that his innermost certainties will never be shaken (erschüttert) if he finds it impossible theoretically to represent the life of the holy in a conceptual construction (Begriffsgefüge).⁸⁹

⁸⁸ See Brightman's, The Problem of God, The Finding of God, Personality and Religion, and A Philosophy of Religion.

⁸⁹ Hessen, Wertphilosophie, 210-211.

Hessen is right if he means here that there is always an element of mystery in our knowledge of God and that the clearest vision is most keenly aware of the inexhaustible abysses of our religious life. And we do not take Hessen to mean to hold with Calvin that disquisitions on the essence of God are cold and frivolous,⁹⁰ or with a modern humanist that our belief in God is merely an idealistic dream.⁹¹ Hessen's position, then, is not contradictory to that of a thinker who holds that theism is philosophically well-grounded and that we must tell our stories of Him as best we can, though it may be that when we have done that silence is better.⁹²

Hessen says that Augustine emphasizes grace at the cost of freedom but N. P. Williams represents Augustine's view in a different way.⁹³ Williams admits that on Augustine's view of grace real freedom of choice cannot exist in fallen man, for his will is invariably determined by concupiscence, nor yet in the elect, for in them the will is moulded by grace.⁹⁴ Nevertheless, Augustine himself,

⁹⁰ Calvin, Institutes, Bk. I, Chap. II, 11.

⁹¹ See Horton, TMM, 44-86.

⁹² Calhoun, GCC, 249.

⁹³ Williams, GG, 19-43.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 29.

says Williams, never admitted that he had denied free will either to the unregenerate or to the elect.⁹⁵ In fallen man the will is now hampered by the tyranny of the passions, so that heart-breaking effort is needed to overcome them, and yet, our freedom is real, though limited: to believe or not to believe, to welcome or to reject God's call, is within our own power, and belongs to the exercise of that god-given responsibility which could not be eradicated from our personality without destroying it.⁹⁶

What Hessen says about Augustine is more applicable to Barth's idea of grace. As Baillie points out in his Our Knowledge of God, for Barth there is no knowledge of God except through revelation, and there is no revelation except in Christ.⁹⁷ Barth regards it as a literal truth (wortwörtliche Wahrheit) that there is a new creation whenever a man comes to be in Christ.⁹⁸ Man had once been created in the image of God but this image of God has been so totally defaced by the Fall as to leave not a trace behind, so that nothing but a wholly new act of creation will suffice. And with the rest of his human nature

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 30.

⁹⁷ Baillie, KG, 18.

⁹⁸ Barth, Nein, 30.

his reason also has been totally corrupted, so that since the Fall we are all insane (verrückt).⁹⁹ As Brunner puts it in his Natur und Gnade, Barth's idea of grace is that of a miracle of sheer omnipotence, according to which men like stocks and stones (Steine und Klütze) have no free acceptance in the presence of grace.¹⁰⁰ "What is our sin?" asks Barth. "It is what we are and what we do...."¹⁰¹

Hessen holds that the problem of grace and freedom cannot be explained reasonably.¹⁰² However, the idea of cooperation gives us the clue to the solution of this problem.

The essence of religious activity is that it is cooperative.... It is an elevation of the soul toward God, which involves both a receiving and a response. Without experienced commerce with the divine, involving activity on both sides for a common value, there is no religion.¹⁰³

John Oman's Grace and Personality is an elaboration of the theme that no form of irresistible grace can be harmonized with the conditions which are necessary for the growth of moral persons. Baillie is right in holding that the exercise of grace always implies a certain self-limitation

⁹⁹ Ibid., 42.

¹⁰⁰ Brunner, Natur und Gnade, 18.

¹⁰¹ Barth, KG (tr. Hair and Henderson), 53.

¹⁰² Hessen, Wertphilosophie, 210-211.

¹⁰³ Brightman, POR, 435.

on the part of omnipotence, since there can only be grace where there is free acceptance in the absence of coercion.¹⁰⁴

Both Hartmann and Hessen claim that they hold to Max Scheler's "fünf Kriterien des Wertranges."¹⁰⁵ Hartmann's description of Scheler's third criterion is different from Hessen's representation of the same criterion. Hartmann states:

Der material fundierende Wert ist dann gerade als der selbständigere und unabhängigere zugleich der elementarere und niedere Wert, der fundierte aber der höhere.¹⁰⁶

Hessen says:

Der fundierende Wert ist der höhere gegenüber dem fundierten. Die Gesamtheit der Werte ist fundiert auf den Wert eines unendlichen persönlichen Geistes und der vor ihm stehenden Welt der Werte.¹⁰⁷

Max Scheler, in his Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik, to which both Hartmann and Hessen refer, states his third criterion briefly: "So scheinen die Werte um so höher zu sein...je weniger sie durch andere Werte fundiert sind."¹⁰⁸ This agrees with Hessen. Scheler is explicit: "Dann ist aber der jeweilig

¹⁰⁴ Baillie, KG, 24.

¹⁰⁵ Hartmann, Ethik, 252-255; Hessen, Wertphilosophie, 87-92.

¹⁰⁶ Hartmann, Ethik, 253-254.

¹⁰⁷ Hessen, Wertphilosophie, 88.

¹⁰⁸ Scheler, FEMW, 88.

fundierende Wert...auch jeweilig der höhere Werte."¹⁰⁹

Scheler's view in sharp contrast with Hartmann's leads to this:

Alle möglichen Werte aber sind fundiert auf den Wert eines unendlichen persönlichen Geistes und der vor ihm stehenden Welt der Werte.¹¹⁰

About this matter Scheler and Hessen are right in holding that lower values are more dependent and higher values are more independent. Brightman holds that lower intrinsic values such as bodily values are "narrower, more partial than the higher ones"; they "include a smaller area of value experience," and are "more dependent on other values for their own worth." While higher intrinsic values such as intellectual and religious values are "broader," "more inclusive of experience as a whole," "more independent," and "more coherent."¹¹¹ This insight, coupled with the vision of the uniqueness and the coalescence of the intrinsic values, ¹¹² is "the heart of all idealistic philosophy" and is "a truth which the mind must recognize when it views experience synoptically."¹¹³

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 93.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 94.

¹¹¹ Brightman, FOR, 95-100.

¹¹² Ibid., 100-102.

¹¹³ Brightman, ITP, 313.

d. Merle G. Walker's View

A comparison of Hartmann's ethics and Ralph Barton Perry's is made by M. G. Walker in his article, "Perry and Hartmann: antithetical or complementary?"¹¹⁴

Walker says that to Hartmann the kind of being peculiar to every value is that of an ideal self-existence; each is independent of our knowledge and of our choice; it is equally independent of its actual realization in the actual world. Our sensing of it is a Platonic beholding.¹¹⁵

Perry's view of value, says Walker, is that of psychological subjectivism. Value is, for Perry, a quality bestowed upon any object through its serving the interests of motor-affective life. It is purely subjective. Its source lies in the desires and interests of the subject.¹¹⁶

Walker points out that for Hartmann the nature of the moral obligation follows directly from his conception of the objective sphere of value itself. The actual world is in a state of tension--tension between the ideal ought-to-be and a negative disvalue. Man's dignity is that he is a mediator between the ideal and the real.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁴ Ethics, 49 (October, 1938), 37-61.

¹¹⁵ Walker, Art. 1, 39.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 39.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 41.

According to Perry, the moral values in contrast to "simple values"¹¹⁸ are those values which contribute creatively to the "massive satisfactions of a world of interested persons,"¹¹⁹ but the simple value may lead only to the "trivial satisfaction of a single individual need."¹²⁰

For both Perry and Hartmann the moral situation is set against and in contrast to a mechanistic and ethically indifferent background. Man alone is purposive. Nature is completely careless of value.¹²¹

For Hartmann the higher moral principle is always the more conditioned; the lower is always the more unconditioned.¹²² For Perry also, the relation of the lower to the higher value is that of means to end; but the higher values are more universal than the lower in that they surpass them in validity and are entitled to preference.¹²³

The deepest similarity between the two systems, says Walker, is the agreement on the function of an individual as a carrier of ideals. For Hartmann it is intuitive

¹¹⁸ Ibid., 44.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Ibid., 51.

¹²² Hartmann, Ethik, 157.

¹²³ Walker, Art. 1, 54.

awareness of values¹²⁴ that urges the moral agent to objectify them; for Perry it is the eagerness of life itself that pushes forward to more and more massive interests.¹²⁵

Walker maintains that in their conceptions of moral character there is a difference of emphasis. For Perry man's highest moral efficacy lies in the great consequences of his choice--their congruity with the universal realms of interest. For Hartmann the important values are those incidental but supremely significant moral values which are by-products of conscious and directed actions.¹²⁶

In organizing the value hierarchy, Perry's emphasis is purely quantitative. The final aim of an economy of interests lies in that universal system in which all interests are satisfied in a system of inclusiveness.¹²⁷ For Hartmann the solution is qualitative. The valuational scheme does not ascend in a single series. Values are different qualitatively as well as in the relative spread of their effects. Here Walker holds to Hartmann's view and rejects Perry's.¹²⁸

¹²⁴ By this phrase we understand Hartmann's phrase Wertgefühl.

¹²⁵ Walker, Art. 1, 54.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Ibid., 56.

¹²⁸ Ibid., 57.

Walker maintains that Perry alone, among all ethicists, has given to value a generic sense that bears the scrutiny of analysis, in that Perry has given to ethics the essential concept of interest; thus Perry has avoided that path usually taken by those who seek a generic definition--a summum bonum--and has discovered what truly makes values values. No such satisfactory meaning can be discovered in Hartmann's ethics, says Walker.¹²⁹

Walker sees an element of truth in both Perry's subjectivism and Hartmann's objectivism, for values are subjective in that they are all objects of concern but they are objective in the sense of dictating imperatives to the will.¹³⁰

Walker's article shows successfully that both Hartmann's view and Perry's are inadequate in at least one respect. They have a purely mechanistic view of nature. The existence of values in human life is hard to explain if the universe itself is entirely indifferent to value. On these two views our value experience is "an incoherent item of worth" in a worthless world. In such a world there is something miraculous about the rise of value and if there is an adequate way of describing reality that can include the

¹²⁹ Ibid., 58.

¹³⁰ Ibid., 60.

facts of nature and of value in a more reasonable world-view, reason would compel us to say that the more reasonable view is more probably true.¹³¹ Our second and third chapters will deal with this problem in detail.

Perry's view may be reduced ultimately to the proposition that nothing more than a relation to the feeling of the moment is recognized as entering into value experience. However, he has an ideal criterion of value which is inclusiveness. And about an atomistically intuitive theory of value which associates goodness with agreeable feeling¹³² he says:

The most serious defect of this type of theory is its failure to provide any systematic principle whatever. There are as many indefinable values as there are feeling attitudes, and since these are to be regarded as objective qualities rather than as modes of feeling, there is nothing to unite them, not even the principle of feeling.¹³³

Perry holds that the greatest good is the object of an all-inclusive and harmonious system of interests.¹³⁴ Thus even a subjectivist like Perry stresses the necessity of system in ethics.

Walker holds that Perry has given to ethics the

¹³¹ See Brightman, ITP, 161.

¹³² Perry, GTV, 32-34.

¹³³ Ibid., 34.

¹³⁴ Ibid., 659.

essential concept of interest, thus avoiding a summum bonum.¹³⁵ It is true that value experience in its simplest form is interest (without ideals)--liking, approval or value-claim. In this Perry and Walker and Brightman agree.¹³⁶ But Walker errs in holding that Perry avoids a summum bonum. The "moral economy,"¹³⁷ the most inclusive system of interests (inclusiveness being the ideal criterion), is Perry's summum bonum.

e. George F. Thomas's View

G. F. Thomas criticizes Hartmann for analysing love into three different kinds--love of neighbor, love of the remote and personal love.¹³⁸ Thomas claims that Hartmann conceives them as so antithetical that he is unable to bring them into fruitful relation with one another. Thomas attributes this to Hartmann's almost exclusive use of the analytical method. Thomas holds that Hartmann's use of analysis to separate completely three different kinds of love leads him to find irreconcilable antimonies where there are only distinctions, essences opposed to one

¹³⁵ Walker, WdG, 58.

¹³⁶ See Brightman, POR, 88.

¹³⁷ See Perry, ME, Chapter III.

¹³⁸ Thomas, SIF, 62-65.

another where there are only aspects closely related to one another.¹³⁹

Thomas is right in holding that Hartmann is pre-eminently an analytic thinker. However, "the analytic method also takes account of the relations of the parts (synthesis)."¹⁴⁰ And in the section of the Ethik, to which Thomas refers, Hartmann's interest is as much synthetic as analytic. Hartmann keenly differentiates different kinds of love because he desires to make more meaningful the synthesis which is to follow. Thomas sees nothing but an irreconcilable antinomy between Hartmann's Nächstenliebe and Fernstenliebe, and yet Hartmann himself points out the following concerning the relation between the two:

Das Bestehen der Wertantinomie entbindet nicht von der Aufgabe der Wertsynthese. Der Wert der Nächstenliebe besteht an sich zu Recht und darf nicht herabgesetzt werden. Übertagt ihn ein höherer Wert, so kann seine Herrschaft im Leben durch diesen höchstens eingeschränkt werden. Seine vollständige Aufhebung würde das Leben des Fernsten auch wertlos machen, wertloser vielleicht als das in seinem Wert angefochtene Leben des Nächsten.¹⁴¹

Hartmann is even more emphatic in stressing the importance of synthesis in the theoretical construction of his ethics:

Sofern aber die Antithetik der Werte sich abgestuft durch das ganze Wertreich hindurchzieht, so ergibt sich die

¹³⁹ Ibid., 63.

¹⁴⁰ Brightman, ITP, 24.

¹⁴¹ Hartmann, Ethik, 447.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS
CHICAGO, ILL. 60607

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS

CHICAGO, ILL. 60607

CHICAGO, ILL. 60607

CHICAGO, ILL. 60607

CHICAGO, ILL. 60607

CHICAGO, ILL. 60607

CHICAGO, ILL. 60607

CHICAGO, ILL. 60607

CHICAGO, ILL. 60607

CHICAGO, ILL. 60607

CHICAGO, ILL. 60607

CHICAGO, ILL. 60607

CHICAGO, ILL. 60607

CHICAGO, ILL. 60607

CHICAGO, ILL. 60607

CHICAGO, ILL. 60607

CHICAGO, ILL. 60607

CHICAGO, ILL. 60607

CHICAGO, ILL. 60607

CHICAGO, ILL. 60607

CHICAGO, ILL. 60607

CHICAGO, ILL. 60607

Konsequenz, dass isolierte Werte für sich überhaupt nicht bestehen, dass vielmehr jeder Wert nur in Synthese mit anderen zu seiner wahren Sinnerfüllung kommt--und zwar der Idee nach schliesslich in Synthese mit allen.¹⁴²

Hartmann probably anticipated the kind of criticism Thomas makes when he wrote in the "Vorwort zur zweiten Auflage" of his Ethik the following:

Dass einzelne Kapitel ein einseitiges Bild geben, ist bei einem so grossen Stoff nicht zu vermeiden; nur im Zusammenhange kann das Einzelne seine Einschränkung, das Ganze seinen Ausgleich erfahren.¹⁴³

3. Method of the Dissertation

The method of the dissertation is that of internal criticism and evaluation. It starts from Hartmann's own convictions about ethical knowledge and attempts to discover whether or not those convictions are consistent among themselves and with his metaphysics as a whole. However, internal criticism may become dogmatic, in the sense that it may aim at no more adequate statement of a position that is essentially untenable. Hence Hartmann's point of view (or any other thinker's) needs also to be confronted by external criticism,¹⁴⁴ that is, by criticism which rests on different presuppositions and criteria and which may

¹⁴² Ibid., 526.

¹⁴³ Ibid., viii.

¹⁴⁴ See Brightman, POR, 438-489.

therefore challenge the validity of his whole position. Thus this dissertation refers to Plato's system of ethical philosophy, Sorley's, or Brightman's, as a source of such possible challenge. However, these other systems are not regarded as final truths accepted by all thinkers but as alternative views which may serve to bring out the full implications of Hartmann's system of ethics. Nevertheless, the outcome of the investigation is that Hartmann's system (and, inferentially, any system) is truer in its internally coherent aspects than in those which rest solely on independent intuitions. This result is harmonious with the Platonic-Hegelian conception of reason,¹⁴⁵ which Hartmann himself makes use of in the theoretical construction of his system of ethics.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁵ See Plato, Republic, 537 B ff; Hegel, PG, 20; Brightman, POR, 189-195.

¹⁴⁶ Hartmann, Ethik, 144, 245, 269, 496, 518, 527, 534, 535, 540, 556, 557; See pages 2, 3 of this dissertation.

CHAPTER I

EMPIRICAL BASIS FOR HARTMANN'S POSITIVE VIEW

1. Wertgefühl as Central

According to Hartmann, man's spiritual growth (geistiges Wachstum) is essentially an inner growth of his valuational feeling amid a given fulness of values ("ein inneres Heranwachsen des Wertgefühls an gegebene Wertfülle").¹ And the greatest task of ethics is to educate and sharpen (erziehen, schärfen) our Wertgefühl so that we may be receptive of the significant and lie open to whatever has meaning and value.²

Hartmann holds that through Wertgefühl alone can we grasp valuational structures which are ideal objects.

Wertstrukturen sind eben ideale Gegenstände, jenseits alles realen Seins und Nichtseins, auch jenseits des realen Wertgefühls, welches allein sie erfasst.³

Wertgefühl is the only point of contact between human personality and the ideal self-existent realm of values.

Das Wertgefühl des Menschen ist das Hineinragen des lebenden Geistes in die andere Welt; oder richtiger wohl umgekehrt das Hereinragen dieser anderen, an sich

¹ Hartmann, PgS, 145.

² Hartmann, Ethik, 8.

³ Ibid., 107.

idealen und gegen das Reale indifferenten Welt in die reale Welt.⁴

For example, the essence of brotherly love (Nächstenliebe) is a Wertgefühl of the living feeling of another's worth ("Das lebendige Wertgefühl für den Wert des Anderen"). It is not pity (Mitleid) nor suffering (Leiden) but a feeling, a striving, which approves another person as such ("ein die fremde Person als solche bejahendes Fühlen und Streben").⁵

The historic form of the current consciousness of value ("geschichtliche Form eines jeweiligen Wertbewusstseins")⁶ includes every kind of concrete ideal, every kind of reverence for heroes. Every moral rejection or acceptance ("alles moralische Ablehnen und Anerkennen") rests upon an independent feeling of value (selbständiges Wertgefühl), even in example and imitation.⁷ And the pre-supposition of our commitment (Einsatz) to any cause is the Wertgefühl of that toward which the commitment is directed.⁸

Thus Hartmann regards Wertgefühl as central in his ethics. It is the empirical basis for his positive view.

⁴ Hartmann, PgS, 138.

⁵ Hartmann, Ethik, 413.

⁶ Ibid., 119.

⁷ Ibid., 116.

⁸ Ibid., 533.

a. Wertgefühl and Wertordnung

Hartmann believes that every morally selective consciousness of value ("alles sittlich seligierende Wertbewusstsein") is necessarily a consciousness of gradation ("ein Bewusstsein der Rangordnung").⁹ The phenomena of valuational feeling which are to be analysed ("die zu analysierenden Phänomene des Wertgefühls") furnish us with the single assured landmarks which we have ("die einzigen sicheren Anhaltspunkte, die wir haben"); they contain implicitly in themselves the total phenomenon (das Gesamtphänomen) of the gradation of values.¹⁰

In investigating the gradation in the Wertreich Hartmann regards the atomistic intuition of Wertgefühl to be absolutely dependable while the synoptic intuition of the relational criterion is almost useless. Because the synoptic intuition encounters the greatest difficulties, for example, even the general laws of a synoptic view ("die allgemeinen Gesetze konspektiver Schau") like logical laws are here partly adjourned (verschoben) --contradiction, for instance, which is cancelled in the law of contradiction, is shown to be present throughout in the

⁹ Ibid., 247.

¹⁰ Ibid., 249.

Wertreich: there are antinomies of values, conflicts of values, and harmonies of values, where they appear, can never unconditionally hold good as a sign of correctness ("Anzeichen der Richtigkeit"). On the contrary, as things lie, solely out of the immediate feeling of value ("lediglich aus dem unmittelbaren Wertgefühl"), and not out of a synoptic survey ("nicht aus konspektiver Überschau"), can we know even the few features of the valuational gradation, which are known to us ("die wenigen uns bekannten Züge der Wert-Rangordnung"). Under such circumstances it is comprehensible that the role of the relational criterion ("die Rolle des relationalen Kriteriums") is reduced to a minimum. The relational criterion hardly functions ("es tritt kaum in Funktion"). Thus Hartmann concludes that if an emotional intuition of values is actually absolute (wirklich absolut) then there is no need of the relational criterion.¹¹

b. Wertgefühl and Werthöhe

According to Hartmann, valuational feeling reacts in a totally different way to different values ("das Wertgefühl reagiert auf verschiedene Werte in durchaus verschiedener Weise").¹² For each value there is one, and

¹¹ Hartmann, GME, 542.

¹² Hartmann, Ethik, 255.

only one, attitude corresponding to its nature ("nur eine, seinem Wesen entsprechende Art der Stellungnahme"). The connection between a mental attitude and a value is something fixed in the nature of things ("eine wesensgesetzlich bestimmte Beziehung"). This irremovable uniformity ("diese unverrückbare Gesetzmäßigkeit") holds in regard to negative as well as to positive values; also to every disvalue a specific kind of attitude corresponds, both as regards quantity and quality.¹³

This uniformity furnishes Hartmann with a basis for a phenomenology of the valuational height ("eine Phänomenologie der Werthöhe"), and not only for the larger intervals in a whole group, but for the finer and often imponderable distances of moral values among themselves ("auch für die feineren, oft unwägbaren Distanzen sittlicher Werte untereinander"). The variety of response is extraordinarily great, and is by no means exhausted within the narrow limits of spoken language. The shades of value, for which there are no names, must be described somehow by circumlocutions (Umwegen).¹⁴

Hartmann goes on to describe that the valuational predicates and responses are outward manifestations of an

¹³ Ibid., 255-256.

¹⁴ Ibid., 256.

existing inner connection between valuational height and the kind of valuational feeling ("die äusseren Kundgebungen eines bestehenden inneren Zusammenhanges zwischen Werthöhe und Art des Wertgefühls."). There must be a primary feeling of difference of valuational height ("ein primäres Differenzgefühl der Werthöhe"), which corresponds with the types of response. And this must be as original as the valuational feeling, which discriminates materially and qualitatively ("wie das material und qualitativ unterscheidende Wertgefühl"). The feeling of relation of height among values must adhere to the primary feeling for value (primäres Wertfühlen) in such a way that when two values are given the valuational height of each is given. A valuational consciousness limited to one single value is only an abstraction, and in all concrete feeling of value ("in allem konkreten Wertgefühl") the feeling of height referred to a valuational gradation ("das auf eine Wertordnung bezogene Höheng Gefühl") is primary. Such Wertgefühl is characterized by the complete absence of reflection in the valuational responses tuned to the valuational height ("die vollkommene Unreflektiertheit der auf die Werthöhe abgestimmten Wertantwort").¹⁵

Hartmann is convinced that the clue to the

¹⁵ Ibid., 257-258.

valuational height (Index der Werthöhe) lies in the assenting feeling of value (zustimmendes Wertgefühl), as it expresses itself in specific responses and predicates such as approval (Billigung), respect (Verehrung), admiration (Bewunderung), and so on.¹⁶

Hence the good man does not spend time to weigh and choose (wägen, wählen); his Wertgefühl guides (leitet) him surely, even in axiologically complicated predicaments ("auch in axiologisch komplizierter Lebenslage"). The conflicting values need not appear as such to him. He does not primarily resort to deliberation (Überlegung). None the less his decision for the one value and against the other has the weight of a preference on principle ("das Gewicht eines prinzipiellen Vorziehens"). How this is possible, is the innermost secret of the valuational feeling ("das innerste Geheimnis des Wertgefühls"). The fact that such decisions exist--perfectly spontaneous and unreflective--shows that our Wertgefühl consists not only in a consciousness of the content and the character of its value ("nicht nur ein Bewusstsein der Materien und ihrer Wertcharaktere"),, but also in a consciousness of the direction which shows the valuational height ("sondern

¹⁶ Ibid., 547.

auch ein die Werthöhen anzeigendes Richtungsbewusstsein").¹⁷

c. Wertgefühl and Wertstärke

Hartmann holds that the unconditionality of the Ought-to-Be ("die Unbedingtheit des Seinsollens") is presented to Wertgefühl not only in the assenting Wertgefühl which is the clue to valuational height but also in the negative, rejecting feeling ("im negativen, absprechenden Wertgefühl") which is the clue to valuational strength (Index der Wertstärke). This negative, rejecting Wertgefühl asserts itself wherever values are violated (verletzt). Das absprechende Wertgefühl also has its specific valuational responses and predicates, which are reactions to disvalues. These show an independent scale of intensification ("eine selbständige Skala der Steigerung"),--such as disapproval (Missbilligung), contempt (Verachtung), abhorrence (Abscheu), and so on. This is not a simple reflection of the scale of positive responses ("einfaches Spiegelbild nach der Skala der positiven Wertantworten"). The variability of strength, which is independent of height is attached to the independence of the negative scale.¹⁸

This is proof of the peculiar autonomous character

¹⁷ Ibid., 351.

¹⁸ Ibid., 547.

of valuational strength as compared with valuational height. When the higher value is violated, the transgression (Vergehen) is less, not more serious; but when the stronger value is fulfilled, the meritoriousness (Verdienst) is not greater but less.¹⁹

For example, murder, theft, and all real crimes are felt (empfunden) to be the most grievous transgressions, because the justice which they violate is based upon the most elementary of goods-values (life, property and the like). Justice is the virtue which protects these goods which support all actualization of values whatever. Hence the unique import of justice in moral life. This import does not attach to its Werthöhe but to its Wertstärke.²⁰

Compared with justice radiant virtue (schenkende Tugend)²¹ exposes no one to radical danger. A person who is incapable of it is not on that account a bad man; his conduct does not threaten any one; it merely lacks the higher moral content. Only the lower value is more elemental and requires prior actualization.²²

¹⁹ Ibid., 547-548.

²⁰ Ibid., 550-551.

²¹ Originally a Nietzschean concept (Nietzsche, AsZ, 109 ff.); Hartmann, Ethik, 456-462.

²² Hartmann, Ethik, 551.

It is significant that for our Wertgefühl the characteristics of the strongest values become less marked, while those of the highest are discriminated with the greatest plasticity ("mit der grössten Plastik").²³

For example, we think of schenkende Tugend with the greatest admiration; but the most elementary values, where they are actualized, are taken for granted--thus life, health, welfare, especially whatever is necessary for daily needs. We first become properly aware of the value of such goods, when we are in need of them. What we thus become aware of is not the height of their value but its strength.²⁴

d. Wertgefühl and Wertsynthese

Hartmann claims that wherever there are valuational antinomies (Wertantinomien) the living feeling of value (das lebendige Wertgefühl) spontaneously (unwillkürlich) seeks for the synthesis (Synthese) and thus indicates clearly the direction, in which philosophical reflection must look. Whether in all cases the synthesis really exists, and whether, even when it does exist, it is discernible (erfassbar) to Wertgefühl, is another question. The watchfulness of the valuational feeling (Ausschauen

²³ Ibid., 561-562.

²⁴ Ibid., 562.

des Wertgefühls) is independent of that. This Ausschauen des Wertgefühls is the indication of the way to a possible investigation of values ("die Wegweisung möglicher Wertforschung").²⁵

The perpetual watchfulness of the valuational feeling ("das ewige Ausschauen des Wertgefühls") is an eloquent witness (beredtes Zeugnis) to the valuational syntheses towards which the whole multiplicity of values (alle Wertmannigfaltigkeit) presses commandingly (gebieterisch hindrängt).²⁶

e. Werttäuschung

Hartmann realizes that there is a possibility of valuational deception. About this he holds that when valuational deception (Werttäuschung) is demonstrable (nachweisbar) there is always an underlying fact that the positive valuational feeling (positives Wertgefühl) is right (Recht hatte) but the negative valuational feeling (negatives Wertgefühl) or disputation concerning felt values is not right. The positives Wertgefühl is illustrated by the Wertgefühl of the lover, of the moral reformer, of the misunderstood and persecuted champion of ideas, and of the

²⁵ Ibid., 523.

²⁶ Ibid., 563.

artist. On the contrary the negatives Wertgefühl finds its illustrations in valuational adjournments (Wertverschiebungen) such as the false objectification (Verselbstständigung) of instrumental values, for example, the false appreciation of utility (Nützlichkeit) in utilitarianism:²⁷ such Wertverschiebungen are not valuational substitutions (Wertunterschiebungen) but blindness towards the underlying value which is actually autonomous ("Blindheit gegen den dahinterstehenden, wirklich selbständigen Wert").²⁸

Hartmann goes on to maintain that the moral phenomena, of which the primary valuational consciousness (primäres Wertbewusstsein) is the witness are unmistakable ("gar nicht zu verfehlen"), if once their significance has been grasped. They contain such manifestations (Erscheinungen) as moral approval (moralische Billigung) and disapproval (Missbilligung), accusation (Anklage), self-blame (Selbstvorwurf), conscience (Gewissen), the sense of responsibility (Verantwortungsgefühl), the consciousness of guilt (Schuldbewusstsein) and remorse (Reue). Hartmann admits that there can be a falsification (Verfälschung) of

²⁷ However, Mill holds that every writer, from Epicurus to Bentham, who maintained the theory of utility, meant by it pleasure, together with exemption from pain (Mill, ULRG, 5). Yet, Mill's own usage is not uniform.

²⁸ Hartmann, GME, 541.

these phenomena. But ordinarily they are genuine and are based on a genuine valuational feeling (echtes Wertgefühl). Even in this one's intuition (Blick) can be sharpened. But the criterion of the genuine and spurious is nothing but the primary Wertbewusstsein.²⁹

Hartmann understands that not everyone has the ethical maturity (die ethische Reife) for seeing the situation as it is. Nevertheless, Hartmann believes in the universality, necessity and objectivity of the valuational judgment ("die Allgemeinheit, Notwendigkeit und Objektivität des Werturteil") based on Wertgefühl.³⁰ Because he thinks that valuational deception is possible only in the case of mediocre persons (Durchschnittsmenschen), morally inexperienced or narrow-minded ("moralisch Unerfahrene oder Engherzige") or philosophically undisciplined (philosophisch Ungeschulte).³¹ And whoever has attained the adequate mentality ("wer überhaupt geistig an ihren Sinn heranreicht") must necessarily feel and judge in a certain way and not otherwise. For instance, the moral value of a noble-minded act matured in quiet meditation ("der sittliche Wert einer in der Stille vollbrachten hochherzigen Handlung") is

²⁹ Hartmann, Ethik, 55.

³⁰ Ibid., 140.

³¹ Ibid., 55.

certainly appreciated by the Wertgefühl of everyone who has the sense and understanding (Sinn und Verständnis) for such a noble-minded act. In this sense, moral judgment and the primary moral feeling of value which underlies it ("das moralische Werturteil und das hinter ihm stehende primäre moralische Wertgefühl") are strictly (streng) universal, necessary and objective.³²

f. The Apriority of Wertgefühl

Hartmann maintains that, unlike categories, values are not to be recognized by the fact that they are, or are not, contained in the real. They subsist even where the given case, or where all actual cases, contradict them. For so long as one does not already know the value from some other source it remains questionable whether the case agrees with it or not. Thus the knowledge of a value is a purely a priori knowledge.³³

Thus ethical values are not to be discovered in the conduct of man ("am Tun des Menschen"). One must already have knowledge of them in order to distinguish whether his conduct accords with them or not. But even if the facts of human conduct ("die Tatsachen des menschlichen

³² Ibid., 140.

³³ Ibid., 51-52.

...the ... of the ...
 ...the ... of the ...
 ...the ... of the ...
 ...the ... of the ...
 ...the ... of the ...
 ...the ... of the ...
 ...the ... of the ...

THE ... OF ...

...the ... of the ...
 ...the ... of the ...
 ...the ... of the ...
 ...the ... of the ...
 ...the ... of the ...
 ...the ... of the ...
 ...the ... of the ...

...the ... of the ...

...the ... of the ...

...the ... of the ...

...the ... of the ...

...the ... of the ...

...the ... of the ...
 ...the ... of the ...

Verhaltens") cannot reveal the principle, it is not these facts alone which are here at hand. Rather is there also, accompanying them, a valuational consciousness of the fact ("ein Wertbewusstsein des Tatsächlichen"). This is not a consciousness of principles, not a pure beholding of values, but a valuational feeling which is a clearer or obscurer acquaintance with the worth or worthlessness of the actual conduct ("ein Wertgefühl, ein klareres oder dunkleres Mitwissen um Wert und Unwert des tatsächlichen Verhaltens").³⁴

This Wertgefühl is not constructed out of the laws of existence ("nicht aus Seinsgesetzen aufgebaut ist") and rejects and accepts, condemns and justifies ("ablehnt und anerkennt, verurteilt und rechtfertigt"). This can separate the good from the bad ("Gut und Böse scheiden") and constitutes the ethical standard (ethischer Massstab) of man's resolutions and dispositions.³⁵

The phenomenon of the primary Wertbewusstsein is real (real), is capable of being experienced (erfahrbar), and yet in its essence not empirical ("in seinem Wesen nicht empirisch"). The primary Wertbewusstsein is aprioristic. Valuational intuition (Wertschau) is aprioristic, whether it have the primary form of Wertgefühl or the derived form

³⁴ Ibid., 52-53.

³⁵ Ibid., 53.

of reflective discrimination ("die Form des differenzierten Durchschauens"). The posterius is only a roundabout way to autonomous aprioristic insight ("nur ein Umweg zur autonomen apriorischen Einsicht").³⁶

Hartmann goes on to maintain that the aprioristic is always universally valid, the aposterioristic is not. "Das Apriorische ist zwar immer allgemeingültig, das Aposteriorische nicht." The aprioristic is not necessarily formal as Kant maintained. A principle like the moral law (das Sittengesetz), or a commandment (ein Gebot) in general, even a standard of value (Wertmassstab), can have matter (eine Materie), without any prejudice to its apriority. The distinction between form and matter has no bearing upon an autonomous ethical principle. It is only a question of apriority ("Es kommt nur auf die Apriorität an").³⁷

According to Hartmann, the aprioristic Wertgefühl is emotional and not intellectual; intuitive, not reflective. It does not first wait for a judgment of the understanding. Immediately, in accordance with feeling, does it penetrate our practical consciousness or our whole conception of life. The valuational hall-marks (Wertakzente) which it communicates to things and events are

³⁶ Ibid., 54-56.

³⁷ Ibid., 99.

not derived from the things and events. On the contrary, the Wertakzente are impressed by Wertgefühl upon the things and events.³⁸

Der primäre Sitz des Wert- A priori ist und bleibt das die Wirklichkeitserfassung und Lebenseinstellung durchdringende Wertgefühl selbst. Nur in ihm ist ursprüngliche, inexplizite sittliche Erkenntnis, eigentliches Wissen um Gut und Böse.³⁹

Ethics as a science is the logical work of making explicit this implicitly given aprioristic factor and setting upon it the seal of concepts and formulae. A special philosophical method is needed, which discovers laws (Gesetze) and makes their content and matter accessible to consciousness and to the conceptual understanding. But such a method is secondary. The essential factor in ethics is the primary Wertgefühl and an ethicist can do nothing except draw out (herausheben) from the total emotional phenomenon the aprioristic content which was already within it.⁴⁰

Hartmann explains further the nature of the apriority of Wertgefühl. Wertgefühl is aprioristic over against the real particular case ("dem realen Einzelfall gegenüber"), such as a real person, action and situation.

³⁸ Ibid., 104-105.

³⁹ Ibid., 105.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 105-106.

And here everything depends upon this apriority. The penetrative intuition of Wertgefühl is not directed to the real as such but to the self-existent value which may or may not be represented in the real. Since Wertgefühl is radically aprioristic over against the real it follows from this that Wertbewusstsein is completely autonomous as the fundamental condition of the act of evaluation ("als der Grundbedingung des Bewertungsaktes").⁴¹

The atomistic intuition (stigmatische Anschauung) of Wertgefühl, like all atomistic intuition, is a synthesis of genuine apriority and direct givenness which is caused by the ideal object ("eine Synthese von echter Apriorität und direkter, vom idealen Objekt her kommender Gegebenheit"): thus it is an aprioristic givenness (apriorische Gegebenheit). It is aprioristic over against the real case, but given over against the relational-synoptic view, pure thought and reflection of every kind ("gegeben dem relational-konspektiven Schauen, dem reinen Denken und der Reflexion aller Art gegenüber"). This atomistic valuational intuition is aprioristic in relation to knowledge of the real but aposterioristic in relation to the synoptic knowledge of the ideal ("apriorisch ist diese stigmatische Wertschau in bezug auf die Realerkenntnis,

⁴¹ Hartmann, GME, 538

aposteriorisch aber in bezug auf die konspektive Ideal-
erkenntnis").⁴²

2. Wertgefühl and the Extent of the Wertreich

Hartmann holds that in the Wertreich every grade (Höhenlage) is a whole plane of values (eine ganze Wertebene); and the manifold, that is grasped by Wertgefühl at any time, is always only a section ("immer nur ein Ausschnitt").⁴³ Thus the extent (Spannweite) of the Wertreich is greater not only than that of the primary Wertgefühl but also that of the philosophical Wertbewusstsein.⁴⁴

According to Hartmann, it is impossible to give an unambiguous account of the content of the good, for that content embraces the whole table of values (die ganze Werttafel), including the principle on which they are arranged (Ordnungsprinzip). But neither the table nor the principle is ever given in its entirety. And for this reason the content of the good varies from case to case. In other words, the Werttafel has not been presented in its clarity and entirety (Eindeutigkeit und Totalität) to our Wertgefühl. We can always have but a segment

⁴² Ibid., 538-539.

⁴³ Hartmann, Ethik, 358.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 495.

(Ausschnitt) before our eyes and since we lack the perspective of the whole (Perspektive des Ganzen) we may be subject to errors even within the segment. Hence every gradation of values being dimly felt has an element of subjectivity in it and is only an approximation to the objective gradation of values itself.⁴⁵

But the rudiments of an absolute scale of values ("ein Ansatz zur absoluten Rangordnung der Werte") are contained in all moral feeling for values ("in allem sittlichen Wertgefühl"). The good as the controlling moral order of the heart hidden in man ("das Gute als die verborgen im menschen waltende moralische Ordnung des Herzens") is not simply the objective gradation of values ("die objective Rangordnung der Werte") but is the decisive role which this gradation--so far as it is revealed in Wertgefühl--plays in disposition, will and behavior ("Gesinnung, Wollen, und Handlung").⁴⁶

The realization of this limitation on the part of Wertgefühl leads Hartmann to a theoretical construction of his ethics which we shall discuss later.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 352-353.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 353-354.

3. Criticism of Hartmann's View of Wertgefühl

Empirically Hartmann's ethics is based solely on Wertgefühl. About this Scheler,⁴⁷ Messer⁴⁸ and Hessen⁴⁹ essentially agree with Hartmann. Nevertheless, it is possible to hold with Brightman that "the basis of moral knowledge is total moral experience."⁵⁰ Our moral experience⁵¹ includes at least four factors: (1) the consciousness of value; (2) of obligation; (3) of law; (4) and of an intelligent interest in the whole self on the part of the datum self."⁵² Of these four experiences Wertgefühl may include the first two but not the last two experiences. Because, as Hartmann himself holds, in Wertgefühl there is not an original, explicitly present consciousness of law ("ein ursprüngliches, explizite vorliegendes Gesetzesbewusstsein").⁵³ And Wertgefühl is only one aspect of the

⁴⁷ Scheler, FEMW, 94; See pages 18-21 of this dissertation.

⁴⁸ Messer, WdG, 13-14; See pages 4,5,8,9,13 of this dissertation.

⁴⁹ Hessen, WP, 87-92,125; See pages 18-21,33,34 of this dissertation.

⁵⁰ Brightman, ML, 84.

⁵¹ Ibid., 58.

⁵² Ibid., 79.

⁵³ Hartmann, Ethik, 105.

present complex consciousness which is a datum self. Thus if this alternative view is right about the basis of moral knowledge Hartmann's system of ethics is potentially incoherent at its very basis.

As to the gradation of values, he declares that Wertgefühl furnishes us with the single assured landmarks which we have,⁵⁴ and that, while the atomistic intuition of Wertgefühl is here absolute, the synoptic intuition of the relational criterion is useless, because solely out of the immediate feeling of value without regard to any synoptic survey can we know even the few features of the valuational gradation which are known to us.⁵⁵ This assertion contradicts his statement that morality in the full and genuine sense has to do with the entire gradational ladder of moral values which is revealed to us through synoptic thought,⁵⁶ and it contradicts also his statement that coherence is superior to intuition in the sense that through the former a unique insight into ethical knowledge can be obtained--an insight which is beyond the scope of

⁵⁴ Ibid., 249.

⁵⁵ Hartmann, GME, 542; For Hessen also Wertgefühl is the criterion of valuational height (Hessen, WP, 87-92).

⁵⁶ Hartmann, Ethik, 556, 557; See pages 2,3 of this dissertation.

any immediate intuition.⁵⁷ Thus Hartmann is not consistent about the relative adequacy of intuition and coherence as a basis for ethical knowledge.

Hartmann reveals his supreme confidence in intuition when he maintains that the connection between the intuitional, mental attitude and a value is something fixed in the nature of things ("eine wesensgesetzlich bestimmte Beziehung").⁵⁸ He bases this on his intuitive conviction that "Das Wertgefühl reagiert auf verschiedene Werte in durchaus verschiedener Weise."⁵⁹ Hence he claims that the clue to the valuational height lies in the assenting Wertgefühl, as it expresses itself in specific responses and predicates like approval, respect, admiration and so on.⁶⁰ Likewise he holds that the clue to the valuational strength lies in the negative, rejecting feeling of value ("im negativen absprechenden Wertgefühl") which is shown in an independent scale of intensification such as disapproval, contempt, abhorrence and so on.⁶¹ Since he believes that Wertgefühl can reveal all this about the Wertreich he claims that the

⁵⁷ Hartmann, Ethik, 144; See pages 2,3 of this dissertation.

⁵⁸ Hartmann, Ethik, 255; He regards this fixed connection as an unverrückbare Gesetzlichkeit (Ethik, 255-256).

⁵⁹ Hartmann, Ethik, 255.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 547.

⁶¹ Ibid.

good man does not spend time to weigh and choose; his Wertgefühl guides him surely, even in axiologically complicated predicaments.⁶²

Here again what Hartmann claims for Wertgefühl contradicts his own conviction that through coherent thought a unique insight into ethical knowledge can be obtained--an insight which is beyond the reach of any immediate intuition.⁶³

Hartmann maintains that wherever there are valuational antinomies (Wertantinomien) Wertgefühl spontaneously aims at a synthesis and thus indicates clearly the direction in which philosophical reflection must look.⁶⁴ But in another context he maintains that every value, when once it has gained power over a person, has the tendency to set itself up as sole tyrant of the whole human ethos ("die Tendenz, sich zum alleinigen Tyrannen des ganzen menschlichen Ethos aufzuwerfen"), and indeed at the expense of other values ("zwar auf Kosten anderer Werte"), even of such as are not inherently opposed to it; and that this tendency adheres to values as the determining or selective powers in the valuational feeling of man ("als bestimmenden

⁶² Ibid., 351.

⁶³ Hartmann, Ethik, 144. See pages 2,3 of this dissertation.

⁶⁴ Hartmann, Ethik, 523.

oder seligierenden Mächten im menschlichen Wertgefühl").⁶⁵

Here Hartmann refers to two conflicting tendencies inherent in Wertgefühl, and thus implicitly demonstrates that Wertgefühl has to be guided and enlightened by a criterion other than intuition itself.

Hartmann claims that Werttäuschung is possible only in the case of mediocre persons (Durchschnittsmenschen)⁶⁶ but the Wertgefühl of the philosophically disciplined is always right.⁶⁷ However, here an advocate of coherence would present an alternative view: The very nature of coherence indicates that it must be applied to the experience of every person, testing all thoughts and experiences and "itself being constantly tested anew by the very use that is made of it."⁶⁸

Hartmann declares that the positive Wertgefühl which is demonstrated by the intuition of the lover, of the moral reformer, or of the artist is always right.⁶⁹ But history testifies to the fact that this assertion is unjustifiable. Hartmann does not tell us how to distinguish the positive

⁶⁵ Ibid., 524.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 55.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 140.

⁶⁸ Brightman, ITP, 66.

⁶⁹ Hartmann, GME, 541

Wertgefühl from the negative Wertgefühl which he regards as illusory.⁷⁰ By indicating that Wertgefühl is sometimes positive (and right) and sometimes negative (and deceptive) he again demonstrates that Wertgefühl must be guided by a criterion which is more synoptic than any atomistic intuition.

According to Hartmann, the knowledge of a value cannot be found in ordinary human experience⁷¹ but only in Wertgefühl, which is independent of experience and not constructed out of the laws of existence ("nicht aus Seinsgesetzen aufgebaut ist"),⁷² and Wertgefühl alone can separate the good from the bad.⁷³ Hence the judgment of Wertgefühl is always a priori,⁷⁴ and what is a priori is always universally valid.⁷⁵

According to an alternative view, however, it is misleading to claim that there is anything independent of experience.⁷⁶ Our experience of Wertgefühl is certainly a

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Hartmann, Ethik, 52-53.

⁷² Ibid., 53.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 54-56.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 99.

⁷⁶ Brightman, POR, 2-3.

conscious experience. "The assertion that one part of experience is independent of all experience is logically contradictory."⁷⁷

The quality of being independent of experience appertains to no truth, if experience be defined inclusively. No truth can be said to be unqualifiedly a priori unless it is necessarily related to all experience in such a way that it is always valid, no matter what happens.... It is possible that some truths are universal and necessary; but this fact cannot be known prior to experience of thinking and observing.⁷⁸

A priori principles cannot even be known to be a priori unless they are necessary to a coherent universe of discourse; and any such universe must be related to other possible universes and criticized with regard to its coherence.⁷⁹

In view of all this we conclude that in presenting the empirical basis for his positive view Hartmann depends ultimately on what he claims to be the universally valid apriority of Wertgefühl, which is his criterion of the truth of value judgments.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 3.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 3-4.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 191-192.

CHAPTER II

THE THEORETICAL CONSTRUCTION OF HIS SYSTEM

1. Grounds for Objectivity of Value

In presenting the empirical basis for Hartmann's positive view, it was found that the fundamental presupposition was that values are objective. Experience is an experience of an objective order. So before a presentation of the theoretical construction of his system, his grounds for accepting the objectivity of value must be mentioned.¹

a. Kant's Subjectivism and Its Two Difficulties

According to Kant, the will is free to follow the principle and at the same time to be itself the originator of the principle (Urheber des Prinzips).²

Hartmann holds that it is not conceivable that the will should first give the law and then transgress (übertreten) it. The will must be able to transgress it, since otherwise it would not be free but would be subjected to the principle as to a natural law. But if the principle be already contained in the essence (Wesen) of the will, the will cannot deviate from the principle.³

¹ Hartmann, Ethik, 88-153.

² Ibid., 91.

³ Ibid.

Hartmann realizes that Kant could recognize, along with the law (Gesetz), alien, anti-moral impulses ("anderweitige, antimoralische Triebfedern") which allure the will from the direction proper to it. Then there would be two kinds of will: the pure will which gives the principle and the empirical one which is subjected to other determining factors.⁴

Hartmann maintains that of these two the will which is free is the one which has before it the open possibility (die offene Möglichkeit) of following either the principle or the alien determinants. Therefore the empirical will. However, for Kant the pure will is accepted as free, in so far as it has no other ground of determination than the principle which inheres in its own essence. Hence Kant's free will has, on the basis of these determinations, self-legislation (Eigengesetzlichkeit), but no freedom in the proper sense of the word. It is subject to the autonomous principle of its essence exactly as nature is subject to natural law.⁵

Thus in ethics Kant's subjectivism does not lead to that freedom of the will for the sake of which it was introduced. What would be requisite is not the laying down

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid., 91-92.

of the principle by the will, but its own activity in face of the principle ("seine Beweglichkeit ihm gegenüber"). Only this condition of aloofness fits the facts if the principle has some other origin (if it is not rooted in the subject). Thus, in Hartmann's thinking, only the objectivity of value solves the problem of moral freedom.⁶

For Kant there exist only two possibilities: either the moral law (Sittengesetz)--hence every moral value--emanates from nature (Natur) or from reason (Vernunft). In the former case it is merely a hypothetical imperative ("ein bloss hypothetischer Imperativ"). In the latter case it is universal, a priori, an unconditional categorical imperative ("ein unbedingter kategorischer Imperativ").⁷

But Hartmann regards this Kantian alternative as false, the disjunction as not complete. Because the a priori does not subsist in a function of the subject. Aprioristic insight subsists without there being given to the mind any real individual objects of perception. As the relation of cause and effect is never perceptible to sense but objective, so the exacted harmony (geforderte Übereinstimmung) of the individual will with the ideal will of all cannot be extracted from an empirical will. It is not a legislation

⁶ Ibid., 92.

⁷ Ibid., 92-93.

of reason ("eine Gesetzgebung der Vernunft") either. It is purely objective. Its content is an ideal objective relation which hovers before the moral consciousness, independently of the degree of its actualization in real life.⁸

Thus Hartmann concludes that Kant's subjectivistic and functionalistic apriorism is a total misunderstanding of the originally objective character of everything knowable a priori

b. Value is Related to a Subject but is Absolute in Itself

According to Hartmann, the relatedness of goods (Güter) to a personal subject is not valuational relativity (Wertrelativität). It does not bar out the objective character of the Güter but evidently implies it. A person cannot change the fact that a thing is good for him. The fact that it is so is not relative to the valuableness of the Güter for the subject. In this "for" the subject does not play the part of a determiner or giver of values. His role is that of a point of reference concerning the valuational material (Wertmaterie). The relativity of the value of the goods to the subject is an absolute relation which is comprised in the content of these values ("eine absolute, im Inhalt dieser Werte enthaltene Relation"). The

⁸ Ibid., 93-96.

thing and the subject are here objectively drawn into the structure of the valuational materials, as cause and effect (Ursache und Wirkung) are included in the causal nexus. In both cases the binding relation is purely objective, and, as regards any understanding of it, is absolute. "In beiden Fällen ist die bindende Relation eine rein objektive und aller Auffassung gegenüber absolute."⁹

Speaking of moral values Hartmann maintains that the sort of relativity which exists objectively in the value of goods is here excluded. Moral values adhere not to things and relations but to deeds, to the will, purpose and disposition. Moral value in the conduct of a person does not exist for a subject, whether for one's self or for another. It inheres simply in the person or to the act of the person, as a quality. Virtues (Tugendwerte) have a purer self-existence than goods-values (Güterwerte). Moral values have another kind of autonomy, evidently more absolute ("eine andere, und offenbar absoluterer Autonomie").¹⁰

This circumstance does not exclude relation to a subject in another way. This relation is threefold in direction and here valuational relativism is still less involved than in Güterwerte.

⁹ Ibid., 126-127.

¹⁰ Ibid., 128.

(1) Every moral value is also a goods-value indirectly and as such it actually exists for other persons. But it also subsists exclusively as a quality of his own personality, of his own conduct as such. The relatedness to another person is thus in this case not only a Wert-relativität, but is also not even an inner relation belonging to the objective structure of the Wertmaterie. For it does not concern the ethical quality of the conduct or of the person but only the accompanying goods-value.¹¹

(2) The outer relation of the goods for the other person rests upon the inner relation of the direction of the act towards him, without the two relations on that account coinciding or the valuational characteristics commingling. The inner, intentional Relativität conditions the other Relationalität of the goods-value which is dependent upon it. But this conditioning relationship (Bedingungsverhältnis) no more allows the two relations to coincide than the two kinds of value.¹²

(3) All moral imputations (Zurechnungen) attach to the person. Thus moral values are related to the person as a carrier of values (Wertträger). But this does not mean valuational relativity. It does not imply that the value

¹¹ Ibid., 128-129.

¹² Ibid., 130.

of noble-minded disposition and the anti-value of a mean one are dependent upon whether anybody thinks such dispositions really exist. An actual noble-minded disposition is of value, because such disposition is universally a moral value. The relation to the person as a Wertträger inheres in the nature of the material of the moral value. But the moral value itself is absolute.¹³

Now Hartmann takes the last two types of relation together and obtains the basic relational structure of the moral valuational materials. Upon the bipolar structure of deeds, in which the two poles are persons, depends the double relationality of the values to the personal entity as such--to a subject as subject, and to a subject as object, of the acts. But with this the relation is exhausted. It has resolved itself, without a remainder, into the inner relational structure peculiar to the contents, which is universally imbedded in the essence of personal conduct. This structure is a general one, applicable to all moral values.¹⁴

Hartmann goes on to maintain that thus the nature of this twofold relation is completely severed from the nature of the values themselves. The ethical dimension of

¹³ Ibid., 131-132.

¹⁴ Ibid., 132-133.

value and anti-value, together with its qualitative differentiation, finds scope only within this general relational structure. But this means that the values themselves are not affected by this relation. They are absolute. The structure is nothing but their categorial (not their axiological) *conditio sine qua non*. The values themselves are neither contained in the relation nor derivable from it. They come to it from another source.¹⁵

c. Not the Material of Value but the
Valuational Character is Objective

Hartmann distinguishes between the material (Materie) of value and the valuational character (Wertcharakter). The material is only the concrete structure which has the valuational character ("das inhaltliche Gebilde, das den Wertcharakter hat"). The moral worth of trust ("der sittliche Wert des Vertrauens") is not the trust itself (Vertrauen selbst). The latter is only the material--a specific relation between person and person, which can be quite generally described. But the value of trust is not this relation, and indeed is not only not an actual relation between particular persons, but is also not the idea of such a relation in general ("nicht die Idee eines

¹⁵ Ibid., 133.

solchen Verhältnisses überhaupt"). The material is here simply the idea of trust (Idee des Vertrauens). It is, taken by itself, purely an ontological structure, not axiological; it is the ideal structure of essence of a specifically formed relationship ("die ideale Wesensstruktur eines besonders gearteten Seinsverhältnisses"). Its proper valuableness is something different, not capable of being derived from anything else, but can be felt in its own peculiarity and exhibited in our Wertgefühl.¹⁶

Now according to Hartmann, a subject, by his co-operation (Zutun), can, within certain limits, produce the material (for example, a relation of confidence); but he can not prevent such a material from being of value,--or the contrary. Such a material simply is so, without any co-operation, and even if it is believed not to be so. Thus valuational characters have self-existence. Consciousness can grasp (erfassen) or miss (verfehlen) them, but cannot make (machen) them or spontaneously decree (spontan setzen) them. They are objective.¹⁷

¹⁶ Ibid., 133-134.

¹⁷ Ibid.

d. A Subject is Purely Receptive in
Intuiting values, and is Ethically
Spontaneous Only as Regards Other Persons

Hartmann believes that values are objects of possible valuational intuition (*Gegenstände möglicher Wertschau*), and not intuitions (Anschauungen) nor thoughts (Gedanken) nor presentations (Vorstellungen). In intuiting values the subject is purely receptive (rein rezeptiv). He is determined by the object, the self-existent value. But he himself, on his side, determines nothing ("Es selbst aber bestimmt seinerseits nichts"). The spontaneity of the subject in ethical conduct sets in on the ground of a primary intuition of values ("auf Grund primärer Wertschau"). But it is not spontaneity as regards value, but as regards other persons ("Sie ist aber nicht Spontaneität gegen den Wert, sondern gegen andere Personen"). This indicates that values are objective.¹⁸

e. Value Offers the Same Absolute Resistance
to the Will as the Real Object of Perception

According to Hartmann, perceived reality (das wahrgenommene Reale) differs from mere presentation by the impossibility of perceiving it otherwise than just as it

¹⁸ Ibid., 134-135.

is perceived. The ideal object, which is known a priori, differs in exactly the same way from one which is a mere thought (ein blosser Gedanke).¹⁹

In the same way, Hartmann holds, no ideal object of a priori insight ("kein idealer Gegenstand apriorischer Einsicht") can be displaced by the subject or made dependent upon him. It offers the same absolute resistance ("der gleiche absolute Widerstand") to the will of the philosophically trained person as any real object of perception (Wahrnehmung). This resistance indicates that value is objective.²⁰

f. The Phenomenon of Werttäuschung

is a Proof for the Objectivity of Value

If values were only things posited by the subject, if they consisted of nothing except the act of evaluating enlistment of feeling as such ("wertende Gefühlseinstellung als solcher") then every chance enlistment of feeling ("jede beliebige Gefühlseinstellung") would be as justifiable as every other. Valuational delusion (Werttäuschung) would then be impossible. Hartmann maintains that if anything is proof for the self-existence of values ("das Ansichsein

¹⁹ Ibid., 139.

²⁰ Ibid.

der Werte") it is exactly the phenomenon of Werttauschung.²¹

g. The Self-existence of Value

As to the nature of the objectivity of value Hartmann claims that there are two different kinds of self-existence; one real (real) and the other ideal (ideal). Between the two subsists an essential relationship: The structure of ideal self-existence reappears in that of the real--not exhaustive of the latter, but in so far that the aprioristic knowledge of ideal Being at the same time constitutes an inner foundation (Grundlage) for all knowledge of the real (Realerkenntnis).²²

The ideal sphere, though homogeneous in mode of existence (Seinscharakter) is heterogeneous in content (inhaltlich). However, in mode of existence and for knowledge it is a unity. Its patterns are known in all the departments always and purely a priori.²³ "Ideale Seins-erkenntnis lässt nur einen, den apriorischen Erkenntnis-modus zu."²⁴

According to Hartmann, naive thought is prone to

²¹ Ibid., 141-142.

²² Ibid., 135-136.

²³ Ibid., 136.

²⁴ Ibid., 136-137.

look upon real actuality (reale Wirklichkeit) alone as self-existence (Ansichsein), but to exclude the ideal from it. Because reality (Realität) and Being (Sein) are falsely identified. Moreover, ideality is mistaken for subjectivity. For this the double meaning of the term Idee is to blame. When Idee is taken as the equivalent of presentation (Vorstellung), ideality becomes the mode of Being of whatever subsists only in and for the presentation of a subject. The true meaning of logic and mathematics, however, is different: they treat of a system of laws (Gesetzlichkeiten), dependencies (Abhängigkeiten) and structures (Strukturen) which on their side control thinking, but themselves can neither be forms of thought nor be in any way infringed (beeinträchtigt) by thinking. Like the principles of mathematics and logic, values constitute an objective, absolute realm of essences, which man discovers a priori.²⁵

2. The Systematization of Values as the Task of Philosophical Ethics

Hartmann is Hegelian enough to deal with the proposition that "die Wahrheit ist das Ganze."²⁶

²⁵ Ibid., 137.

²⁶ Hartmann, PgS, 6.

Der Gedanke Hegels, dass in allen philosophischen Systemen ein Stück ewiger Wahrheit stecke, und dass es die Aufgabe der Philosophie sei, diese Bruchstücke der einen absoluten Wahrheit im idealen System der Philosophie zu vereinigen, muss *mutatis mutandis* auch für die Ethik fruchtbar werden.²⁷

He makes multiplicity of ends, which is a given phenomena, the point of departure for his investigation. Then he seeks connections (Zusammenhänge), binding relations (bindende Relationen), references (Beziehungen), among the empirical norms and values. Hartmann goes on to investigate whether or not moral commandments (moralische Gebote) are really disparate (disparat); whether or not there are, among those moral commandments, links (Bindungen), attachments (Zusammengehörigkeiten), conditions (Bedingtheiten), and dependencies (Abhängigkeiten). In short, Hartmann tries to investigate whether or not there is a system of ends ("ein System der Zwecke") or a system of values ("ein System der Werte"), since values stand behind all ends and only what appears to a man as valuable can he convert into an end.²⁸

Hartmann explains that the positive living morality (positive lebendige Moral) takes an atomistic view through a temporary Wertgefühl; the philosophical ethics takes a

²⁷ Hartmann, Ethik, 267.

²⁸ Ibid., 38.

synoptic view. Compared with the former the latter is derivative and dependent. But it has the advantage that in being subsequent and taking a synoptic view sees something entirely new and unique ("etwas durchaus Neues und Eigenartiges"): it sees the connections (Zusammenhänge), the order (Ordnung), the relations and regularities which run through the realm of values ("die das Wertreich selbst durchziehenden Relationen und Gesetzmäßigkeiten"). For philosophical ethics the stages of the wandering of a temporary Wertschau are not lost (verloren). In it they are transmuted (aufgehoben) and correlated (zusammengefügt). Its tendency is towards the system of values (System der Werte).²⁹

In another context Hartmann refers to the same aim-- the aim of philosophical ethics to systematize values:

Es handelt sich um eine durchgehende Gliederung des ethischen Wertreichs, sowohl desjenigen der Sachen und Sachverhalte als auch desjenigen der Personen und ihres Verhaltens.³⁰

3. The Order of the Wertreich

a. The Lack of Systematic Structure

Hartmann's consideration of the laws of the Wertreich starts from his intuitive presupposition that the Wertreich is

²⁹ Ibid., 144.

³⁰ Ibid., 245.

a scale of values, that each value has its eternally fixed place assigned for it, and that Wertgefühl is the only cognitive authority which could test the scale of values.³¹ This presupposition, however, is atomistically intuitive and untested by coherent thought. Hartmann himself holds that one's Wertblick is often so prone to one-sidedness and limitation³² that it must be corrected and supplemented by synoptic thought which is the source of a new and unique insight into ethical knowledge--an insight which is beyond the scope of any immediate intuition.³³ If this last contention is right, his consideration of the laws of the Wertreich must be based on a precarious presupposition, whose validity we shall investigate more adequately later.³⁴

He holds that the extent of the Wertreich is greater not only than a philosophical consciousness but also than a Wertgefühl.³⁵ Both of the two poles of the realm of values ("die beiden Pole des Wertreichs"), that of the simplest elements and that of the most complex materials,

³¹ Ibid., 497, 499.

³² Ibid., 556, 557; See pages 2,3 of this dissertation.

³³ Ibid., 144; See pages 2,3 of this dissertation.

³⁴ See pages 128-140 of this dissertation.

³⁵ Hartmann, Ethik, 495.

elude his survey ("Überschau").³⁶ Hence the lack of completely systematic structure in the Wertreich.

Guided by his Wertgefühl, he arranges all the discerned values in ascending order of intrinsic importance. He maintains that this ascending order is objective in the sense that it is eternally fixed,³⁷ that it subsists beyond all actuality (Wirklichkeit) and consciousness (Bewusstsein), perduring side by side (neben) with the world of things and persons.³⁸

Hartmann claims that the objectivity of his Wertreich is the same as that of Platonic Ideas;³⁹ the differences and similarities between these two realms, together with systematic coherence in each of them, we shall investigate later.⁴⁰

In the lowest stratum of the above-mentioned ascending order of values Hartmann sees the most general valuational antitheses ("die allgemeinsten Wertgegensätze"),⁴¹ which consist of three valuational oppositions: 1. Modal

³⁶ Ibid., 496.

³⁷ Ibid., 497, 499.

³⁸ Ibid., 140.

³⁹ Ibid., 108, 109, 140.

⁴⁰ See pages 119-126 of this dissertation.

⁴¹ Hartmann, Ethik, 267-303.

oppositions (the antinomy of necessity and freedom, the antinomy of activity and inertia, and so on);⁴² 2. Relational opposites (harmony and conflict, simplicity and complexity, and so on);⁴³ 3. Qualitative and quantitative oppositions (universality and singularity, humanity and nation, and so on).⁴⁴

In the second stratum are discerned the fundamental values which condition contents ("die inhaltlich bedingenden Grundwerte"), which consist of valuational foundations in the subject (consciousness, foresight and so on) and of goods-values (situation, happiness and so on).⁴⁵

In the third stratum are found fundamental moral values (die sittlichen Grundwerte), which are four in number: 1. the good; 2. the noble; 3. richness of experience; 4. purity.⁴⁶

In the fourth stratum he discerns special moral values (spezielle sittliche Werte),⁴⁷ which can be divided into two groups. The first group is that of general virtues

⁴² Ibid., 271-276.

⁴³ Ibid., 276-285.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 285-305.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 328-335.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 336-378.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 379-492.

such as justice; wisdom; courage; self-control; the Aristotelian virtues; brotherly love; truthfulness and uprightness; trustworthiness and fidelity; trust and faith; modesty, humility, aloofness; the value of social intercourse; love of the remotest; and radiant virtue.⁴⁸ The second group is that of individual virtues, such as personality and personal love.⁴⁹

What Hartmann here maintains amounts to the fact that situated in the highest stratum of his Wertreich is personal love which is permanent, universal and genuinely objective; and his view of the objectivity of value is such that this personal love eternally persists beyond any human experience of such a value. This cannot be reasonably explained apart from theism which means that the Cosmic Source and Continuer of personal love permanently exists. It is true that one's belief in God must be based on the consideration, not only of this one aspect of human experience, but its whole concrete range viewed coherently. Nevertheless, it is also true that Hartmann's view of the objectivity of value such as personal love would create a most incoherent item in his atheistic metaphysics.⁵⁰ Hartmann, or anyone, who thinks

⁴⁸ Ibid., 381-461.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 463-492.

⁵⁰ See pages 141-175 of this dissertation.

persistently about value experience must inquire about its validity, its source, and its destiny. And Hartmann's contention that personal love, as an abstract impersonal entity, eternally subsists, might explain the validity of the ideal value of our personal love, but would leave unexplained the actual phenomena of "axiogenesis" and "axiosoteria."⁵¹ An abstract ideal has "no power to generate values or conserve them"; that power inheres only in God, who is a person and adopts the ideal as his own.⁵²

In investigating the Wertreich thus stratified Hartmann's Wertgefühl discovers in it the intimation (Andeutung) of six laws: 1. Laws of stratification ("Gesetze des Schichtungsverhältnisses"); 2. Laws of foundation ("Gesetze des Fundierungsverhältnisses"); 3. Laws of opposition ("Gesetze der Gegensätzlichkeit"); 4. Laws of complementation ("Gesetze des Komplementärverhältnisses"); 5. Laws of valuational height ("gesetze der Ranghöhe"); 6. Laws of valuational strength ("Gesetze der Wertstärke").⁵³

In order that he may understand more clearly the meaning of each one of those laws he employs the following methods: Wertgefühl, valuational analysis (Wertanalyse),⁵⁴

⁵¹ See Brightman, POR, 230.

⁵² Ibid., 230-231.

⁵³ Hartmann, Ethik, 498-500.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 521, 528, 563.

synopsis (Überschau),⁵⁵ and comparison between the intuitively discerned laws of the Wertreich and the laws which are valid in the realm of categories.⁵⁶

Hartmann holds that he is justified in employing the last method because in a more extended sense values are as yet categories (principles of existence sui generis), and have in them a categorial arrangement, except that they are other categories than those of ontological reality.⁵⁷ The first two and the last two of the above-mentioned laws receive the most elucidation from this method, says Hartmann.⁵⁸

b. Stratification and the Foundational Relation

Hartmann holds that in the categorial realm the laws of stratification play a conspicuous part. There are four laws:

1. The law of recurrence (Wiederkehr). The lower principles and their elements recur in the higher as their partial factors; thus they may enter into the foreground

⁵⁵ Ibid., 556, 557, 563.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 499, 543-545.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 499; Hartmann confuses values and ideals. Hence this statement.

⁵⁸ Hartmann, Ethik, 500.

or the background of the higher structures, and accordingly be visible (sichtbar) in them or vanish (verschwinden).

In both cases they are pervading structural elements ("durchgehende Strukturelemente").⁵⁹

2. The law of transformation (Abwandlung). In their recurrence these elements are not affected by the structure of the higher forms. They vary in many ways, according to the role which falls to them in the higher complex. Only their elemental essence remains the same.⁶⁰

3. The law of novelty (Novum). The higher forms cannot be resolved into the various elements recurring in them. Together with the elementary stratification they always manifest something new, which is not contained in the elements. It is this novelty which determines the prominence (Hervortreten) or seclusion (Zurücktreten) of the elements, as well as the transformation (Abwandlung) of their significance.⁶¹

4. The law of distance between strata (Schichten-distanz). The superimposition of the higher upon the lower principles does not advance in unbroken continuity but in

⁵⁹ Hartmann, Ethik, 503; Hartmann, GME, 255-257; Hartmann, Ethik, 543-545.

⁶⁰ Hartmann, Ethik, 543-545.

⁶¹ Ibid.

strata, which are separated from one another by distinct intervals ("in Schichten, die gegeneinander durch deutliche Schichtendistanzen abgehoben sind").⁶²

In the realm of values Hartmann finds the laws of stratification modified.⁶³ Here the presence of the conditioning relation (Fundierungsverhältnis) complicates the situation. It is the relation of goods and situational values to moral values ("das Verhältnis der Güter= und Sachverhaltenswerte zu den sittlichen Werten").⁶⁴ Hartmann discovers three differences between the conditioning relation and the relation of stratification (Schichtungsverhältnis).⁶⁵

1. In stratification the lower value reappears as an element in the higher; it is contained in it in a modified form, and cannot be removed from its substance. In the conditioning relation the lower element does not enter as a constituent into the higher value. For example, the moral value no longer has in it anything of the situational value. The latter is neither transformed (abgewandelt) in it nor even merely completed by any new

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ibid., 504.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 506.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 506-509.

factor ("durch ein Novum ergänzt"), but is simply presupposed (vorausgesetzt) in it as its axiological condition.⁶⁶

2. In the Schichtungsverhältnis, when the higher value is actualized, the recurring lower element is necessarily actualized at the same time. In the Fundierungsverhältnis, when the conditioned value is actualized, the conditioning value is not necessarily actualized with it. For example, the value of a moral disposition is indeed dependent upon the value of the object aimed at; but its actualization in the person depends in no way upon his achievement of the object, but simply upon the object's being intended in his disposition.⁶⁷

3. Wherever there is a stratification of values, the matter (Materie) of the higher value is not only conditioned by that of the lower, but even the grade (Werthöhe) of the higher is conditioned by the grade of the lower. For example, the value of radiant virtue (schenkende Tugend)⁶⁸ grows with the fulness of life within it. However, this dependence also does not reappear in the Fundierungsverhältnis. Here the moral value rises or falls with the degree of commitment (Einsatz), as well as with the depth

⁶⁶ Ibid., 507.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 507-508.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 456-462.

and genuineness of the intention (Intention), but not with the height of the value aimed at.⁶⁹

c. Oppositional Relation and the Synthesis of Values

It is theoretically possible, says Hartmann, that concerning every individual value there are the following five types of contrast in their anomalous inter-connectedness: 1. Value-neutrality (Wert-Wertindifferenz); 2. Disvalue-neutrality (Unwert-Wertindifferenz); 3. Value-disvalue (Wert-Unwert); 4. Value-value (Wert-Wert); 5. Disvalue-disvalue (Unwert-Unwert).⁷⁰

Hartmann holds that the Wertindifferenz has a peculiar meaning: it is the fixed point (der feste Punkt), in relation to which the distances of height first attain an absolute meaning. Hence he considers the first two types of contrast later, when he investigates the order of rank (Ranghöhenordnung) in the Wertreich.⁷¹

He discovers that the relation between disvalues, which corresponds to an antinomy between value and value, is not antinomical. Purity and fulness of life stand in an

⁶⁹ Ibid., 508.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 513.

⁷¹ Ibid., 513-514; Ibid., 558-564.

antinomic relation; but impurity and moral poverty may be compatible. In the diagram only three of the four basic

relations represented are in opposition (A to B, A to -A and B to -B), but the fourth (-A to -B) is not oppositional. Even the two diagonally placed connections (A to -B and B to -A) manifest no oppositional character. Purity does not conflict with moral poverty; neither does fulness of life conflict with impurity.⁷²

Hartmann admits that in their concrete materials there are contrasts enough among disvalues; arrogance and self-belittlement, and so on. He says that this type of contrast is familiar to us from Aristotle's doctrine of the virtues.⁷³

Hartmann discovers that, hidden behind the Aristotelian virtues, there is always a duality of antithetically placed values, the synthesis of which constitutes the sought-for virtue.⁷⁴ As Hartmann points out, it is untrue that the Aristotelian *μεσότης* is merely built upon the antithetic of disvalues: actually it is also built

⁷² Ibid., 515.

⁷³ Ibid., 516; Aristotle, Nic. Eth., Books II,vi,ix.

⁷⁴ Hartmann, Ethik, 517.

upon an antithetic of values.⁷⁵ The Aristotelian virtues, says Hartmann, are really valuational syntheses. They are complex values, which never consist of one-sided enhancements of single valuational elements alone, but of inner organic combinations of two materially contrasted elements.⁷⁶

From this he infers that every moral value has a "barbed hook"⁷⁷ (Widerhaken), not indeed in itself but for men; there is a limit beyond which its dominance (Herrschaft) in consciousness ceases to be of value.⁷⁸ It is only in their syntheses that the "barbed hook of values" (Widerhaken der Werte) is diminished, their tyranny in consciousness ("ihre Tyrannei im Wertbewusstsein") paralysed (paralysiert).⁷⁹ Thus he concludes that every value may reach true fulfilment only in its synthesis with others--only in its synthesis with all (in Synthese mit allen).⁸⁰

d. The Complementary Relationship

Hartmann holds that there is linked (knüpft) to the

⁷⁵ Ibid., 519.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 518.

⁷⁷ The "barbed hook" is Brightman's translation which he gave in a note of October 1, 1940.

⁷⁸ Hartmann, Ethik, 525.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 526.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

oppositional relationship a second one, of a different kind but lying in the same dimension: the complementary relationship. He sees it in trust and trustworthiness, faith and fidelity, and so on.⁸¹ And there is always this peculiarity in it, that the one value requires (verlangt) the other, has fulfilment of meaning (Sinnerfüllung) in it, but without its own worth thereby becoming dependent. Thus the trust bestowed upon one who is unreliable or the fidelity shown to one who is suspicious is still of moral worth; it lacks only the axiological completion of its meaning in the adequate attitude of the other.⁸²

Hartmann points out that this relation extends down to the fundierende Werte.⁸³ Thus material goods are complementary to certain biological values, upon which the capacity of the person to enjoy goods depends; for example, physical comfort, health; but complementary not less to the communal good of legal status, which renders possible the use and enjoyment of material goods.⁸⁴

In the domain of moral values, says Hartmann, the Komplementärverhältnis does not consist in the completion

⁸¹ Ibid., 532.

⁸² Ibid., 532-533.

⁸³ Ibid., 305-335.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 534.

(Ergänzung) of one and the same complex attitude, but in one person's moral completion through the moral value of another. In other words, there is established in the reciprocity of the two persons an ethically real structure of a higher order ("ein ethisch reales Gebilde höherer Ordnung"), which as a union of two dispositions bears a unique value which is higher and more complex.⁸⁵

Hartmann holds that this is an inter-personal synthesis (interpersonale Wertsynthese). As it forms out of the two values one value, so also it forms out of the two Wertträger one Wertträger. And as the one value is the higher, so the one Wertträger is the more able to carry the values.⁸⁶

e. The Grade and the Strength of Values

The order of rank (Rangordnung) of values, says Hartmann, does not simply concern the principle of valuational height (Werthöhe), but involves in itself a second decisive factor: valuational strength (Wertstärke). He holds that the regularity of height (Höhe) and strength (Stärke) is a fundamental categorial law, which prevails ontologically in all ideal and real Being (Sein) and thence

⁸⁵ Ibid., 539.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 540.

extends over the Wertreich; but in this extension (Übergreifen) it gains a new meaning.⁸⁷

According to Hartmann, there are three laws which here come in question. In content they link up with the laws of stratification, but unlike these latter they do not concern the structure of the categorial edifice ("die Struktur des kategorialen Aufbaues"), but the dynamic type of dependence ("der dynamische Typus der Abhängigkeit"). They are laws of dependence (Abhängigkeitsgesetze).

1. The Law of Strength: the higher principle is always the more dependent and in this sense the weaker. The more unconditioned and in this sense the stronger principle is always the lower one.

2. The Law of Material: every lower principle is only raw material for the higher which is raised upon it. Since the lower is the stronger, the dependence of the weaker upon it goes only so far as the scope of the higher formation is limited by the definiteness (Bestimmtheit) and peculiarity (Eigenart) of the material.

3. The Law of Freedom: compared with the lower, every higher principle is a new formation which is raised upon it. As such it has unlimited scope (unbegrenzter Spielraum). Thus in spite of dependence upon the lower

⁸⁷ Ibid., 543.

principle the higher is free, as against the lower.⁸⁸

Hartmann holds that the way in which these three laws are valid in the Wertreich is indicated by Wertgefühl. If the clue to valuational height (Index der Werthöhe) lies in the assenting feeling of value (das zustimmende Wertgefühl), as it expresses itself in specific responses such as approval (Billigung), respect (Verehrung), and admiration (Bewunderung), so the clue to valuational strength (Index der Wertstärke) lies in the negative, rejecting feeling of value ("das negative, absprechende Wertgefühl"), as it asserts itself wherever values are violated (verletzt).⁸⁹ According to Hartmann, das absprechende Wertgefühl also has its specific responses, which are reactions to disvalues. These show an independent scale of intensification ("eine selbständige Skala der Steigerung") such as disapproval (Missbilligung), contempt (Verachtung), abhorrence (Abscheu), and so on. He holds that this is not a simple reflection of the scale of positive valuational responses ("einfaches Spiegelbild nach der Skala der positiven Wertantworten"). The variability of valuational strength, which is independent of height ("die von der Werthöhe unabhängige Variabilität der Wertstärke"), is attached to the independence

⁸⁸ Ibid., 544; Hartmann, PgS, 15-17.

⁸⁹ Hartmann, Ethik, 546-547.

of the negative scale.⁹⁰

Here Hartmann maintains that this is proof of the peculiar autonomous character of valuational strength as compared with valuational height. When the higher value is violated, the transgression (Vergehen) is less, not more serious. When the stronger value is fulfilled, however, the meritoriousness (Verdienst) is not greater but less. He gathers this fact into a formula (Formel) in which the meaning of the basic categorial law, when transported into the axiological realm, is clearly given:

The higher law is always the more conditioned, the more dependent, and in this sense the weaker; its fulfilment is conceivable only in so far as it is raised upon the fulfilment of the lower values. The more unconditioned, the more elementary, and in this sense the stronger value is always the lower; it is only an axiological foundation of moral life ("axiologisches Fundament des sittlichen Lebens"), not a fulfilment of its meaning ("Erfüllung seines Sinnes"). The most greivous transgressions are those against the lowest values, but the greatest moral desert attaches to the highest values.⁹¹

⁹⁰ Ibid., 547.

⁹¹ Ibid., 548.

f. Value and Valuational Indifference

Hartmann holds that in addition to the limitations of Wertgefühl what makes the Rangordnung der Werte difficult to grasp objectively is the circumstance that, so far as most students of ethics are concerned, there is no fixed point of reference (fester Richtpunkt) in the scale. The same holds true, says Hartmann, of the Rangordnung der Unwerte.⁹²

In the indifference-point (Indifferenzpunkt) Hartmann discovers such a fixed point to which all that is of value or contrary to it is related. It is the absolute zero of dimensional elevation ("der absolute Nullpunkt der Höhendimension"). To it corresponds--throughout the whole extent of the Wertreich--a single average level ("ein einheitliches mittleres Niveau"), at which without distinction of qualitative difference value and disvalue separate. He holds that this level of neutrality is the same for all the qualitatively different scales of value.⁹³

He points out that the Indifferenzpunkt is not necessarily midway in the single valuational scale ("die Mitte der einzelnen Wertskalen"). Rather it is to be found now nearer to the value, now to the disvalue, according to

⁹² Ibid., 558.

⁹³ Ibid.

the rank (Ranghöhe) of the value. It may of course lie midway also; and there is a series of values of average grade ("eine Reihe von Werten mittlerer Ranghöhe"), of which this applies approximately.⁹⁴

Hartmann holds that with the height of the value the absolute grade of the whole valuational scale ("die absolute Höhenlage der ganzen Wertskala") moves against the Indifferenzpunkt, and in the same way the grade of the disvalue. In the case of the lower values the whole scale lies more below, in the case of the higher more above, the Indifferenzpunkt. Hence with the lower value the anti-value (Unwert) is far below it; with the higher the Unwert is near to the Indifferenzpunkt. Since the depth (Tiefenabstand) of the Unwert is the measure of the grievousness of transgression against the value, but since in the grievousness of the transgression is seen the strength of the value, it follows universally (allgemein) and on principle (prinzipiell) from this that the lower values are the stronger--a fact which hitherto could be seen only inductively from particular values.⁹⁵

⁹⁴ Ibid., 559.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 561.

4. Criticism of Hartmann's System of Values as a Whole

a. In considering Kant's subjectivism Hartmann states that it is not conceivable that the will should first give the law and then transgress it. This statement, however, is untenable because it is our common experience that we sometimes violate a self-imposed principle. What a will he must have never to contradict himself.⁹⁶ Socrates, too, believed that intentional inconsistency was impossible,⁹⁷ but he was wrong. If a student wishes to be educated, yet does not study, he violates the principle which he has imposed upon himself.⁹⁸

Denying Kant's conviction that the moral law, hence also every moral value, emanates from or depends on reason (Vernunft), Hartmann holds: (1) Value is perceived only a priori; (2) What is perceived a priori is objective, though independent of experience; (3) Hence value, which is perceived a priori is objective.⁹⁹

This argument is based on an atomistic conception of

⁹⁶ Hartmann, Ethik, 91.

⁹⁷ Plato, Charmides; See Taylor, Plato, 57.

⁹⁸ Brightman, ML, 102-104.

⁹⁹ Hartmann, Ethik, 94.

the meaning of a priori. According to an alternative view, a priori principles cannot even be known to be a priori unless they are necessary to a coherent universe of discourse, which in turn must be related to other universes of discourse and criticized with regard to its coherence.¹⁰⁰

b. Hartmann maintains, through an atomistic intuition, that the relation between a valuable thing and a perceiving subject is absolutely fixed and is objectively drawn into the structure of the valuational materials. From this he infers that goods are objective.¹⁰¹

Here an alternative view is presented by Brightman who holds that our perceptions of values, which are not tested by "rational norms (rational meaning logically consistent and coherent),"¹⁰² are only value-claims, which may sometimes be illusory; only systematic thought can support the claim. For example, maternal love is an instinctive, empirical value. Yet a mother may show it in an unenlightened way. Such love becomes a true value only when it is tested by intelligent regard for the child's welfare.¹⁰³ Hence, only when value-claims are consistent

¹⁰⁰ Pages 69, 70 of this dissertation.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 126-127.

¹⁰² Brightman, POR, 91-93.

¹⁰³ Brightman, ML, 131.

and coherent with each other and with the other facts of experience, are the claims verified;¹⁰⁴ only tested value-claims are true values.¹⁰⁵

Hartmann holds that moral value in the conduct of a person does not exist for a subject but adheres to the person as a quality. From this he infers that moral value has a purer self-existence ("ein reineres Ansichsein") than a goods-value.¹⁰⁶

Here Hartmann fails to note that all valuing is a conscious experience.¹⁰⁷ Moreover, he has not demonstrated that the particular moral value which adheres to a particular person is genuinely and objectively moral. At this point it is possible to hold that only what a rational system of the moral ideal commands us to regard as moral is moral. For example, filial piety which is traditionally regarded as a supreme moral value in Japan may manifest itself in such a way¹⁰⁸ that a rational system of the moral

¹⁰⁴ Bertocci holds that the standard of true value is the result of the coherent systematization of value-claims (Bertocci, EAG, 285). This statement is not coherent enough for it fails to consider the relationship of the value-claims to the other facts of experience.

¹⁰⁵ Brightman, POR, 93.

¹⁰⁶ Hartmann, Ethik, 128.

¹⁰⁷ This matter will be considered later (pages 116-119 of this dissertation. Hartmann confuses values and ideals.

¹⁰⁸ This refers to a Japanese girl who volunteered to become a geisha that her father might meet his financial obligation.

ideal cannot sanction it. The moral ideal, then, must be taken as a whole. As Haeckel said, "Reason is the highest good of man."¹⁰⁹ Rational system must survey, order, unify, and systematize all the instances of our moral experience.

c. Hartmann distinguishes between the Materie of value and its Wertcharackter; in the case of the value of trust the Materie is the idea of trust ("die Idee des Vertrauens"); the Materie is the ideal structure of essence of specifically formed relationship ("die ideale Wesensstruktur eines besonders gearteten Seins-verhältnisses").¹¹⁰ Here Hartmann's view of the Materie means something like what Brightman means by the ideal, which is "a definition of value"¹¹¹ or "a general concept of a type of experience which we value."¹¹²

Hartmann goes on to maintain that the Wertcharakter, distinguished from the Materie, is always self-existent and objectively valuable.¹¹³

However, here a thinker who appeals to coherence

¹⁰⁹ Cited by Brightman, ML, 84; See Fabricus, AG, 28.

¹¹⁰ Hartmann, Ethik, 133-134.

¹¹¹ Brightman, FOR, 91.

¹¹² Ibid., 90.

¹¹³ Hartmann, Ethik, 134.

would say that the Wertcharakter of trust is nothing but an empirical value or value-claim which is indeed the very stuff of value experience but may sometimes be subject to illusion. We cannot know that the trust under consideration is the right kind of trust¹¹⁴ until we realize that that is coherent with other value-claims and other facts of experience. We know that the Wertcharakter is a true value only after we have tested it by rational norms and thus have discovered its function in personality as a whole.¹¹⁵

For example, some people in Japan trust that what the government declares to be right is always right. Yet an independent thinker must test the validity of a particular form of trust on their part, say their trust in the government's decree that Shintoism ought to be imposed on everyone who lives in the country. He must test such trust by the rational system of Moral Laws and all the other facts of experience, especially by his knowledge of God.

d. Hartmann holds that in intuiting values the subject is always purely receptive; he, himself, on his side, determines nothing, but they determine him. In this respect, Hartmann claims, our knowledge of values is

¹¹⁴ Cf. Brentano, TRW, in which he calls true value "rightly characterized love." (TRW, 16).

¹¹⁵ See Brightman, POR, 93.

absolutely different from our knowledge of Anschaungen, Gedanken, or Vorstellungen. Hence values must be self-existent and objective.¹¹⁶

Messer regards this argument as valid¹¹⁷ but in other contexts Hartmann himself refers to some actual cases of Werttauschung¹¹⁸ when he mentions the false objectification of instrumental values. This could be illustrated by a miser who regards an economic value as intrinsic, or a legendary emperor¹¹⁹ who identified a natural value like longevity with an intrinsic value (his highest aim in life). However, when we test such value-claims by reason we find that both the economic value and longevity are merely instrumental values. It is, then, impossible to hold that in intuiting values the subject is always purely receptive, and at the same time explain how these cases of Werttauschung can take place.

Brightman presents an interpretation of the knowing process which is inconsistent with Hartmann's intuitionism:

¹¹⁶ Hartmann, Ethik, 133-134.

¹¹⁷ Messer, WdG, 14.

¹¹⁸ Hartmann, GME, 541; Hartmann, Ethik, 55, 141-142; pages 54-57 of this dissertation.

¹¹⁹ A Chinese story.

The reference of our experience to something beyond its present range is far from being a proof that the object referred to (the referent) actually exists outside the realm of imagination or conceivable essence.... When we refer to any supposed object (be it real or imaginary) we are setting up what may be called a knowledge-claim. Every experience, whatever else it may be, always includes a knowledge-claim which refers to something beyond the experience.

...We experience only our present consciousness; of this and this alone we are certain.... Knowledge-claims are never perfectly well-grounded; but when a reasonable degree of coherent empirical evidence and logical consistency supports belief in a knowledge-claim, we call it knowledge.¹²⁰

e. Hartmann holds that, like the real object of perception, value offers an absolute resistance to our will in the sense that it is impossible for us to perceive it otherwise than just as it is perceived.¹²¹

However, the same is true of the snakes seen by the victim of delirium tremens. Here again Hartmann identifies a knowledge-claim with an absolutely certain knowledge of the object perceived. According to an alternative view, however, all knowledge is "belief (more or less well-grounded) that the referent of the knowledge is as described," and yet it is "never so certain that we know any object correctly as it is that we are now conscious."¹²² Our perception of any and every object is valid only after it

¹²⁰ Brightman, POR, 165-166.

¹²¹ Hartmann, Ethik, 139.

¹²² Brightman, POR, 165-166.

has been tested by the ideal function of reason, which "surveys, orders, unifies, and systematizes."¹²³

f. If values were purely subjective, Hartmann holds, Werttauschung would be impossible, hence Werttauschung itself proves the objectivity of value.¹²⁴

This argument contradicts his other arguments for the objectivity of value, which imply that Werttauschung is impossible.¹²⁵ It is, however, quite conceivable that values are objective and yet our perceptions of them may sometimes be vitiated by Werttauschung. Here again an alternative view is found: Though all such perceptions are empirical values which are the very stuff of value experience and without which there is no value experience at all, and though many value-claims are true values, some value-claims are not entirely free from subjective illusion.¹²⁶ According to this view, a true value is what we still value after the testing of our empirical values by rational norms¹²⁷ which are based on a systematic organization of all value-claims and all other facts of experience. For

¹²³ Brightman, ML, 84.

¹²⁴ Hartmann, Ethik, 141-142.

¹²⁵ Pages 80, 81 of this dissertation.

¹²⁶ Ibid., pages, 2, 3, 65, 66, 68-70.

¹²⁷ See Brightman, POR, 93.

example, an experience of alcoholic intoxication cannot meet such a test but a philosopher's devotion to truth can. Thus without appeal to reason we cannot always know the fact that a certain perception of value is a Werttauschung. Hence this argument for objectivity is a repudiation of the appeal to intuition alone, and is essentially an argument based on discriminations between coherent and incoherent intuitions!

These investigations reveal that his arguments for the objectivity of value are ultimately based on his conviction that value is always known a priori and what is known a priori is objectively valid. Thus his arguments for the objectivity of value disregard the claims of coherence.

An alternative argument for the objectivity of value is presented by Sorley and Brightman when they hold that just as the hypothesis of a real world is the most coherent way of interpreting our sense experiences of nature and of communication with other persons, so our value-judgments can be organized into a system which is most coherent when we interpret value as an objective claim that reality makes, rather than as our merely subjective demand for pleasure or satisfaction.¹²⁸ Bertocci interprets this same argument

¹²⁸ Sorley, MVIG, 172 ff., 498 ff.; Brightman, ITP, 159.

as follows:

A coherent interpretation of such value-judgments indicates that values are as metaphysically objective as are the existential objects reached by way of a coherent interpretation of sense-impressions.¹²⁹

It is true that arguments for axiological objectivity lack the mathematical accuracy of those for physical objectivity. But that accuracy is achieved only by abstraction.

g. So far Hartmann's arguments for the objectivity of value have been examined. Now let us move on to examine what he means by this objectivity of value. For him it has six meanings:

(1) Values are originally patterns of an ethically ideal sphere, of a realm with its own structures, its own laws and order.¹³⁰

(2) This ideal realm of values subsists for itself--beyond actuality just as much as beyond consciousness; and Wertgefühl alone can grasp them.

Es ein an sich bestehendes Reich der Werte gibt, einen echten κόσμος νοητός, der ebenso jenseits der Wirklichkeit, wir jenseits des Bewusstseins besteht,--eine nicht konstruierte, erdichtete oder erträumte, sondern tatsächlich bestehende und im Phänomen des Wertgefühls greifbar werdende ethisch ideale Sphäre....¹³¹

¹²⁹ Bertocci, EAG, 163.

¹³⁰ Hartmann, Ethik, 136.

¹³¹ Ibid., 140.

(3) The structure of the ideal self-existence re-appears in that of the real in so far that the aprioristic knowledge of ideal Being at the same time constitutes an inner foundation of all knowledge of the real.

Die Struktur des idealen Ansichseins kehrt in der des realen wieder--zwar nicht restlos und nicht die des letzteren erschöpfend, wohl aber so weit, dass die apriorische Erkenntnis des idealen Seins zugleich eine innere Grundlage aller Realerkenntnis ausmacht.¹³²

(4) Values are materials, structures which constitute a special source in things, relations and persons ("Inhalte, Materien, Strukturen, die ein spezifisches Quale an Dingen, Verhältnissen oder Personen ausmachen").¹³³

(5) It makes no difference to value whether there be persons in whose actual conduct it is embodied or not.

Am eigentlichen Wertcharakter von etwas, d. h. von einer spezifischen Materie, etwa der Wahrhaftigkeit oder der Liebe, macht es gar keinen Unterschied aus, ob es Personen gibt, in deren wirklichen Verhalten er realisiert ist oder nicht.¹³⁴

(6) Values are eternally unchanging essences in the sense of subsisting beyond the change of individual existence ("Wesenheiten, die über dem Wechsel des individuellen Daseins bestehen").¹³⁵

¹³² Ibid., 135.

¹³³ Ibid., 109; this passage is quoted approvingly by Messer in his WdG, 13.

¹³⁴ Hartmann, Ethik, 136.

¹³⁵ Ibid., 135.

(7) The whole realm of values constitutes a multi-dimensional scale where each value, in comparison with all others, has a fixed place (Ort), relation (Verhältnis) and character (Wertcharakter).¹³⁶

The theoretical construction of Hartmann's system of ethics deals chiefly with the last item, namely, his scale of values.¹³⁷ Later the evaluation of this will appear separately.

Concerning his view of the objectivity of value we must say first of all that he confuses values and ideals. In one context he definitely affirms:

Werte haben kein reales Ansichsein.... Die eigentliche Seinsweise der Werte ist offenkundig die eines idealen Ansichseins.¹³⁸

Brightman has stated, in correspondence, the difference between his view of value and Hartmann's:

When Hartmann speaks of values as essences, he is speaking of what I call ideals. Every valid ideal, indeed every concept of every sort, qua concept, is timeless in the sense of having a fixed and determinate meaning. Whenever I refer to what I mean by cat today, I must use exactly the same concept I now have, or else my reference will not be valid. If I alter my concept of cat, it remains eternally true that I once had the former concept and now have a new one, which in turn is eternally valid as what I now believe. This, of course, applies to ideals.

But I do not regard an ideal as a value. An ideal is a valid concept of what would be a value if it were

¹³⁶ Ibid., 497.

¹³⁷ Vide pages 85-104 of this dissertation.

¹³⁸ Hartmann, Ethik, 136.

realized in temporal-personal experience. The eternal truth that I ought to be benevolent is an ideal; but I find no value in that ideal until I actually am benevolent; then my actual benevolence is a value because it is a real experience conforming to the ideal. Hence I say that values are not fixed entities, but conscious fulfillments of ideals. The ideals themselves are fixed concepts (although I may be ignorant of what the valid fixed concept of justice is); but values are never mere concepts. Ideals are objective as God's knowledge; values are objective as God's experience, and it is in process of temporal development so that even God's values are not static.¹³⁹

For Hartmann the realm of values enjoys its objectivity in an isolated way because in the rest of the world there is only rigid mechanism,¹⁴⁰ (of course, no God¹⁴¹), except for our moral potentialities. His scale of values is abstractly conceived and is incoherent with his total world-view. Here he has created many a mystery rather than succeeding in explaining reasonably all the moral experiences in connection with the rest of the whole concrete range of human experience.¹⁴² And what makes his view even

¹³⁹ Brightman's letter of September 9, 1940; "An ideal is a general concept of a type of experience which we approve in relation to a complete view of all our experience, including all our approvals, and which we acknowledge that we ought to realize." (Brightman, POI, 86); "Values are conscious fulfillments of ideals, not fixed entities or things." (Brightman, POR, 106 footnote).

¹⁴⁰ Hartmann, *Ethik*, 187-188. See page 38 of this dissertation.

¹⁴¹ Vide pages 141-175 of this dissertation.

¹⁴² Pringle-Pattison (*IGRP*, 38), Sorley (*MVIG*, VIII), Brightman (PI, 210-212), Taylor (*FM*, Vol. I, 36), Van Dusen

more incoherent is the fact that he is definitely aware of the meaning and importance of coherence¹⁴³ in one's philosophizing.¹⁴⁴

Both Hartmann and Messer believe in an ideal self-existent realm of values, which is indifferent to our real world, the only point of contact between the two realms being Wertgefühl.¹⁴⁵ As to this function of Wertgefühl

Brightman stated in correspondence:

By a value Hartmann means an ideal, yet for an ideal, I do not see that Wertgefühl is necessary. Knowledge suffices.

Hartmann's chief error is in supposing that value experience is merely a Wertgefühl, merely a beholding of eternal ideals. Rather, value experience is the creation of actual values which conform to the rule of the eternal ideal, yet manifest freedom and variety, within that rule.

The objectivity of the ideal is its eternal subsistence. But if values are objective, they must exist,

(PMSG, 111) all agree in regarding it as one of the most important problems of philosophy to investigate the relation between value and reality. This means that Hartmann's failure coherently to explain this relation counts seriously against his philosophy.

¹⁴³ Hartmann, Ethik, 38, 144, 245, 267, 496, 527, 534, 535, 540, 556, 557; See pages 2, 3, 83-85 of this dissertation.

¹⁴⁴ Whitehead defines philosophy as the endeavor to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be interpreted (PR, 4); Brightman defines it as an attempt to discover a coherent and unified definition of the real (Brightman, POR, 534).

¹⁴⁵ Hartmann, Ethik, 107, 140; Messer, WdG, 16; pages 1, 7, 8, 144 of this dissertation.

not merely subsist; and exist in an objective mind.

On Hartmann's view value is never experienced; and what it defines has no coherent relation to any actual experience of value. It would make all claims to actual value experience false, and hence would be a theory of value with no valid empirical basis. Since it confuses value and ideal, it is incoherent with the reference of these terms to different types of referent.¹⁴⁶

Hartmann holds that since, in their mode of Being (Seinsweise), values are Platonic ideas (Platonische Ideen), we cannot grasp (erfassen) them by thought (Denken) but we can only behold (schauen) them by an inner vision (eine innere Schau) or Wertfühlen just as Plato beheld his Ideas.¹⁴⁷

Das Platonische Motiv des Schauens gerade passt gut zu auf das, was die materiale Ethik Wertfühlen nennt....¹⁴⁸

A comparison of Hartmann's idea of beholding values with Plato's own idea of beholding his Ideas reveals that Hartmann misrepresents the original meaning of beholding, by substituting an atomistic Wertfühlen for a synoptic θεωρία. A few passages in Plato's dialogues throw light on this matter:

A relevant passage is found in the Phaedo. About

¹⁴⁶ Brightman's letter of September 21, 1940.

¹⁴⁷ Hartmann, Ethik, 108-109; The fact that on Hartmann's view our sensing of value is a Platonic beholding is mentioned by M. G. Walker (Walker, Art. 1, 39; See pages 35-40 of this dissertation).

¹⁴⁸ Hartmann, Ethik, 109.

the philosopher Plato states that his soul must gain peace from emotions, must follow reason, and abide always in it, beholding (*θεωμένη*) that which is true and divine and not a matter of opinion, and making that its only food.¹⁴⁹ Here Plato's interest in truth is not emotional but it is in keeping with reason, which is "the one principle of coherence, synopsis, or totality."¹⁵⁰

Another relevant passage is found in the Republic. Referring to a soul that is ever to seek integrity and wholeness in all things human and divine, Plato says that it is habituated to the beholding (*θεωρία*) of all time and all existence.¹⁵¹ Since this soul is always devoted to seek integrity and wholeness in all things human and divine, such a soul is identical with a synoptic thinker, and it follows from the very nature of this soul that this beholding is not atomistic or merely intuitive, as is indicated by Hartmann's Wertfühlen, but synoptic and comprehensive, thus indicating reason.

A third passage is found in the Republic. Here Plato attributes to dialectic the power to behold the intelligible (*νοητοῦ*) which is distinguished from reality

¹⁴⁹ Plato, Phaedo, 84 B.

¹⁵⁰ Brightman, POR, 184.

¹⁵¹ Plato, Republic, 486 A.

(ὄντος).¹⁵² Plato means by the νοητόν the realm of ideas¹⁵³ and a clear understanding of the meaning of dialectic will serve to illuminate what Plato means by this passage. He says in the Phaedrus¹⁵⁴ that dialectic is philosophy in the wide sense in which that word means the capacity for seeing the real affinities in things, and so grouping them in well-defined genera; and detecting the differences which mark off different species within the genus. Again in the Philebus¹⁵⁵ Plato speaks of dialectic, the business of which it is to study the absolutely real and the eternal. In the Republic,¹⁵⁶ the dialectic method is described as a kind of induction (συναγωγή) whereby the mind ascends from the many particulars to the one universal concept or idea: a comprehensive view (σύννοψις) of the whole is what marks the synoptic dialectician (ὁ συνοπτικὸς διαλεκτικός).¹⁵⁷

¹⁵² Ibid., 511 c.

¹⁵³ Hartmann uses the expression κόσμος νοητός for his realm of values (Wertreich). (Ethik, 140).

¹⁵⁴ Phaedrus, 265 c - 266 a.

¹⁵⁵ Philebus, 57 d.

¹⁵⁶ Republic, 537 B ff.; Brightman defines dialectic as the mind's search for completeness and coherence (POR, 528).

¹⁵⁷ This means: The synoptic man is dialectical; Alexander refers to the fact that Plato regards the metaphysician as a synoptical man (STD, vol.1, 4).

This consideration of Plato's ideas of beholding and of dialectic reveals to us the fact that Hartmann misrepresents Plato's thought when he substitutes Wertfühlen for dialectic. Plato's thought that the Ideas can be seen only by reason was misinterpreted by Hartmann to mean that only Wertfühlen or l'ordre du coeur¹⁵⁸ or l'organe morale¹⁵⁹ can behold the values.

It has been pointed out¹⁶⁰ that on Hartmann's view the realm of values, which is supposedly modelled after Plato's realm of ideas,¹⁶¹ enjoys its objectivity in an isolated way and its relation to the rest of the world, where there is only rigid mechanism, creates a difficult problem for synoptic thought. According to Calhoun, Plato's ideas do not create such difficulty:

Calhoun holds that Platonic ideas or forms (ἰδέαι, εἶδη) are the factors in a thing which make this thing what it describably is, and are the ground for specifying its relationships with other things. An idea, then, is not a thing, but a stable character, the presence of which justifies the attribution to the thing in which it is

¹⁵⁸ Pascal's phrase quoted by Hartmann (Ethik, 260).

¹⁵⁹ Hemsterhuis's phrase quoted by Hartmann (Ethik, 260).

¹⁶⁰ Pages 117, 118 of this dissertation.

¹⁶¹ Hartmann, Ethik, 108-109.

present of just that single character itself.¹⁶² It is a noumenon in the proper sense, an essential character comprehensible not by the senses but only by rational mind and thought (*νοῦς, νόησις*).¹⁶³

Concerning the relations of Platonic ideas to things, Calhoun holds that if we could read Plato's statements "in their original contexts without preconception," we should get the "impression of clear logical differentiation and close ontological association between ideas and things." Calhoun thus rejects Aristotle's interpretation of Plato, which sees not only "a logical distinction" but "an ontological disjunction"¹⁶⁴ of ideas from things, such that the ideas are a second order of things existing separately,¹⁶⁵ the relation of which to sensible things would pose in-

¹⁶² Calhoun in Macintosh (ed.), RR, 222.

¹⁶³ Ibid., 223.

¹⁶⁴ Messer's view that Plato's ideas are "wahrhaft wirkliche Wesenheiten," points to the same ontological disjunction (Messer, WdG, 13). However, Brightman holds with Calhoun that at least the Platonic Ideas are eternal subsistents. Brightman says: "Plato never made up his mind about the metaphysical status of the Forms; they seem in Phaedrus 247 to be noumenal reality (*οὐσία*); so in the myth of the cave (Republic, 514 ff.); and in Timaeus (e.g. 38, and esp. 27 D--*τὸ ὅν αἰεί*); yet the Parmenides and Epistles are a testimony to Plato's self-criticism." (A note of January 15, 1941).

¹⁶⁵ Aristotle, Met., 1078b.30-1079a.4; 990a.33-991b.9

tractable problems for reason.¹⁶⁶

Calhoun goes on to maintain that for Plato there are not two separate realms, one of intelligible or noumenal things, the other of perceptible or phenomenal things, standing over against each other in reciprocal isolation. Ideas and things are present together in one world, in which each is logically distinguished from the other; in which there are systematic inter-relations among things; and in which more ultimate factors than either things or ideas are discoverable by systematic analysis.¹⁶⁷

As to Plato's cosmology Calhoun accepts the lines of interpretation which are opened up in the Politicus, Phaedo, and Philebus, and followed without essential change in the Timaeus and the Laws. Good is the end in the light of which all things are as far as possible to be understood, but which can itself only be appreciated, not analytically defined.¹⁶⁸ Order, largely geometrical and numerical, is

¹⁶⁶ Calhoun in Macintosh, RR, 226.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., 231.

¹⁶⁸ Defining the Good Hartmann says: "Das Gute ist inhaltlich umfassend und setzt die ganze Werttafel voraus, nicht nur in ihren Materien, sondern auch in deren gegenseitigen Wertverhältnissen. Es setzt also auch die Gesetzmäßigkeit der Werttafel voraus." (Ethik, 496); however, since some values are invisible to his Wertgefühl (Ethik, 496), the complete view of the Good is impossible. Thus for him the Good cannot be experienced, though it can be defined.

the formal condition basic to the realization of good.¹⁶⁹ Mind is the agent by whose activity order is comprehended and effected, the good being thereby progressively achieved. The God (ὁ Θεός) of the *Timaeus*¹⁷⁰ is good and desires that, as far as possible, all things shall be good.¹⁷¹ Calhoun concludes that Plato's is a thorough-going teleological theory¹⁷² which, whatever its degree of validity, is at least straightforward and coherent.¹⁷³ Compared with this Platonic theory, Hartmann's world-view, with its Wertgefühl, its confusion of ideals and values, its realm of values enjoying its objectivity in isolation and its rejection of the concept of God as a Principle of Unification,¹⁷⁴ reveals

¹⁶⁹ Calhoun in Macintosh (ed.), RR, 238.

¹⁷⁰ *Timaeus*, 30a. 2-3.

¹⁷¹ Calhoun in Macintosh (ed.), RR, 238.

¹⁷² Calhoun points out that in Plato's later dialogues there is a growing emphasis of the alogical factors without reference to which the actual world cannot readily be described (Calhoun in Macintosh (ed.), RR, 239).

¹⁷³ Calhoun in Macintosh (ed.), RR, 239; Brightman holds that "Plato's ultimate metaphysics remains unsatisfactory and disunified, because both the principles of reason and the disorderly infinite seem to be external to God." Brightman goes on to maintain that "Plato preserves the goodness of God at the cost of metaphysical coherence." "Plato seems to have believed that axiological coherence was more important than cosmological coherence." (Brightman, POR, 288).

¹⁷⁴ See pages 141-175 of this dissertation.

internal inconsistency.

h. Another difficulty with Hartmann's theory of value is that, though he takes seriously the objectivity of value, he does not take its subjectivity seriously--the empirical fact that valuing is a conscious experience, that "value is dependent on personality."¹⁷⁵

As Hessen points out, for Hartmann values are objective self-existent essences which do not require any subjective correlate:

Für ihn sind die Werte, wie wir bereits wissen, objektive, an sich seiende Wesenheiten, die keinerlei subjektives Korrelat erfordern.¹⁷⁶

Hessen is right in holding that it is intolerable to detach values from their living connection with the value-feeling personality and to make them fixed essences:

Es geht in der Tat nicht an, wie wir schon öfter betont haben, die Werte aus dem lebendigen Zusammenhang mit dem wertführenden Geist zu lösen und zu starren Wesenheiten zu machen.¹⁷⁷

Such a fixed essence is really, as Hessen says, an inadmissible hypostasization ("eine unzulässige Hypostasierung").¹⁷⁸ Hessen is right when he maintains that if we

¹⁷⁵ Brightman, ITP, 163.

¹⁷⁶ Hessen, Wertphilosophie, 243.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., 243.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., 31.

eliminate from the concept of value its relation to a value-experiencing personality we are sure to destroy it as value; and we may add that there is left from the destruction, at best, only the truth that value ought to be--but is not.

Die Beziehung auf einen werterlebenden Geist kann man aus dem Wertbegriff nicht eliminieren, ohne ihn zu zerstören.¹⁷⁹

Hence, for anyone who wants to think coherently, the subjectivity of value, its dependence on consciousness,¹⁸⁰ must be reconciled with its objectivity or the fact that "I face a world in which value is a reality beyond myself."¹⁸¹ There is only one way to reconcile them, to suppose that "the true values are experiences of a mind beyond all human individuals and societies."¹⁸² And it follows that the true

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., 32; Matthews says that no value of any kind can exist apart from personal experience (Matthews, GCTE, 161); Perry says that values are not absolute in the sense of being independent of all consciousness (Perry, PPT, 335).

¹⁸⁰ This is recognized by Perry when he defines value as any object of any interest (GTV, 115-145), or as a function of interest (GTV, 693); See also Perry, PPT, 335.

¹⁸¹ Brightman, ITP, 163.

¹⁸² Ibid.; In his POR Brightman holds that logical thought about value experience points to the conception of a Supreme Person, who guides the universe by its ideals, and in whom supreme good is acknowledged and actualized. He calls this "the dialectic of desire." (POR, 251-259).

ideals are the norms or purposes of that mind.¹⁸³

1. Hartmann's discussion of the laws of the Werttafel¹⁸⁴ starts from his presupposition that the scale of moral values from das Gute and das Edle up to Schenkende Tugend and Persönliche Liebe¹⁸⁵ is a valid scale. He intuitively arranges these values in ascending order of intrinsic importance and then attempts to discover objectively--through the methods of intuition (Wertgefühl), of analysis (Wertanalyse) and of synopsis (Überschau)--the laws which govern them. What is incoherent is not so much his attempt to discover such laws as his intuitive presupposition that such a scale of moral values really exists.

His belief in the scale of values is supported by his incoherent intuition that each value has its eternally fixed place assigned for it in the scale. He maintains:

Die einzelnen Werte lassen sich aus ihrem bestimmten Ort im Wertraum auf keine Weise herauslösen; wie sich die vertikal (in der Ranghöhe) geschiedenen Werte nicht künstlich zusammenbringen lassen--es sei denn in abstracto, wobei sie aber ihren spezifischen Wertcharakter einbüßen--so auch die horizontal geschiedenen.

Das lebendige Wertgefühl an die materialen und axiologisch-qualitativen Unterschiede fest gebunden bleibt.

¹⁸³ Pages 116-117 of this dissertation.

¹⁸⁴ Hartmann, Ethik, 495-564.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., 336-495.

Das Wertgefühl ist die alleinige erkennende Instanz, welche die Projektion auf der Höhenskala ablesen könnte....¹⁸⁶

Aufzwingen lassen sich die Werte kein Gesetz.¹⁸⁷

This theory of his makes it necessary to examine the validity of the idea of a scale of values.

W. R. Sorley in his Moral Values and the Idea of God regards it as impossible to discover the relative importance of intrinsic values. When intellectual values are under consideration, he says, we cannot prefer mathematics to biology, economics to metaphysics, or the reverse. Or, in morality, we cannot distinguish kinds of goodness and arrange them in the order of their value, Reid and Martineau to the contrary notwithstanding. Hence Sorley believes that if we are to compare values at all we must give up the idea of a scale for that of a system. We shall never get what we want by adding and subtracting quantities. Moreover, intrinsic value is relative to the situation in which it is realized.¹⁸⁸ For example, there is no value in playing baseball if we play it at a church service, or in rehearsing Hamlet if we want to solve a mathematical problem at the same time.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., 497.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid., 499.

¹⁸⁸ Sorley, MVIG, 50-52.

Sorley goes on to maintain that there are many dominant conceptions of value which appeal to the judgments of different men. A complete theory of value should be able to determine the relative validity of these conceptions; and this would involve two things. In the first place it would be necessary to make clear the universal conditions of value which are valid irrespective of the time, place and circumstances of the persons in and by whom value is to be realized. In the second place, these general principles should be shown to be consistent with, and to make possible, different types of value corresponding to differences of endowment and opportunity. And yet, behind their difference of thought and of achievement, there may be an identity of principle. To determine the way in which different ideals are related to one another in a community of lives that seek the highest value is the crowning work of an ethical theory. Yet, short of this, we cannot give a satisfactory solution of the problem of the scale of values. Thus Sorley concludes that the problem of the scale of values must be resolved into that of the organic unity or systematic whole into which all values enter, and by their relation to which the place and degree of all partial values are determined.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., 52-53.

It has been suggested by a reader of Sorley that the ground for the grouping of values into higher and lower is found only in the extent of the contribution made by each value to the coherent whole of life.¹⁹⁰ Then that value is, in any given situation, the highest which contributes most to the coherent functioning and organization of experience as a whole.¹⁹¹ Thus in some situations one value will be highest, in others, another. For example, when a person is hungry a good meal is more valuable to him than a lovely poem, but when the meal is over, a walk in the open air may perhaps be the highest value to him.

Brightman holds that each intrinsic value has a dual character; it has a unique quality of its own to contribute to the total value experience and yet each tends to coalesce with the others.¹⁹² There is ultimately only one intrinsic value, namely, the systematic whole of value experience. For example, we know that social values coalesce with the others, for "unless we have play, or work, or knowledge, or beauty, or religion, there is nothing to share." And religion would be worthless "if it could not include either

¹⁹⁰ Brightman, ITP, 146.

¹⁹¹ Ibid., 144.

¹⁹² Everett holds that all intrinsic values interpenetrate (Everett, MV, 183).

goodness or truth or beauty in either the worshiper or his God."¹⁹³

He goes on to maintain that in the coalescence of the system, the values are "more like whirlpools or eddies than like fish swimming in the sea." They are "centers of organization" rather than "separate and distinct entities, each more or less valuable than the other." Hence, in estimating the importance of a value Brightman, like Sorley, gives up the idea of a scale for that of a system. Within the system, degrees of value would be measured by "the extent to which the particular value in question mirrors or expresses the nature of the whole system of value."¹⁹⁴

This consideration makes it clear that Hartmann's belief in a scale of values, in which each value is a separate and distinct entity (each more or less valuable than the other), is not a reasonable belief. Hartmann errs in trying to substitute intuition of concrete values for law or system as the basic ethical principle. Though he attempts to systematize those values by means of a synoptic survey¹⁹⁵ what was missed in the initial act of intuition is lost sight of entirely. For example, religious values,

¹⁹³ Brightman, FOR, 100-101.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid., 101-102.

¹⁹⁵ Hartmann, Ethik, 38, 144, 245, 267.

which can enrich the content of our morality,¹⁹⁶ are lost from his system forever.¹⁹⁷

Thus his ethics, when compared with Brightman's system of Moral Laws, does not allow scope for "growth and movement of life toward higher and deeper levels of insight"; while the Moral Laws are "principles of rational development," not "rigid prescriptions of specific acts which are supposed to be eternally right,"¹⁹⁸ nor, like Hartmann's, descriptions of concrete values grasped only through intuition.

After this general criticism of Hartmann's scale of values let us move on to examine specifically his view of the laws of the Werttafel.

j. In considering the Schichtungsverhältnis Hartmann investigates the relationship between one value (the well-being of one's neighbor) and another (a situational value).¹⁹⁹

In this consideration his analytical genius shows its remarkable accuracy. And yet his thought remains abstract and to that extent incoherent in the sense that in it he does not consider any other value or any other fact

¹⁹⁶ Brightman, ML, 269.

¹⁹⁷ See pages 141-175 of this dissertation.

¹⁹⁸ Brightman, ML, 94.

¹⁹⁹ Hartmann, Ethik, 508-509.

of experience. What Hegel calls "the seriousness, the pain, the patience and labor of the negative" ("der Ernst, der Schmerz, die Geduld und Arbeit des Negativen")²⁰⁰ ought to enlighten us here. By this he means that if we desire to know the truth of anything we must not only study that thing itself but also its relation to all the rest of reality. Hegel admits that such a coherent investigation is not easy. On the contrary, that requires pain, patience, and labor. Nevertheless, it must be taken seriously because the true is the whole ("Das Wahre ist das Ganze").²⁰¹

This Hegelian wisdom, when applied to our problem, means that in the investigation of the relation between A and B, what is not A and what is not B must also be taken into account and studied analytically, synoptically, and thus in a systematically coherent way.

The same abstract procedure vitiates Hartmann's Fundierungsverhältnis,²⁰² though here again his analysis is equally precise and keen

k. In the Gegensatzverhältnis and the Wertsynthese,²⁰³

²⁰⁰ Hegel, PG, 20; Baillie, PM, 81 gives an English translation.

²⁰¹ Hegel, PG, 21; Baillie, PM, 81.

²⁰² Hartmann, Ethik, 506-511.

²⁰³ Ibid., 512-532.

the first of these is the fact that the
 the second is the fact that the
 the third is the fact that the
 the fourth is the fact that the
 the fifth is the fact that the
 the sixth is the fact that the
 the seventh is the fact that the
 the eighth is the fact that the
 the ninth is the fact that the
 the tenth is the fact that the
 the eleventh is the fact that the
 the twelfth is the fact that the
 the thirteenth is the fact that the
 the fourteenth is the fact that the
 the fifteenth is the fact that the
 the sixteenth is the fact that the
 the seventeenth is the fact that the
 the eighteenth is the fact that the
 the nineteenth is the fact that the
 the twentieth is the fact that the
 the twenty-first is the fact that the
 the twenty-second is the fact that the
 the twenty-third is the fact that the
 the twenty-fourth is the fact that the
 the twenty-fifth is the fact that the
 the twenty-sixth is the fact that the
 the twenty-seventh is the fact that the
 the twenty-eighth is the fact that the
 the twenty-ninth is the fact that the
 the thirtieth is the fact that the

13

the first of these is the fact that the
 the second is the fact that the
 the third is the fact that the
 the fourth is the fact that the
 the fifth is the fact that the
 the sixth is the fact that the
 the seventh is the fact that the
 the eighth is the fact that the
 the ninth is the fact that the
 the tenth is the fact that the
 the eleventh is the fact that the
 the twelfth is the fact that the
 the thirteenth is the fact that the
 the fourteenth is the fact that the
 the fifteenth is the fact that the
 the sixteenth is the fact that the
 the seventeenth is the fact that the
 the eighteenth is the fact that the
 the nineteenth is the fact that the
 the twentieth is the fact that the
 the twenty-first is the fact that the
 the twenty-second is the fact that the
 the twenty-third is the fact that the
 the twenty-fourth is the fact that the
 the twenty-fifth is the fact that the
 the twenty-sixth is the fact that the
 the twenty-seventh is the fact that the
 the twenty-eighth is the fact that the
 the twenty-ninth is the fact that the
 the thirtieth is the fact that the

his consideration is more adequate. He starts from the three different kinds of Gegensatzverhältnis--Value-Disvalue, Value-Value, Disvalue-Disvalue²⁰⁴--and attempts to see the interrelations among them. He then realizes that only in a synthesis can the valuational contrasts find their fulfilment.²⁰⁵ Then he realizes that when syntheses do not exist between single values they are not to be sought for within the valuational structure of these values but outside of it, in its relation to other valuational materials.²⁰⁶

The dialectic of thought does not let him rest here but rather does it urge him to move on to the highest and all-embracing synthesis, in which the essence of the good may be fulfilled and have a unified meaning.²⁰⁷ Here he is adopting the principle of coherence for the time being.

1. In the Komplementärverhältnis he considers the relationship between values which require each other. Here too, Hartmann discovers, only synthesis brings the single values to fulfilment, though they stand in no antithetical relation (such as in the relationship between activity and strength, strength and freedom).²⁰⁸ In the domain of

²⁰⁴ Ibid., 513.

²⁰⁵ Ibid., 518.

²⁰⁶ Ibid., 521.

²⁰⁷ Ibid., 527.

²⁰⁸ Ibid., 527.

the moral values, the synthesis, which he requires, is inter-personal (forming one Wertträger out of two Wertträger).²⁰⁹ Here again he is thinking coherently.

m. His supreme aim in the theoretical construction of his ethics is to discover the Werthöhe of each and every value in the total scale of values. All the other relations are intended to throw light on this. His consideration of the Werthöhe and the Wertstärke is based on his intuitive presupposition that the Wertreich may be ordered by a fixed scale.²¹⁰ The incoherences contained in such a fixed scale of values have already been pointed out.²¹¹

His consideration of the Werthöhe and Wertstärke is also based on his categorial laws²¹² which are as follows:

A. Die Schichtungsgesetze

1. Die niederen Prinzipien oder deren Elemente kehren in den höheren als Teilmomente wieder; sie können dabei in den Vordergrund oder Hintergrund der höheren Gebilde rücken und dementsprechend in ihnen sichtbar werden oder verschwinden. In beiden Fällen bleiben sie durchgehende Strukturelemente.

2. Diese Elemente bleiben in ihrer Wiederkehr von der Struktur der höheren Gebilde nicht unberührt. Sie wandeln sich mannigfaltig ab, je nach der Rolle, die

²⁰⁹ Ibid., 540.

²¹⁰ Ibid., 336-492.

²¹¹ Pages 128-133 of this dissertation.

²¹² In his note of September 21, 1940, Brightman has expressed agreement with my statement that Hartmann is the only thinker who has ever contemplated categorial laws.

ihnen in der höheren Komplexion zufällt. Identisch erhält sich an ihnen nur ein elementarer Grundsinn.

3. Die höheren Gebilde gehen in der Mannigfaltigkeit der in ihnen wiederkehrenden Elemente nicht auf. Sie zeigen jedesmal neben der Elementarschichtung--schon allein in der Struktur der Komplexion--ein spezifisches Novum, das in den Elementen nicht enthalten ist. Dieses jedesmalige Novum ist es, was das Hervor- und Zurücktreten der Elemente, sowie die Abwandlung ihres Sinnes bestimmt.

4. Die Überlagerung der niederen Prinzipien durch höhere schreitet nicht in schlichter Kontinuität fort, sondern in Schichten, die gegeneinander durch deutliche Schichtendistanzen abgehoben sind. Jede höhere Schicht zeigt den niederen Schichten gegenüber wiederum ein gemeinsames Novum, während die Verbindung mit jenen durch die Wiederkehr der sich abwandelnden Elemente hergestellt wird.

5. Gesetz der Stärke: die höheren Prinzipien sind von den niederen abhängig, nicht aber umgekehrt. Das höhere Prinzip also ist allemal das bedingtere, abhängigere und in diesem Sinne schwächere. Das unbedingtere, elementarere und in diesem Sinne stärkere Prinzip aber ist allemal das niedere. Die Inversion dieses Verhältnisses ist wohl in abstracto denkbar, niemals aber am Wesen der Prinzipien aufzeigbar.

6. Gesetz der Materie: Jedes niedere Prinzip ist für das höhere, das sich über ihm erhebt, nur Materie. Da nun das niedere Prinzip das stärkere ist, so geht die Abhängigkeit des schwächeren vom stärkeren Prinzip nur so weit, als der Spielraum seiner höheren Formung durch Bestimmtheit und Eigenart der Materie begrenzt ist.

7. Gesetz der Freiheit: Jedes höhere Prinzip ist dem niederen gegenüber durchaus neue Formung, die sich über ihm erhebt. Als solche hat es oberhalb der niederen (materialen und stärkeren) Bestimmtheit unbegrenzten Spielraum. Das heisst, ungeachtet seiner Abhängigkeit vom niederen Prinzip ist das höhere ihm gegenüber frei.²¹³

As to these categorial laws the following incoherencies will be found:²¹⁴

²¹³ Hartmann, Ethik, 502-504; 544.

²¹⁴ This reasoning follows out Brightman's suggestions given in a note of August 13, 1940.

In the first law Hartmann states that the lower principles may enter into the foreground or the background of the higher principles, and accordingly be visible in them ("in ihnen sichtbar werden") or vanish (verschwinden). It would have been wise for Hartmann to think of the lower as aufgehoben in the Hegelian sense,--died and risen again (transmuted). This first law is really dialectic; the lower is aufgehoben in the higher.

According to the second law, he claims that when the lower principles recur in the higher, the former do not remain intact (unberührt). Only an elemental essence ("ein elementarer Grundsinn") remains the same.

This is very abstractly stated. Here is nothing of bodily values in (say) logical values. If so, it is very greatly aufgehoben,--both berührt and verschwunden.

The third categorial law states that the higher forms manifest something new and this novelty determines (bestimmt) the prominence (Hervortreten) or seclusion (Zurücktreten) of the lower elements recurring in the higher, as well as the transformation (Abwandlung) of their significance.

Now the fact that the novelty of the higher forms determines the lower elements in this way is not consistent with the fifth categorial law which states that higher principles are dependent upon the lower, but the converse

is not true. This fifth categorial law really breaks the backbone of morality. The only sense in which this is really true is that violence can destroy the life of persons, and so in a sense the physical is stronger than the higher values.

This same categorial law, which states that higher principles are dependent upon the lower, but the converse is not true, flatly contradicts also the seventh law which states that compared with the lower every higher principle is a new formation which is raised upon it and as such it has unlimited scope (unbegrenzter Spielraum) above the lower fixity.

Hartmann's view that higher principles are dependent upon the lower but that the converse is not true overlooks the fact that all intrinsic values interpenetrate²¹⁵ and coalesce.²¹⁶ As has been pointed out, values are not arranged in a scale or series but they constitute a system, so that each value includes all the others, higher as well as lower. For example, recreation (play or drama) includes some form of intellectual, religious, moral, aesthetic, as well as lower (bodily) values. Hartmann needs to specify

²¹⁵ See Everett, MV, 183.

²¹⁶ Brightman, POR, 100-102.

far more clearly the sense in which the higher is both dependent and independent.

n. Hartmann's discussion on the Wertindifferenz is based on the alleged power of Wertgefühl, which can tell exactly the height and strength of each value.²¹⁷ Here he appeals to atomism without regard to the claims of coherence. However, here again he demonstrates his unusual ability as an analytic thinker.

²¹⁷ Hartmann, Ethik, 559.

CHAPTER III

EXAMINATION OF HARTMANN'S CRITIQUE OF THE CONCEPT OF GOD AS A PRINCIPLE OF COHERENCE AMONG VALUES

Metaphysically, morally, and theologically, Hartmann finds it impossible to accept belief in God. In this chapter we examine his reasons for atheism.

1. His Metaphysical Reasons

a. God's Timelessness Not Relevant to Moral Struggle

Hartmann holds that in the first stage of any teleological process the subject overleaps (springt über) the time process in the setting up of the end. The second stage consists of the return determination (die rückläufige Bestimmung) of the means by the end, beginning with the means nearest to the end and so backward to the first means which is close to the subject. The third stage contains the actualization of the end wherein the relation of means and end which was reversed in the backward determination is changed into a straightforward continuous relation of cause and effect.¹

¹ Hartmann, Ethik, 174-177.

Now in the second stage, Hartmann maintains, the teleological process goes against the temporal succession (die zeitliche Sukzession). Only a form which is in itself timeless ("ein an sich zeitloses Gebilde") can move against the temporal current. Thought, the content of consciousness (der Bewusstseinsinhalt), can do this. Hence only human consciousness can furnish the ontological mode for the anticipation needed in the finalistic nexus and for the reversal of temporal succession ("der ontologische Modulus für die im Finalnexus erfordernte Antizipation und Umkehrung der Sukzession"). In man we find the single point in the world ("der einzige Punkt in der Welt"), where there is really verifiable axiological determination ("wirklich nachweisbare axiologische Determination").²

Hartmann's argument is too exclusively analytic; his logic is too atomistic to be convincing. A theistic argument, which is valid, is based on a coherent synopsis (as contrast with analysis) of all that we know of reality as a whole. A theist maintains that there is a God who is rational and purposive solely because the facts of experience viewed coherently bespeak the existence of such a God. Hartmann is against the testimony of reality when he concludes that only human consciousness is purposive.

² Ibid., 186-188.

According to Brightman, for example, belief in God is based on the following considerations:³

(1) The synoptic method is the right method of philosophical investigation; (2) Coherence is the criterion of truth; (3) "Knowledge of purpose other than that of the present idea of the human knower is possible";⁴ (4) Nature can be "understood best as the energizing of the rational purposive will of the Supreme Person";⁵ (5) "Universals and values have meaning only as the reason and purpose of conscious mind, finite and infinite";⁶ (6) "Human persons are genuinely real and are clues to the nature of the universe";⁷ (7) Personalistic theism is "the philosophical standpoint that does fullest justice by all the facts of experience";⁸ (8) "Mechanical laws in the universe" are "incoherent if taken as a complete account of reality";⁹ (9) "The recognition of purpose as a fundamental principle of explanation" is coherent with "the results reached by

³ Brightman, ITP.

⁴ Ibid., 314.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

the investigation of the other problems of philosophy."¹⁰

Hence Brightman concludes; "This world is a realm of persons, human and divine, whose calling is to realize both individually and collectively the whole range of true value."¹¹

In The Finding of God Brightman points out that revelation, reason, moral loyaltly, and religious experience, considered synoptically, lead us to the idea of God who is patient, mysterious, good, and powerful.¹²

Since personalism regards Nature as being all of the same kind of stuff as consciousness, its theistic position is not invalidated by Hartmann's argument that only man is conscious and that he alone can furnish the ontological mode for teleology. In fact, Hartmann's view is metaphysically question-begging.

Hartmann's description of teleological process with its three stages is not valid. As Brightman has stated in correspondence,¹³

He substitutes a logical order for the actual order. There is no way of knowing what "the means nearest to

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Brightman, FG, Chaps. I-IX.

¹³ Brightman's letter of March 6, 1940.

the end" are until we have experimented and inquired. In short, his second stage is a function and result of the operations of his third stage.

Further, his phrase "ein an sich zeitloses Gebilde" is not philosophically sound. It is clearly indicated by the context that Hartmann means human consciousness by the "Gebilde." But since human consciousness exists in time it cannot be timeless. "Timeless subsistence is clear, but timeless existence is absolutely unthinkable...."¹⁴

b. God Not Objective

Hartmann maintains that Max Scheler's theistic argument is based on the law of a correlation between person and world. According to this law, the world lacks the all-embracingness and absoluteness (Einzigkeit und Absolutheit) which Hartmann thinks it possesses. The limited personality is confronted with the idea of the macrocosm, to which it is related as the part to the whole. If correlativity (Korrelativität) continues in force as a law, there must be a corresponding personal counterpart for the macrocosm. The idea of God, the idea of an infinite and perfect spiritual person ("die Idee einer unendlichen und vollkommenen Geistesperson"), is the formulation of such a

¹⁴ Brightman, FG, 132.

correlate.¹⁵

Concerning Scheler's law of correlativity, Hartmann says that there is no such essential law. It contradicts the plain and evident meaning of all objectivity (Gegenständlichkeit),¹⁶ theoretical as well as practical. Just as little does the concreteness of the world depend upon the concreteness of a personal counterpart. The world is all-embracing, absolute, and exists independently. Conversely, a personal being who was not a member of a concrete, real world would be an abstraction.¹⁷

Hartmann is justified in disbelieving Scheler's theism which is exclusively based on the law of correlativity. But this does not invalidate the theistic argument of a thinker who maintains that "no special formulation of any law is sacred,"¹⁸ and that "man has no intellectual right to any idea that he is unwilling to relate to the rest of his thinking."¹⁹ The cogency of a synoptic argument for theism is not affected by the untenability of an abstract incoherent law like the law of correlativity.

¹⁵ Hartmann, Ethik, 217.

¹⁶ Ibid., 217.

¹⁷ Ibid., 217-218.

¹⁸ Brightman, ITP, 261.

¹⁹ Ibid., 335.

c. Illicit Universalization of Human Personality

Hartmann maintains that the basic error of the belief in a personal God lies in the universalization of personality beyond its natural sphere of givenness and validity ("die Verallgemeinerung der Personalität überhaupt--über ihre natürliche Gegebenheits- und Geltungssphäre hinaus").²⁰ Hartmann goes on to maintain that aspects of the world are relative to persons, and even this is true only in so far as the persons are members of a real world; but the one real world itself is not on that account related to any person. But all persons are ontologically relative to the world. If out of this relation of dependence one makes a correlation by a forced passage beyond bounds, one stands in the conceptual construction of theism. What holds good for one aspect of the world cannot be transferred to the world itself ("Was für den Weltaspekt gilt,..., ist offenbar nicht übertragbar auf die Welt selbst,...").²¹

Hartmann's contention that what holds good for one aspect of the world cannot be transferred to the world itself seems to mean that nothing can be known about the world, for all knowledge must start from special aspects.

²⁰ Hartmann, Ethik, 218.

²¹ Ibid.

However, the present moment of my personal consciousness, or the datum self, is my only possible starting point in philosophy.²² The fact that I must start with this is not the fault of any type of philosophy, but of the universe.²³

I am an individual monad which in some dim way mirrors the universe; but the universe is only reflected in me, it is not itself in me.²⁴

However, "I cannot maintain my own reason without acknowledging the insufficiency of my present consciousness."²⁵ Every datum self contains "signs of a larger self to which it belongs"; the whole self, or person, is a total conscious process which is aware of its identity and wholeness by means of its "backward-looking memories" and its "forward-looking purposes." The unity of personality is that of consciousness; personality includes consciousness only, and does not include any of its environment.²⁶

Again it is reason that drives consciousness beyond itself; for a complete view of a person cannot be a coherent view unless it be assumed that there is some explanation

²² Brightman, PR, 28.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid., 29.

²⁵ Ibid., 28.

²⁶ Brightman, POR, 358.

for the experiences of the person in realities that lie beyond it.²⁷ All its environing factors, biological, physical, social, subconscious, logical and ideal, and metaphysical, are hypothetical entities; they are not actually present in the datum self but reason leads us to believe in them.²⁸

As has been mentioned before, a valid theistic philosophy must be more comprehensive, synoptic and coherent than the theistic argument which Hartmann here refers to; the former is based, not on what holds good for one aspect of the world, but on aspects which may coherently be viewed as valid for the whole.

Hartmann holds that the world is not relative to any person but is self-sufficient and independent:

Weltaspekte sind relativ auf Personen, und auch das nur sofern diese ihrerseits Glieder einer realen Welt sind; die eine reale Welt selbst aber ist deswegen nicht relativ auf eine Person.²⁹

This is exactly what personalistic idealism denies. The synoptic view of our experience of reality indicates that the world is not self-subsistent but is best explained as the creation, or more exactly, the activity of God who

²⁷ Brightman, PR, 27.

²⁸ Brightman, POR, 359.

²⁹ Hartmann, Ethik, 218.

is immanent in the world. "God is the metaphysical cause of every event in Nature."³⁰

d. Corporate Personality is Illicit

Max Scheler believes that man is rooted in a personal unit of a higher order ("die Verwurzelung in einer personalen Einheit h heren Ordnung")³¹ and that such higher orders always take on further potentialities--up to an absolute and all-embracing corporate person ("bis zu einer absoluten und allumfassenden Gesamtperson"),³² thus culminating in the idea of God.

Hartmann rightly points out that the conditioning of the individual person and his acts by a narrower or wider community does not imply the personal character of the latter, just as little as the conditioning of individual knowledge by the prevalent level of public opinion ("ein jeweiliges Gesamtniveau menschlicher Erkenntnis")³³ implies that the latter is a conscious communal subject.

However, Hartmann is wrong when he lets an inadequate theory of God such as Scheler's prevent him from

³⁰ Brightman, ITP, 336.

³¹ Hartmann, Ethik, 219.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid., 220.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
DIVISION OF THE PHYSICAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF CHEMISTRY

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE
PROGRESS OF THE WORK

The Committee on the Progress of the Work
has the honor to report to the Board of Trustees
that during the year ending June 30, 1911, the
Department of Chemistry has been engaged in
the study of the properties of the various
elements and compounds of the periodic table,
and has made considerable progress in the
study of the properties of the various elements
and compounds of the periodic table.

The Committee on the Progress of the Work
has the honor to report to the Board of Trustees
that during the year ending June 30, 1911, the
Department of Chemistry has been engaged in
the study of the properties of the various
elements and compounds of the periodic table,
and has made considerable progress in the
study of the properties of the various elements
and compounds of the periodic table.

The Committee on the Progress of the Work
has the honor to report to the Board of Trustees
that during the year ending June 30, 1911, the
Department of Chemistry has been engaged in
the study of the properties of the various
elements and compounds of the periodic table,
and has made considerable progress in the
study of the properties of the various elements
and compounds of the periodic table.

Very respectfully,
The Committee on the Progress of the Work
J. H. VAN VLECK, Chairman
J. H. VAN VLECK, Chairman
J. H. VAN VLECK, Chairman

believing in theism at all, for all the facts of experience viewed synoptically bespeak the presence of God in the universe.³⁴

e. Category of Subject Not Applicable to God

According to Hartmann, personality exists only on a basis of subjectivity, just as subjectivity exists only on a basis of organic life, and life only on a basis of the whole subordinate uniformity of nature. This categorial gradation ("diese kategoriale Stufenfolge") is not reversible (umkehrbar).³⁵ The higher can never be brought forth out of the lower but the former is always conditioned by the latter. The higher category is always the weaker, the more dependent ("eben allemal die schwächere, abhängigere"),³⁶ in spite of its autonomy; the lower is the stronger in spite of its paucity of content and indefiniteness of outline ("trotz ihrer geringeren inhaltlichen Bestimmtheit und Fülle").³⁷ For the higher form it is only material but it is necessary material. Without it the higher remains an abstraction ("Ohne sie bleibt die höhere eine Abstraktion").³⁸ Every

³⁴ See pages 142-144 of this dissertation.

³⁵ Hartmann, Ethik, 213.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

inversion of this categorial law ("jede Inversion dieses kategorialen Grundgesetzes") is a falsification of the given coherence of phenomena ("eine Verfälschung des gegebenen Zusammenhangs der Phänomene").³⁹

Es gibt Subjektivität ohne Personalität, aber nicht Personalität ohne Subjektivität. Das Bewusstsein ist die kategoriale Basis, die Materie über der sich die höhere Formung der Person erhebt. Also auch hier ein Schichtungsverhältnis mit deutlicher Geltung der kategorialen Abhängigkeitsgesetze. Personalität ist die höhere, Bewusstsein die stärkere und allgemeinere Kategorie.⁴⁰

Hartmann depends on this categorial law (das kategoriale Grundgesetz) as the criterion of truth. With him this law rules our thought and intuition; only in accordance with it can we hold anything before our minds, but never without it or in opposition to it.⁴¹

Kategoriale Gesetze sind, soweit überhaupt sie einsichtig sind, evident. Vom Wesen Gottes aber wissen wir nichts. Wir können es auch nur nach den kategorialen Verhältnissen, die unser Denken und Anschauen beherrschen, uns vor Augen halten, niemals aber ausser ihnen oder im Gegensatz zu ihnen.⁴²

Since Hartmann believes that there is no consciousness except in human personality he concludes that there is no God in the universe where there is no consciousness as

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 619.

⁴¹ Ibid., 221.

⁴² Ibid.

the basis of divine personality. Such personality would be a free-floating personality without a categorial basis ("freischwebende Personalität ohne kategoriales Fundament").⁴³

Hartmann's categorial law, or any and every law in philosophy, must be judged by its adequacy to interpret all the facts there are in experience as a whole.⁴⁴ The categorial law is untrue to the whole life of ideal purpose. What Hitler has done in Germany indicates that purpose, which is characteristic of personality, is not the weaker. Hence Hartmann's polemic against theism, which is based on the categorial law, loses its cogency.

Hartmann's view is an emergent evolution which sees consciousness developing out of the unconscious, if his categorial law is true. Brightman holds, however, that everything real is eternally conscious, but development is a process of change and growth in consciousness, human and divine.⁴⁵ Hartmann treats subject as based on organic life. But there is no reason why he should confine it to this. If subject need to be based on something it must be based

⁴³ Ibid., 220.

⁴⁴ Brightman, ITP, 261.

⁴⁵ This argument owes much to Brightman's letter of March 20, 1940.

on the total content of The Given which affords concreteness. The divine subject eternally requires and eternally controls The Given. Each being in the universe is conditioned by the rest of the universe, but some personalities argue that the rest of the universe (including organism) is all of the nature of consciousness.⁴⁶

Over against Hartmann's categorial law, personalism asserts:

Mechanism is always and everywhere subordinate to rational purpose. The lower, the beginnings, the elements, find their explanation in the higher, the consummations, the wholes.⁴⁷

Then, not that the personality depends upon the unconscious for its explanation, but that personality is the clue to the nature of the universe. Hartmann's categorial law is metaphysically question-begging.

f. An Absolute Entity Excludes Personality

Scheler argues that persons of a higher order are personal carriers of moral values, that the higher values (die höheren Werte) attach (zukommen) to the persons of the higher order ("die Personen höheren Ordnung"), and that the highest value (der höchste Wert) therefore attaches

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Brightman, ITP, 313.

only to an infinite person, God. Scheler concludes that to man only the lowest moral values ("die niedersten sittlichen Werte") are attached.⁴⁸

But Hartmann maintains that man alone is a moral being. Collective entities (Gesamtpersonen) such as nation (Volk), state (Staat), humanity (Menschheit), and God (Gott) are not good (gut) or bad (böse), not honest (ehrlich) or mean (hinterhältig), not loving (liebenvoll) or hateful (hasserfüllt), in the same primal sense as is the individual man. Conversely, the universal, absolutely all-embracing entity ("das universale, absolut allumfassende Wesen"), if such exist, is so far removed from being the highest person that it must be much rather the lowest order of person, the absolute minimum as regards personality ("ein absolutes Minimum an Personalität").⁴⁹

Sittliches Wesen ist eben weder Gott noch der Staat, noch sonst etwas in der Welt, sondern einzig der primäre Träger der sittlichen Werte und Unwerte der Mensch.⁵⁰

Hartmann is right in pointing out that nation, state, or humanity is not a person. Such a collective entity "cannot experience or think or infer."⁵¹ But the validity

⁴⁸ Hartmann, Ethik, 225.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 225-226.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 226.

⁵¹ Brightman, PR, 18.

of personalism is not affected by it since such theism is based on a coherent investigation of reality as a whole.

The idea of God to which Hartmann objects, namely, that of the universal, absolutely all-embracing God corresponds to the God of absolute idealism, though the theistic argument of the latter is more coherent than that of Scheler. Brightman also is against such an idea of God for the following reasons:

(1) "The point of view of the Absolute" cannot be the same as that of the finite mind;⁵²

(ii) "My individual selfhood" cannot be understood as being "truly merged in the absolute self without a surrender of the privacy and immediacy that is the very nature of what a self is";⁵³

(iii) "Such an Absolute tends to destroy distinctions between good and evil and make freedom impossible";⁵⁴

(iv) If there is only one Self, the testimony of my own self-experience that I am a distinct consciousness is so false that it becomes impossible to use selfhood any longer as a clue to reality.⁵⁵

⁵² Brightman, ITP, 244.

⁵³ Ibid., 245.

⁵⁴ Syllabus for the Philosophy of Religion course given by Professor E. S. Brightman, 40-41.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

2. Moral Reasons for Atheism

a. Religious Determinism Violates Moral Freedom

In ethics, Hartmann holds, the will only stands over against the law of nature on the one side and the moral law on the other. Both allow scope (Spielraum), because the uniformity of nature determines only causally, while values in themselves do not determine at all. In the religious conception of the world the will has, besides all this, to cope with the providence of God. Divine providence is a teleologic, finalistic determinism. Its ultimate ends are the determinants. And because their determining power is infinite and almighty and permeates the entire world, over against it man with his teleology is impotent.⁵⁶

Und weil die bestimmende Kraft in ihnen eine unendliche und allmächtige ist, die überdies alles Weltgeschehen durchdringt--auch die kleine seelische Welt des Menschen--, so ist der Mensch mit seiner Teleologie ihr gegenüber ohnmächtig.⁵⁷

In divine providence man thus finds no more scope (Spielraum) for his self-determination (Selbstbestimmung). According to Hartmann, this thorough-going finalistic determinism ("durchgehender Finaldeterminismus") is an inversion of the basic categorial law: the higher form of

⁵⁶ Hartmann, Ethik, 740-741.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 741.

determination is made the stronger form, the finalistic nexus alone dominates.⁵⁸

According to Hartmann, divine teleology determines every event in the world. But this is not an empirical account of the way God works in the world, and this for the following considerations:

All that a personalist would say is that

There is positive reason for believing that there is superhuman purpose in our world; and that there is equally positive reason for believing that we do not know all there is to know about that purpose.⁵⁹

The facts of experience never bespeak absolute teleological determination nor do they prove to him that everything in the world-process is clearly discernible to him, but they merely show that our partial knowledge of purpose implies larger purposes of which we are ignorant. The kind of divine teleology which Hartmann mentions is a fiction. Cosmic teleology proposed by Brightman⁶⁰ or by Tennant⁶¹ is a reasonable interpretation of the facts of experience in the world where there are mechanisms, purposes, and free creative persons. The facts come first and

⁵⁸ Ibid. 741.

⁵⁹ Brightman, ITP, 297.

⁶⁰ Brightman, ITP, and Brightman, FG.

⁶¹ Tennant, PT, II, Chap. 4.

then an interpretation follows. Hartmann's teleological determinism can never be forthcoming as an interpretation of the facts. Since such determinism excludes facts of freedom and novelty in the world it is not coherent with experience.

A consideration of time also denies such absolute predetermination. A synoptic thinker does not believe in "the notion of a completed infinity of time" for the experience of God; "Human freedom, and the reality of evolution and of creation," would suggest that the divine time span is somehow limited.⁶² Hence even God is not entitled to absolute "foreordination" but for him there is "a future with some possibilities open."⁶³ What realistic religion finds in God is not some abstract omnipotence nor absolute predetermination, but a steady, invincible purpose for right in dealing with every situation.⁶⁴

Hartmann compares causal determinism with teleological determinism and maintains that the former is compatible with morality because both the law of nature and moral law, which are at work in it, may allow scope to

⁶² Brightman, FG, 133.

⁶³ Ibid., 135.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 181.

moral freedom.⁶⁵ Here Hartmann's description of causal determination is nothing but an empirical account of the world-process, in which a personalist may discern divine purposiveness. A synoptic thinker may see in Natural Law the very expression of an eternal rational purpose of God,⁶⁶ while he regards moral law as an expression of the reason of God, which is eternal and uncreated.⁶⁷

Hence the antinomy assumed to exist between causal determinism and teleological determinism disappears when we see in the former a glimpse of divine purpose and in the latter a misrepresentation of divine providence.

That there is no antinomy between religion and morality is indicated by Brightman when he writes about God who is finite and yet the "Controller" of "The Given."

Belief in such a God is a moral necessity for freedom; a religious necessity for redemption; a metaphysical necessity for creation; and an ideal necessity, if God's perfection be perfectibility.⁶⁸

b. Religion is Heteronomous As Regards the Authority of Values

Hartmann holds that ethical values are autonomous; they are of worth not for the sake of anything else but

⁶⁵ Hartmann, Ethik, 741.

⁶⁶ Brightman, ITP, 288-290.

⁶⁷ Brightman, ML, 269.

purely from their own nature and for their own sake ("rein aus sich selbst heraus und um ihrer selbst willen").⁶⁹ No authority, no fiat of power (Machtspruch) nor any will stands behind ethical values, for otherwise their evidence (Einleuchten) would not be absolute.⁷⁰

Against this religion sets up the antithesis: every moral claim of the Ought is at bottom a commandment of God and only on this account does man, towards whom the commandment is directed, feel its content to be a real moral value.

Denn Sittlichkeit besteht im Leben nach Gottes Gebot. Dadurch werden die sittlichen Werte unselbständig, heteronom. Sie sind nun gerade durch göttlichen Machtspruch gegeben.⁷¹

This is Hartmann's view of religion. He sees thus, between the authority of religion and that of moral values, an antinomy which is insoluble because it is inherent in the nature of God that nothing can be of value on any other ground except that he wills it and commands it. So if besides these there were values existing in themselves, God must repudiate (verneinen) them or first sanction (sanktionieren) them by his will.⁷²

⁶⁹ Hartmann, Ethik, 739.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 739.

⁷¹ Ibid., 739.

⁷² Ibid., 740.

Hartmann is convinced that it is inherent in the essence of moral values that they have convincing power (Überzeugungskraft) in themselves. And if God dictated what did not harmonize with self-existent values, his dictation could be carried out only as a commandment but could never be sensed (gefühlt) as a value.⁷³

As Hartmann describes the situation, the antinomy between autonomy and theonomy is insoluble. Oman points out that a religion, when it is purely formal, may have no concern with morality; and a morality, when it is purely conventional, may have no dependence upon religion. Oman is right in holding that the interdependence of religion and morality is not seen when religion is regarded as merely creed, and morality as merely conduct, and also when the sole relation of religion to morality is taken to be the providing of rules of conduct and motives for following them.⁷⁴

However, there is really no insoluble antinomy between autonomy and theonomy, but rather there are important relations between the two, and even a reconciliation of them.⁷⁵

⁷³ Ibid., 740.

⁷⁴ Oman, NS, 387.

⁷⁵ This argument is based on Brightman's discussion on "Moral Law and Religion" in his ML (Brightman, ML, 264-272); Lyman holds that prophetic religion is predominantly ethical religion (Lyman, MTR, 77-99).

In the first place, morality is more fundamental than religion:

It is unreasonable to believe in the existence of a good God unless experience offers evidence of goodness; and the evidence of goodness is found largely in moral conduct.⁷⁶

In the second place, autonomy is logically prior to theonomy:

The moral laws are valid because they are a reasoned account of the nature and implications of moral experience, not because they are commanded by an eternal law-giver or communicated on a Mount Sinai. Moral law is autonomous and independent of religion and of the existence of God so far as the obligatory nature of its principles is concerned.⁷⁷

In the third place, there are two respects in which morality is dependent on religion: (i) It is dependent on religion for some of its content;⁷⁸ (ii) Autonomy is dependent on theonomy in the sense that God created us as moral beings.⁷⁹ However, the moral law is not an "arbitrary creation of the will of God" but an expression of the eternal uncreated reason of God, which may be discovered by auton-

⁷⁶ Brightman, ML, 265.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 268-269.

⁷⁸ Brightman holds that if the Law of the Most Inclusive End be true and if religion be a real value, then "it is a part of one's duty to worship God and in accordance with the Law of Best Possible to achieve the highest type of religion of which one is capable." (Brightman, ML, 269).

⁷⁹ Brightman, ML, 269.

omous thought.⁸⁰

In the fourth place, autonomy and theonomy can be reconciled through love:

The love of God is consistent with autonomy because it is recognized as embodying the highest values which autonomy discovers in experience.⁸¹

The realization of these relations between autonomy and theonomy, and of the reconciliation of the two through love, reveals the fact that Hartmann is in error in three respects:

First, Hartmann holds that ethics demands that nothing should stand behind moral values.⁸² However, if they are an expression of the reason of God, the autonomy of the moral life is not violated, because only through autonomy may we discover that values are an expression of the eternal, uncreated reason of God, and only autonomy leads us to acknowledge these values as binding.

Second, Hartmann believes that God must necessarily repudiate (verneinen) values existing in themselves ("an sich bestehende Werte"),⁸³ but the values are objective only in the sense that they are norms in the mind of God.⁸⁴

⁸⁰ Ibid., 269.

⁸¹ Ibid., 271.

⁸² Hartmann, Ethik, 739.

⁸³ Ibid., 740.

⁸⁴ Brightman, ITP, Chapter 5.

Third, the realization that values are norms in the mind of God also takes away Hartmann's fear that God might dictate what did not harmonize with self-existent values.

c. Forgiveness of Sin is Immoral

What Hartmann regards as the antinomy of salvation ("die Antinomie der Erlösung")⁸⁵ is as follows: Morally, there is no taking away of guilt (Schuldabnahme).⁸⁶ Religiously, there is a Schuldabnahme since God might be able to do what a man cannot do. Ethically, a Schuldabnahme is not a thing which a man may will: it would be the disfranchisement and degradation of man, the avowal of his unfreedom ("die Entmündigung und Entwürdigung des Menschen, seine Unfreiheitserklärung").⁸⁷ Yet, religiously it is not only possible but it is the most important and valuable benefit ("das Wichtigste und Wertvollste")⁸⁸ which can accrue to man. The conflict here is that between the preservation and the surrender of freedom ("Wahrung der Freiheit und Preisgabe der Freiheit"), between the will to deliverance from guilt and the will to protection against deliverance

⁸⁵ Hartmann, Ethik, 743.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 745.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Ibid.,

from it ("Erlösungswillen und Erlösungsabwehr"), between the will to bear responsibility and the will to escape it ("Verantwortungswillen und Verantwortungswiderwillen").⁸⁹

With each of these conceptions the thesis as well as the antithesis is substantiated (belegt) by well-known facts (wohlbekannte Tatsachen), on the one side by the phenomena of the ethical life, on the other by those of the religious life ("durch Phänomene des ethischen Lebens einerseits, des religiösen Lebens andererseits"). Hartmann thus sees in this antinomy an insolubility (Unlösbarkeit).⁹⁰

This antinomy, however, is not insoluble. Hartmann does not refer us to the highest and the best in man's religious life but to the antiethical nature of some unhappy outgrowth of the religious life. As Bennett points out, the concept of sin religiously defined is broader than the concept of sin morally defined. With regard to the former he writes as follows.

One is a broader definition which includes under the concept of sin everything traceable to human action and all human motives and dispositions which fall short of the will of God.⁹¹

Bennett goes on to point out that the moral definition of

⁸⁹ Ibid., 746.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Bennett, SS, 6.

sin has only three conditions:

...Knowledge of the standard which is violated, realization that the action in its intention or results does violate the standard, and capacity to obey the standard.⁹²

When Brightman maintains that morality depends on religion⁹³ for some of its content he implies that a religious man compared with an exclusively moral man must have knowledge of a wider realm of value, which he ought to realize.

Thus, instead of securing the sense of the Schuldabnahme one's religion deepens his sense of sin. And the desire to secure the Schuldabnahme formally is not in keeping with a religious interpretation of life like that of Brightman whose religion creates in him not an easy sense of the forgiveness⁹⁴ of sin but the realization of radical change, real improvement, to be the purpose of life.

The sufferings of man and the ideal obligation to attain the highest values are stern factors in life, rendered more stern by the personalistic interpretation of suffering and obligation as entailed by the divine purpose.⁹⁵

⁹² Ibid., 7.

⁹³ Brightman, ML, 269.

⁹⁴ In a letter of May 9, 1940 Brightman defines forgiveness as "loving approval of a man whose goodwill evidences repentance."

⁹⁵ Brightman, ITP, 364.

3. Theological Reasons

a. Otherworldliness is Immoral

According to the conception of religion which Hartmann has, our mundane sphere has no values whatever of its own: To seek the values of this world for their own sake is bad; within this world only that is good which tends beyond it ("Gut ist innerhalb dieser Welt nur, was über sie heraustendiert").⁹⁶

Moral striving, Hartmann says, regards everything which transcends this life as a waste of moral energy and a diversion of it away from true values and their actualization ("Vergeudung und Ablenkung sittlicher Kraft von den wahren Werten und ihrer Verwirklichung").⁹⁷ Hence Hartmann discerns a genuine antinomy between morality and religion.

However, if Hartmann has the right conception of religion when he says that this world has no values whatever of its own ("das Diesseits habe überhaupt keine eigenen Werte"),⁹⁸ then it follows from this logically that then man has no means of access to God.

⁹⁶ Hartmann, Ethik, 738.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Ibid., 737.

As soon as we suppose man to be wholly worthless, so soon we have denied religion entirely. It is chiefly the good in man and in the world, from which we infer God.⁹⁹

Hartmann maintains that for moral striving everything which transcends this life is a deceitful phantom ("Für sittliches Streben ist alle Transzendenz ein trügender Schein").¹⁰⁰ But if the moral life is genuinely valuable and the value it strives to realize is truly objective, as Hartmann maintains,¹⁰¹ then man's moral experience and the whole realm of value point beyond this world toward immortality.

If value be objectively real,..., then the voice of duty is that of reality itself. Further, if personality itself be the value on which all others depend, the objectivity of value cannot be fully expressed (unless it is fully realized in human personality). No human personality must be annihilated if the full actual and potential value of the universe is to be conserved.¹⁰²

The objectivity of value inferred from our moral life thus points beyond this world toward a future life.

According to Hartmann, religion sets up an antinomy between this world and the life to come. But the goodness of God, inferred chiefly from the good in man and in this

⁹⁹ Brightman, PR, 30.

¹⁰⁰ Hartmann, Ethik, 738.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., Chaps. 14,15,16,17.

¹⁰² Brightman, ITP, 346.

world, offers the most fundamental argument for man's immortality. "If there be a God, man's immortality is certain; if not, immortality would not be worth having."¹⁰³

Therefore, the antinomy which Hartmann sees between the tendency towards this world and the tendency towards the Beyond (Diesseits- und Jenseitstendenz)¹⁰⁴ is not genuine.

b. Divine Transcendence

Theology believes in a Person who is outside of the world (eine ausserweltliche Person), maintains Hartmann. And to this ausserweltliche Person the world as a whole is a correlated thing (Sachkorrelat). Hartmann argues that the existence of such a Person is beyond human judgment ("jedem menschlichen Ermessen entzogen"). The only kind of person we know exists in the world and lives, wills, and acts within the real world.¹⁰⁵

Hartmann's polemic against the ausserweltliche Person may apply to deism, which stresses the pure transcendence of God and denies his immanence entirely,¹⁰⁶ but

¹⁰³ Ibid., 349.

¹⁰⁴ Hartmann, Ethik, 737.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 216.

¹⁰⁶ Sorley, MVIG, 450 ff.

not to personalism, which, with its idealistic view of matter, is the type of theism laying chief stress on the immanence of God.¹⁰⁷

c. Divine Teleology has Unknown Ends

Hartmann is convinced that teleology is the peculiarity of human nature. Whether it is found elsewhere in the world, we do not know; for it is possible only in a conscious entity capable of knowing and striving. But whether, besides men, there are other beings with such a capacity is a matter of purely speculative assumption ("Sache blosser spekulativer Mutmassung").¹⁰⁸

It has already been mentioned that our faith in a rational, purposive God is philosophically well-grounded. We thus deny Hartmann's agnostic atheism. However, we must realize that after all has been said for the divine purpose in the universe the fact remains that there is mystery in the universe. We cannot know God with complete certainty.

It is plain that the goodness of any God who is fit to be worshiped--who is transcendent and eternal--is incapable of complete proof. To know the goodness

¹⁰⁷ Brightman, *ITF*, Chaps. X, 5 and 6 (pages 335-339).

¹⁰⁸ Hartmann, Ethik, 180.

of God with complete certainty, one must know his whole present and past and future.¹⁰⁹

All religion is an attempt to solve life's mystery.... There is reason to believe in God; but our vision of him is dim. Both in what we see and in what we do not see of the divine nature we acknowledge a mysterious factor.¹¹⁰

(Modern liberalism) is in need of a recognition of the mystery of God; for over-simplification is its curse at the present time.¹¹¹

The clearest vision is most keenly aware of the inexhaustible abysses of the divine nature.¹¹²

Nevertheless, this justified allowance for an element of mystery in the nature of God should not make us forget that belief in God is not "blind trust" nor "wishful thinking."¹¹³ It is in accordance with "fact and reason"¹¹⁴ that we believe in God.

d. Religion is Heteronomous as Regards Human Ends

The last antinomy which Hartmann sees between ethics and religion is that ethics is always concerned finally with man, while religious thought with God. "Der Ethik

¹⁰⁹ Brightman, FG, 178.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 148-149.

¹¹¹ Ibid., 149.

¹¹² Ibid., 151.

¹¹³ Ibid., 179.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

kommt es letzten Endes immer auf den Menschen an, dem religiösen Denken auf Gott."¹¹⁵ That anything whatever, even though God himself, should take precedence of man, would not be moral.¹¹⁶ Religiously, however, it is inherent in the nature of God, that only he, and nothing outside of him, can be the aim of all aims (das Ziel der Ziele) and that as compared with God everything, even man, is vain (nichtig).¹¹⁷

Here is a form of religion which is open to this criticism. For example, Kierkegaard holds that God is so superior to everything human that man is regarded as absolutely sinful and worthless in the sight of God.¹¹⁸ Barthianism which asserts that our sin is what we are and what we do¹¹⁹ is "operation exclusively on the part of God." On the contrary, "in Humanism there is operation only on the part of man."¹²⁰ However, "personalism states the

¹¹⁵ Hartmann, Ethik, 738.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 739.

¹¹⁸ Cited and discussed by Brightman, ML, 268; See also Leisegang, RP, 38-39.

¹¹⁹ Barth, KG (tr. Hair and Henderson), 53.

¹²⁰ Brightman's statement made in his lectures in philosophy of religion, first semester, 1937-1938, Boston University School of Theology.

relation of God and man in terms of purpose."¹²¹ Religion is not "mere blessed contemplation of a perfect universe," nor is it "mere feverish, despairing activity." "What religion offers is the high adventure of cooperation with God."¹²²

Religion is a devotion to personal values as expressing the purpose of God; not to coöperate with men for the social realization of those values is at the same time not to coöperate with God's purpose. Religion, when conscious of its own destiny, is best defined as coöperation with God and man for the realization of individual and of shared values.¹²³

This same thought is expressed by Calhoun in his God and the Common Life. He holds that the way of God with man includes communication, co-working, and transcendent sovereignty. Men are creatures in the sense that for their existence they are dependent upon powers beyond themselves, also in the sense that their goodness when compared with divine goodness must be infinitesimally small. Yet men may become sons of God and co-laborers with God: co-laborers to share in the task of reconciliation which is healing, whole-making; and sons of God to reflect in their faulty lives something of the mercy of God. This is the meaning of man's vocation: that he is called by God to be a

¹²¹ Brightman, ITP, 339.

¹²² Brightman, RV, 219.

¹²³ Brightman, POR, 435.

participant in a shared task. The call is not coercive, and each man's response must be his own. But the initiative is first and forever from God's side.¹²⁴

These considerations reveal the fact that the antinomy which Hartmann assumes between ethics and religion disappears. The universe is, then, a society of interacting and free persons, endeavoring to discover, appreciate, and create, ideal value.

4. The View of God which is Consistent with the Moral Life and is Not Open to Justified Criticism from Hartmann

a. God as a Principle of Coherence among values is the most reasonable principle of explanation of what we know of reality as a whole. His character, whether it is goodness, rationality, or purposiveness, is inferred from the facts of experience.

b. The fact that some views of God are abstract and incoherent neither proves nor disproves the existence of God in the universe.

c. Evidence, or lack of evidence, for God, which we see in some one aspect of reality does not either prove or disprove theism.

¹²⁴ Calhoun, GCL, 240-242.

d. We acknowledge a mysterious factor in what we see and in what we do not see of the divine nature.

e. God is not only transcendent to the world but immanent in it.

f. God is not an absolutely all-embracing Being, which Hartmann denies, but is finite.

g. Religion is not exclusively other-worldly: God is inferred chiefly from the good in man and in this world, while God's goodness indicates man's immortality; the objectivity of value which we infer from experience also points to man's immortality.

h. God desires that man should cooperate with Him in the preservation and creation of ideal value.

i. Moral law is not an arbitrary creation of God but an expression of his eternal, uncreated reason, which may be discovered by autonomous thought: autonomy and theonomy are reconciled through love.

j. God is not omnipotent: since he does not pre-determine every event in the world he does not violate man's moral freedom; but his purpose cannot ultimately be frustrated.

k. God does not take away our guilt but broadens and intensifies our concept of sin; God does not create in us an easy sense of the forgiveness of sin but he stimulates us to see more clearly our obligation as entailed by

his purpose.

CONCLUSIONS

1. In presenting the empirical basis for his positive view Hartmann depends on Wertgefühl alone; here Wertgefühl is his criterion of the truth of value judgments. In the theoretical construction of his system he is partly an advocate of coherence.

2. His grounds for objectivity of value stand on an almost exclusively intuitive basis.

3. He confuses values and ideals: on his view value is never experienced; and what it ideally defines never appears in any actual experience of value.

4. His chief error is in supposing that value experience is merely a Wertgefühl, merely a beholding of eternal ideals. Rather, value experience is the creation of actual values which conform to the rule of the eternal ideal, yet manifest freedom and variety within that rule.

5. He contemplates, not a system of values, but a scale of values, which is an abstract, formal, and partially incoherent account of our value experience, yet, even as scale, involving comparative intuitions that approach coherence.

6. Incoherent theories of God, of our moral life, and of the world prevent Hartmann from conceiving God as a Principle of Coherence.

7. His world-view, with its Wertgefühl, its confusion of ideals and values, its realm of values enjoying its objectivity in isolation, and its rejection of the concept of God as a Principle of Unification, reveals internal inconsistency.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Alexander, S.--STD
Space, Time and Deity. 2 vols. London: The Macmillan Company, (1920) 1934.
- Aristotle (H. Rackham, tr.).--Nic. Eth.
The Nicomachean Ethics. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1926.
- ____ (W. D. Ross, tr.).
Metaphysics. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1928.
- Baillie, J. B.--PM (Ger. PG)
Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1931.
- Baillie, John.--KG
Our Knowledge of God. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1939.
- Barth, Karl (J. L. M. Haire and Ian Henderson, tr.).--KG
The Knowledge of God and the Service of God according to the Teaching of the Reformation. London: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1939.
- ____ Nein
Nein! Antwort an Emil Brunner. München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1934.
- Bennett, J. C.--SS
Social Salvation. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1935.
- Bertocci, Peter A.--EAG
The Empirical Argument for God in Late British Thought. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938.
- Brentano, Franz (Cecil Hague, tr.).
The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong. Westminster: Archibald Constable and Co., 1902.
- Brightman, E. S.--ITP
An Introduction to Philosophy. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1925

POI

A Philosophy of Ideals. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1928.

RV

Religious Values. New York: The Abingdon Press, (1925) 1930.

PG

The Problem of God. New York: The Abingdon Press, 1930.

FG

The Finding of God. New York: The Abingdon Press, 1931.

ML

Moral Laws. New York: The Abingdon Press, 1933.

PR

Personality and Religion. New York: The Abingdon Press, 1934.

POR

A Philosophy of Religion. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1940.

Brock, Werner.--ICGP

An Introduction to Contemporary German Philosophy. Cambridge: At the University Press, 1935.

Brunner, Emil.--NG

Natur und Gnade. Tübingen: Verlag von J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1935.

Burt, E. A.--PPRT

Principles and Problems of Right Thinking. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1931.

Calhoun, R. L.--RR

"Plato as Religious Realist"
Macintosh (ed.), Religious Realism. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1931.

GCL

God and the Common Life. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1935.

Calvin, John (J. Allen, tr.).

Institutes. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, 1813.

Coit, Stanton (tr.).--Ethics

Ethics by Nicolai Hartmann. 3 vols. London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1932.

Driesch, Hans.--MET

Metaphysik. Breslau: Hirt, 1924.

Everett, W. G.--MV

Moral Values. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1918.

Fabricius, Caius.--AG

Der Atheismus der Gegenwart: seine Ursachen und seine Überwindung. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1922.

Hartmann, Nicolai.--GME

Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1925.

Ethik

Ethik. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., (1926) 1935.

DsPG

Deutsche systematische Philosophie nach ihren Gestalten. Berlin: H. Schwarz, 1931.

PgS

Das Problem des geistigen Seins. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1933.

ZGdO

Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1935.

Hegel, G. W. F.--PG

Phänomenologie des Geistes. Leipzig: Verlag von Felix Meiner, 1928.

Hessen, Johannes.--WP

Wertphilosophie. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1937.

Hildebrand, D.

"Die Idee der sittlichen Handlung."

Husserl (ed.) Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung. Vol. III. Halle: M. Niemeyer, 1916.

Hill, C. M.--WGRP

The World's Great Religious Poetry. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1926.

Horton, W. M.--TMM

Theism and the Modern Mood. New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1930.

Hügel, Baron Friedrich von.--EAPR

Essays & Addresses on the Philosophy of Religion. London: J. M. Dent & Sons, Ltd., 1921.

Husserl, Edmund.--JPpF

Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung. Vol III. Halle: M. Niemeyer, 1916.

IPpP

Ideem zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Halle: M. Niemeyer, 1922.

Kant, Immanuel.--CPR (Ger. KrV)

Critique of Pure Reason (N. K. Smith, tr.). New York: The Macmillan Company, 1929.

Leisegang, Hans.--RP

Religionsphilosophie der Gegenwart. Berlin: Junker u. Dünhaupt, 1930.

Lyman, E. W.--MTR

The Meaning and Truth of Religion. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1933.

Matthews, W. R.--GCE

God in Christian Experience. New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1930.

Messer, August.--WdG

Wertphilosophie der Gegenwart. Berlin: Junker und Dünhaupt Verlag, 1930.

Mill, J. S.--ULRG

Utilitarianism, Liberty and Representative Government (Everyman's Library). London: J. M. Dent and Sons, Ltd., (1910) 1922.

Nietzsche, F. W.--AsZ

Also sprach Zarathustra. Leipzig: Druck und Verlag von C. G. Naumann, 1904.

Oman, John.--GP

Grace and Personality. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1925.

NS

The Natural and the Supernatural. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1931.

Perry, R. B.--ME

The Moral Economy. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1909.

PPT

Present Philosophical Tendencies. London: Longmans, Green and Co., (1912) 1929.

GTV

General Theory of Value. New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1926.

Plato (H. N. Fowler, tr.).

Euthyphro (Loeb). London: William Heinemann, 1914.

(W. R. M. Lamb, tr.).

Laches (Loeb). London: William Heinemann, 1924.

(H. N. Fowler, tr.).

Phaedo (Loeb). London: William Heinemann, 1914.

(W. R. M. Lamb, tr.).

Protagoras (Loeb). London: William Heinemann, 1924.

(H. N. Fowler, tr.).

Philebus (Loeb). London: William Heinemann, 1925.

(H. N. Fowler, tr.).

Parmenides (Loeb). London: William Heinemann, 1926.

(R. G. Bury, tr.).

Laws (Loeb). 2 vols. London: William Heinemann, 1926.

(W. R. M. Lamb, tr.).

Charmides (Loeb). London: William Heinemann, 1927.

(R. G. Bury, tr.).

Epistles (Loeb). London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1929.

(R. G. Bury, tr.).

Timaeus (Loeb). London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1929.

____ (Paul Shorey, tr.).
Republic (Loeb). Vol. I. London: William Heinemann, 1930.

____ (Paul Shorey, tr.).
Republic (Loeb). Vol. II. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1935.

Pringle-Pattison, A. S.--IGRP
The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1920.

Scheler, M. F.--FEMW
Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die Materiale Wertethik. 2 vols. Halle: M. Niemeyer, 1913-1916.

____ VEM
Vom Ewigen im Menschen. 2 vols. Leipzig: P. Reinhold, 1923.

____ PW
Philosophische Weltanschauung. Bonn: F. Cohen, 1929.

Schwarz, Hermann.--ETH
Ethik. Breslau: Hirt, 1923.

Sorley, W. R.--MVIC
Moral Values and the Idea of God. Cambridge: At the University Press, (1918) 1935.

Taylor, A. E.--Plato
Plato. New York: The Dial Press Inc., 1927.

____ FM
The Faith of a Moralist. 2 vols. London: The Macmillan Company, 1930.

Tennant, F. R.--PT
Philosophical Theology. Vol II. Cambridge: At the University Press, 1930.

Thomas, G. F.--SF
Spirit and its Freedom. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1939.

Van Dusen, H. P.--PMSG
The Plain Man Seeks for God. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1935.

Walker, M. G.

"Perry and Hartmann: Antithetical or Complementary?"
Ethics, 49 (October, 1938), 37-61.

Williams, N. P.--GG

The Grace of God. London: Longmans, Green and Co.,
1930.

Whitehead, A. N.--PR

Process and Reality. New York: The Macmillan Company,
1929.

The problem of the dissertation is to investigate the use of systematic coherence in Hartmann's system of ethics. The systematic coherence which concerns the present writer not only excludes logical inconsistency but requires two other attributes: first, consistency between ideas and the facts of experience; secondly, systematic and purposive connections in the facts and theories.

Such an investigation involves two major problems. The first problem is that of the relations between Hartmann's ethical convictions based on atomistic intuition (Wertgefühl) and those based on coherence, because there is an apparent inconsistency between these two kinds of convictions. The second (and related) problem is that of belief in God, a belief which Hartmann rejects on metaphysical, moral, and theological grounds. The dissertation aims to test whether or not Hartmann's reasons for atheism rest on an appeal to coherence.

Hartmann holds that man's spiritual growth is essentially an inner growth of his Wertgefühl and that to educate it is the greatest task of ethics. Wertgefühl is the only point of contact between man and the ideal realm of values. Every moral rejection or acceptance rests upon it. The presupposition of our commitment to any cause is the Wertgefühl of that toward which the commitment is directed. For Hartmann Wertgefühl is the empirical basis

for his positive view.

He declares that the whole responsibility for the legitimacy and objectivity of the Wertmassstab rests upon Wertgefühl because even the few features of the valuational gradation which are known to us, can be grasped not by a synoptic survey but by an immediate Wertgefühl alone. This assertion when used as a basis for ethical knowledge contradicts his statement that one's Wertgefühl is so limited that it cannot always discern the synthesis of moral values, while every value reaches true fulfilment only in its synthesis with all the others, and it also contradicts his statement that synoptic thought, compared with Wertgefühl, is more adequate in grasping the entire gradational ladder of moral values, with which morality in the full and genuine sense has to do.

Wertgefühl, Hartmann says, aims at a synthesis of valuational antinomies. In another context, he says that every value, when once it has gained power over a person, tends to dominate his Wertgefühl at the expense of all others. By thus referring to two conflicting tendencies in Wertgefühl he implicitly demonstrates that it must be guided by a criterion other than intuition itself.

For Hartmann the grounds for the objectivity of value are based on the following considerations: (1) Kant's subjectivistic and functionalistic apriorism is a misunder-

standing of the originally objective character of everything knowable a priori. (2) Value is related to a subject but is absolute in itself. (3) Not the material of value (e.g., the idea of trust) but the valuational character (e.g., the value of trust itself) is objective. (4) A subject is purely receptive in intuiting values. (5) Value offers the same absolute resistance to the will as the real object of perception. (6) Werttauschung is a proof for objectivity of value. All these arguments are ultimately based on his conviction that value is always known a priori and what is known a priori is objectively valid.

For Hartmann, values are objective in the sense that they are originally patterns of an ethically ideal sphere which subsists beyond actuality just as much as consciousness. He misrepresents the Platonic meaning of beholding by substituting an atomistic Wertfühlen for a synoptic *θεωρία*. On his view the realm of values enjoys its objectivity in an isolated way because in the rest of the world there is only rigid mechanism, except for our moral potentialities. His scale of values is abstractly conceived and is incoherent with his total world-view. Here he created many a mystery rather than explaining reasonably our moral experiences in connection with the rest of human experience. What makes his view even more

inconsistent is the fact that he is aware of the meaning and importance of coherence.

Hartmann's discussion of the laws of the Werttafel starts from his intuitive presupposition that the scale of moral values from das Gute and das Edle up to Schenkende Tugend and Persönliche Liebe is a valid scale. He intuitively arranges these values in ascending order of intrinsic importance and then attempts to discover objectively the laws which govern them. Thus he discovers the following laws: (1) Stratification and the foundational relation; (2) oppositional relation and the synthesis of values; (3) the complementary relationship; (4) the grade and the strength of values; (5) valuational indifference.

Here Hartmann's intuition (especially in the second and third laws) becomes substantially identical with coherence.

Hartmann's reasons for atheism are examined. His metaphysical reasons: (1) Hartmann holds that man alone is conscious and can furnish the ontological mode for teleology. However, the facts of experience may be taken coherently to mean that Nature is the will of God in action. (2) Hartmann rejects theism because Scheler's theism is based on the law of correlativity, which is an incoherent account of the correlation between God and world. (3) The idea of God which Hartmann rejects is the illicit universalization of

human personality. However, empirical theology is not derived from such a universalization. (4) Hartmann holds that the conditioning of the individual person by a unit of a higher order does not mean the personal character of the latter. However, not such conditioning but an interpretation of experience as a whole bespeaks a personal God. (5) Hartmann's categorial law states that personality exists only on a basis of subjectivity and that since there is no consciousness except in human personality there is no God as a conscious personality. But such a law begs the question. (6) The absolute person, whom Hartmann contemplates, is the absolute minimum as regards personality. However, God may not be absolute but finite. His moral reasons: (1) According to Hartmann, divine teleology permeates the world, thus violating human freedom. Such teleological determinism, however, is not empirical. (2) The antinomy which Hartmann sees between autonomy and theonomy can be reconciled through love. (3) For Hartmann, the forgiveness of sin, which religion inculcates, is immoral. Forgiveness, however, intensifies the sense of sin. His theological reasons: (1) For Hartmann, religion is otherworldly and therefore immoral. However, God is inferred chiefly from the good in man and in the world, while God's goodness indicates man's immortality. (2) Hartmann rejects a wholly transcendent God because the only kind of person he knows exists

in the world. However, God may be not only transcendent to the world but immanent in it. (3) Hartmann holds that teleology is the peculiarity of man; whether it is found elsewhere, that is unknown. But fact and reason reveal a cosmic teleology. (4) Hartmann sees an antinomy between ethics and religion because he fails to see that religion is a cooperation between God and man.

Conclusions: (1) In presenting the empirical basis for his positive view Hartmann depends on Wertgefühl alone; in the theoretical construction of his system he is partly an advocate of coherence. (2) His grounds for objectivity of value stand on an almost exclusively intuitive basis. (3) He confuses values and ideals; on his view value is never experienced; and what it ideally defines never appears in any actual experience of value. (4) His chief error is in supposing that value experience is merely a Wertgefühl, merely a beholding of eternal ideals. Rather, value experience is the creation of actual values which conform to the rule of the eternal ideal, yet manifest freedom and variety within that rule. (5) He contemplates, not a system of values, but a scale of values, which is abstract, formal, and partially incoherent account of our value experience, yet, even as a scale, involving comparative intuitions that approach coherence. (6) Incoherent theories of God, of our moral life, and of the world prevent Hartmann from con-

ceiving God as a Principle of Coherence. (7) His world-view, with its doctrines of coherence and Wertgefühl, its confusion of ideals and values, its realm of values enjoying objectivity in isolation, and its rejection of the concept of God as a Principle of Unification, reveals internal inconsistency.

COHERENCE IN HARTMANN'S
ETHIK

Abstract of a Dissertation

Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
BOSTON UNIVERSITY GRADUATE SCHOOL

By

DAVID NORIMOTO IINO

Graduate, Aoyama Gakuin (Japan), 1931

Th.B, Auburn Theological Seminary, 1936

Department: Philosophy

Field of Specialization: Philosophy of Religion

Major Instructor: Professor Edgar S. Brightman

1941

The problem of the dissertation is to investigate the use of systematic coherence in Hartmann's system of ethics. The systematic coherence which concerns the present writer not only excludes logical inconsistency but requires two other attributes: first, consistency between ideas and the facts of experience; secondly, systematic and purposive connections in the facts and theories.

Such an investigation involves two major problems. The first problem is that of the relations between Hartmann's ethical convictions based on atomistic intuition (*Wertgefühl*) and those based on coherence, because there is an apparent inconsistency between these two kinds of convictions. The second (and related) problem is that of belief in God, a belief which Hartmann rejects on metaphysical, moral and theological grounds. The dissertation aims to test whether or not Hartmann's reasons for atheism rest on an appeal to coherence.

Hartmann holds that man's spiritual growth is essentially an inner growth of his *Wertgefühl* and that to educate it is the greatest task of ethics. *Wertgefühl* is the only point of contact between man and the ideal realm of values. Every moral rejection or acceptance rests upon it. The presupposition of our commitment to any cause is the *Wertgefühl* of that toward which the commitment is directed. For Hartmann *Wertgefühl* is the empirical basis for his positive view.

He declares that the whole responsibility for the legitimacy and objectivity of the *Wertmassstab* rests upon *Wertgefühl* because even the few features of the valuational gradation which are known to us, can be grasped not by a synoptic survey but by an immediate *Wertgefühl* alone. This assertion when used as a basis for ethical knowledge contradicts his statement that one's *Wertgefühl* is so limited that it cannot always discern the synthesis of moral values, while every value reaches true fulfilment only in its synthesis with all the others, and it also contradicts his statement that synoptic thought, compared with *Wertgefühl*, is more adequate in grasping the entire gradational ladder of moral values, with which morality in the full and genuine sense has to do.

Wertgefühl, Hartmann says, aims at a synthesis of valuational antinomies. In another context, he says that every value, when once it has gained power over a person, tends to dominate his *Wertgefühl* at the expense of all others. By thus referring to two conflicting tendencies in *Wertgefühl* he implicitly demonstrates that it must be guided by a criterion other than intuition itself.

For Hartmann the grounds for the objectivity of value are based on the following considerations: (1) Kant's subjectivistic and functionalistic apriorism is a misunderstanding of the originally objective character of everything knowable a priori. (2) Value is related to a subject but is absolute in itself. (3) Not the material of value (e.g., the idea of trust) but the valuational character (e.g., the value of trust itself) is objective. (4) A subject is purely receptive in intuiting values. (5) Value offers the same absolute resistance to the will as the real object of perception. (6) *Wertt  uschung* is a proof for objectivity of value. All these arguments are ultimately based on his conviction that value is always known a priori and what is known a priori is objectively valid.

For Hartmann, values are objective in the sense that they are originally patterns of an ethically ideal sphere which subsists beyond actuality just as much as consciousness. He misrepresents the Platonic meaning of beholding by substituting an atomistic *Wertfühlen* for a synoptic *Theoria*. On his view the realm of values enjoys its objectivity in an isolated way because in the rest of the world there is only rigid mechanism, except for our moral potentialities. His scale of values is abstractly conceived and is incoherent with his total world-view for the intrusion of value into mechanism violates the purity of both value and mechanism. Here he creates mysteries rather than explaining reasonably our moral experiences in connection with the rest of human experience. What makes his view even more inconsistent is the fact that he is aware of the meaning and importance of coherence.

Hartmann's discussion of the laws of the *Werttafel* starts from his intuitive presupposition that the scale of moral values from *das Gute* and *das Edle* up to *Schenkende Tugend* and *Personliche Liebe* is a valid scale. He intuitively arranges these values in ascending order of intrinsic importance and then attempts to discover objectively the laws which govern them. Thus he discovers the following laws: (1) Stratification and the foundational relation; (2) oppositional relation and the synthesis of values; (3) the complementary relationship; (4) the grade and the strength of values; (5) valuational indifference.

Here Hartmann's intuition (especially in the second and third laws) becomes substantially identical with coherence.

Hartmann's reasons for atheism are examined. *His metaphysical reasons:* (1) Hartmann holds that man alone is conscious and can furnish the ontological mode for teleology. However, the facts of experience may be taken coherently to mean that Nature is the will of God in action. (2) Hartmann rejects theism because Scheler's theism is based on the law of correlativity, which is an incoherent account of the correlation between God and world. (3) The idea of God which Hartmann rejects is the illicit universalization of human personality. However, empirical theology is not derived from such a universalization. (4) Hartmann holds that the conditioning of the individual person by a unit of a higher order does not mean the personal character of the latter. However, not such conditioning but an interpretation of experience as a whole bespeaks a personal God. (5) Hartmann's categorial law states that personality exists only on a basis of subjectivity and that since there is no consciousness except in human personality there is no God as a conscious personality. But such a law begs the question. (6) The absolute person, whom Hartmann contemplates, is the absolute minimum as regards personality. However, God is not absolute but finite. *His moral reasons:* (1) According to Hartmann, divine teleology permeates the world, thus violating human freedom. Such teleological determinism, however, is not empirical. (2) The antimony which Hartmann sees between autonomy and theonomy can be reconciled through love. (3) For Hartmann, the forgiveness of sin, which religion inculcates, is immoral. Forgiveness, however, intensifies the sense of sin. *His theological reasons:* (1) For Hartmann, religion is otherworldly and therefore immoral. However, God is inferred chiefly from the good in man and in the world, while God's goodness indicates man's immortality. (2) Hartmann rejects a wholly transcendent God because the only kind of person he knows exists in

the world. However, God is not only transcendent to the world but immanent in it. (3) Hartmann holds that teleology is the peculiarity of man; whether it is found elsewhere, that is unknown. But fact and reason reveal a cosmic teleology. (4) Hartmann sees an antinomy between ethics and religion because he fails to see that religion is a cooperation between God and man.

Conclusions: (1) In presenting the empirical basis for his positive view Hartmann depends on *Wertgefühl* alone; in the theoretical construction of his system he is partly an advocate of coherence. (2) His grounds for objectivity of value stand on an almost exclusively intuitive basis. (3) He confuses values and ideals; on his view value is never experienced; and what it ideally defines never appears in any actual experience of value. (4) His chief error is in supposing that value experience is merely a *Wertgefühl*, merely a beholding of eternal ideals. Rather, value experience is the creation of actual values which conform to the rule of the eternal ideal, yet manifest freedom and variety within that rule. (5) He contemplates, not a system of values, but a scale of values, which is an abstract, formal, and partially incoherent account of our value experience, yet, even as scale, involving comparative intuitions that approach coherence. (6) Incoherent theories of God, of our moral life, and of the world prevent Hartmann from conceiving God as a Principle of Coherence. (7) His world-view, with its doctrines of coherence and *Wertgefühl*, its confusion of ideals and values, its realm of values enjoying its objectivity in isolation, and its rejection of the concept of God as a Principle of Unification, reveals internal inconsistency.

Additional copies may be obtained on application to

DEAN HOWARD M. LESOURD
Boston University Graduate School
Boston, Massachusetts

AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF CANDIDATE

I, David Norimoto Iino, the eldest son of Kichisaburo Iino and Michi Suzuki, was born in Tokyo, Japan, on February 11, 1910. After attending the Fourth Middle School of Tokyo (1921-1926) and Aoyama Gakuin, Tokyo (1926-1931), in September, 1931, I came to America and studied at Pomona College, Claremont, California (1931-1933). Three years (1933-1936) were spent at Auburn Theological Seminary, Auburn, New York, chiefly under the guidance of Professor John C. Bennett. The winning of the Maxwell Fellowship at Auburn enabled me to study at Boston University, where I continued from 1936 to 1939. These five years Doctor Edgar Sheffield Brightman has been my major instructor.

In October, 1939 I was licensed as a local preacher by the Newton Center (Massachusetts) Methodist Quarterly Conference and left Boston for Walnut Grove, California, where I preached as a student pastor until June, 1940. Since then I have been pastor of the Sonoma County Parish, California, and at the same time have been studying at Pacific School of Religion, Berkeley, California, since August, 1940, again with Professor Bennett.



BOSTON UNIVERSITY



1 1719 02479 6031

